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WHAT INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF SAYS ABOUT
WIVES AND THE REST OF US
STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHONt
Every time spouses sign joint returns, knowingly or not they ac-
cept joint and several liability, meaning that either spouse may be
held liable for all of the tax due on the joint return. Although joint
and several liability facilitates tax collection, it may conflict with a
spouse's claims to have signed the return while being lied to,
abused, or manipulated. The question for Congress is how to bal-
ance these competing demands. Innocent spouse relief provides
some tax relief for spouses Congress does not believe should be
jointly and severally liable. The existence of this relief also offers
an opportunity to explore how the government views married wo-
men, as wives have always composed the lion's share of seekers
and recipients of innocent spouse relief. The relief currently pro-
vided is both over- and under-inclusive by (1) not offering relief to
all spouses or former spouses who are unable to assess the validity
of their returns and (2) offering relief to some who both knew of,
and helped orchestrate, tax evasion. This Article argues that the
existing innocent spouse relief regime should be replaced with one
that respects joint filers' agency when signing joint returns and af-
fords relief only when a joint filer was unable to exercise that
agency. In the event that a spouse is coerced into signing the re-
turn, relief needs to be speedier and less burdensome in application
than under today's law. This approach would increase the equity of
the tax system and reduce the administrative costs on both the tax-
payer and the government.
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INTRODUCTION
A core feature of the U.S. tax system is the decision to view married
couples as a single filing unit for income tax purposes. This decision is ef-
fectuated through the system of joint returns: a single return filed by a mar-
ried couple reporting all income, deductions, and credits due to the spouses
individually or as a unit.' Although this is the dominant approach taken by
tax filing couples,2 an alternative option exists, "married filing separately,"
which allows a spouse to file an individual return reporting only her income,
expenses, and credits. For the 95% of spouses using a joint return, there is
joint and several liability for the taxes due on that return. Thus, either
spouse can be required to pay the tax due regardless of who prepared the
return, who earned the income, or who spent or otherwise benefited from the
income.
Why might this joint and several liability pose a problem? To the extent
that a spouse knowingly files a false return (such as when the couple fails to
list all the income they earned or claims erroneous deductions), it might not
be a problem. However, if a spouse submitted a false return as a result of
abuse or without knowledge of the missing income because the other spouse
hid information, the "innocent" spouse may have an equitable argument that
she should not have to pay the tax due even though there is joint and several
liability for the return.
Consider a simple example: In year one, Jack and Jill, a married couple,
file a joint return. Jack, who has extra income that he has kept secret from
Jill, prepares the return (with or without her participation). They sign and file
the return. In year two, Jack and Jill divorce. In year three, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") audits the year one return and determines that the
couple has underreported income (the income Jack failed to include) and
owes additional tax, interest, and penalties. Because of joint and several lia-
bility, the IRS can pursue either Jack or Jill for the amounts owed. If Jack
cannot be found, the IRS may seek to recover the entire amount from Jill. 4
I I.R.C. § 6013 (2006).
2 Over 95% of couples choose to file jointly, at least in part because the tax brackets
that apply to joint returns are wider than those that apply to spouses who file separately
and because certain credits require joint filing. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS
OF INCoME- 2 01 1, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNs, PUBLICATION 1304, at 37 (2012).
Spouses may not file as "single" taxpayers.
3 I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(b) (as amended in 2002).
4 Legally the IRS does not have to pursue Jack first; however, it is the policy of the
IRS to collect from the more culpable spouse first. See Letter from Grant Newman, Di-
rector, Office of Field Operations (July 6, 1988), quoted in Marjorie O'Connell, Innocent
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Jill, in turn, might argue that such liability is inequitable given her lack of
knowledge of, access to, or benefit from the income.
The tax system has acknowledged this equitable argument and created
"innocent spouse relief' in § 6015 of the Internal Revenue Code that applies
three different facts and circumstances tests described more fully in Part I
below.' The application of § 6015 relief has generated controversy over its
scope.6 Some scholars argue that innocent spouse relief should be broadened
because liability "itself is unfair"' or that the "principal rationale for joint
and several liability-marital unity-is little more than a fiction. . . ," but
the primary argument made is that wives should not be held liable for joint
returns.9 Thus, these critics generally prefer fundamental reform to our filing
system. Rather than revise § 6015, they suggest we abandon joint filing
(with joint and several liability) and move to a system of individual filing in
which each individual files a return reflecting her own income and her own
deductions. Similar to the option of married filing separately, with
mandatory individual filing each spouse is liable only for the taxes due on
her own return.' 0 Given that there is no indication that such a significant
change is likely to occur in the foreseeable future, the analysis of innocent
spouse relief provided in this Article operates on the very realistic assump-
tion that joint filing will continue to operate as the standard approach for
married couples."
This Article agrees that the current system of innocent spouse relief is
flawed; however, it contends that it is both under- and over-inclusive, and
Spouse Rules Can Avoid Unexpected Liability on Joint Returns with Former Spouses, 17
TAX'N FOR LAW. 226, 229 (1989).
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685, 734-40 (1998).
6 See Shari Motro, A New "I Do," 91 IoWA L. REV. 1509, 1532 (2006); Richard
Beck, The Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 928, 932 (2006);
Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261, 261-62 (2004); Amy Christian,
Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 535 (1998). For
students who critique the liability, see Abraham Gutting, Note, The "Price" is Right, 2
CHARLESTON L. REV. 751 (2008); Meghan Kerns, Note, Duress, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1123
(2007); Adrianne Hodgkins, Comment, Getting a Second Chance, 65 LA. L. REV. 1167
(2005); Svetlana Attestatova, Note, The Bonds of Joint Tax Liability Should Not Be
Stronger Than Marriage, 78 WASH L. REV. 831 (2003); Kari Smoker, Comment, IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2045 (1999). One practitioner
recently completed a how-to book for seeking innocent spouse relief. ROBERT B. NAD-
LER, A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE TO INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF (2011).
Beck, supra note 6, at 932.
1 Kahng, supra note 6, at 262.
9 Beck, supra note 6, at 932; Kahng, supra note 6, at 262.
10 Individual filing would remove the perceived bracket penalty imposed on married
filing separately and would allow spouses to claim credits without joint filing.
" Although I have argued elsewhere that we should retain the joint return, accepting
that position is not necessary for accepting the value of the innocent spouse reform pro-
posed in this Article. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does
Love (of Money) Have to Do with Joint Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718 (2011); Stephanie
Hunter McMahon, London Calling: Does the U.K.'s Experience with Individual Taxation
Clash with the U.S.'s Expectations?, 55 ST. Louis U. L.J. 159 (2010).
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thus mere expansion of its scope would not be the appropriate remedy.
Rather, this Article argues that § 6015 should be reformed to provide speed-
ier and less costly relief for a narrower category of spouses who were co-
erced into signing the joint return. 2 Under this proposal, once a requesting
spouse satisfies a relatively low burden of establishing that she was coerced
into signing the return, either by being abused or deceived about the return,
the spouse wins mitigation of the tax burden unless certain extenuating cir-
cumstances discussed in Part III make it equitable for the IRS to collect from
the innocent spouse. In the latter case, the burden of proof falls on the IRS or
the "guilty spouse" to prove it is equitable to collect from an otherwise
innocent spouse.
Why is this reform preferable to both the current system and others'
proposed expansions of innocent spouse relief? Three important reasons, dis-
cussed in more detail in Part II, support a reform of § 6015 that addresses
both its underinclusiveness and its overinclusiveness. First, the current sys-
tem of providing innocent spouse relief is costly and difficult to administer.
Not only is the relief's direct cost in terms of tax revenue high, estimated to
be $1.4 billion in § 6015's first decade, but so is the relief's indirect cost."
For the last decade, in all but one year § 6015 has been one of the IRS's top
ten litigated issues.14 Moreover, we should not forget that at least some
couples work together to use innocent spouse relief against the IRS to reduce
their collective taxes and that some former spouses strategically (or vindic-
tively) use innocent spouse relief to avoid tax and punish their former part-
ner.'5 With the proposal, the IRS can target its efforts on those most likely
12 As used in this Article, coercion is a lesser standard than legal duress, which re-
quires a specific threatening act by the other spouse at the time of the signing of the tax
return. See infra note 26. If a spouse signs a joint return under duress, legally there is no
joint return. See In re Hickley, 256 B.R. 814, 828 (2000); Wiksell v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2360, 2368-89 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 90 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1996).
13 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105th Cong., ESTIMATED BUDGET EF-
FECTS OF THE' CONFERENCE AGREEMENT RELATING To H.R. 2676, JCX-51-98 (1998).
Allowing each spouse to be liable only for her share of liability was estimated to cost
$5.2 billion. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105th Cong., ESTIMATED REVE-
NUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 2676, JCX-42-98 (1998). Because of the limited reporting, it is
unknown how much the provision costs today.
14 1 NATL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, § 3, at 587
(2012), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0xWw5P6upiV; 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE,
2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 414 (2011), archived at http://www.perma.cc/
OxWw5P6upiV; I NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
§ 3, at 403 (2010), archived at http://perma.cc/0Wmcyd9DgGm; I NAT'L TAXPAYER AD-
VOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS § 3, at 455 (2009), archived at http://
perma.cc/OxnZ7r9D7xV; 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS § 3, at 558 (2008), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0zWf9aJGXfs; 1 NATL TAX-
PAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS § 3, at 553 (2007), archived at
http://www.perma.cc/Orgv6gZ6RaQ; 1 NATL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS § 3, at 471 (2006), archived at http://perma.cc/09kz9TN2kp7; 1
NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 496 (2005),
archived at http://perma.cc/08vf7GAu5UV.
" It is impossible to anticipate the extent of this behavior, although the adoption of
the income-splitting joint return in 1948 was largely a response to what Congress per-
144 [Vol. 37
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exploiting innocent spouse relief rather than investigating each relief request
as required under current law.
Second, arguments to broaden the existing package of innocent spouse
relief conceive of the dilemma as one that pits the "innocent," or at least the
less guilty spouse, against the IRS. Framed that way, the innocent spouse
can seem more appealing than the tax collector. However, the more accurate
description is that granting innocent spouse relief shifts tax burdens among
different taxpayers. If in the hypothetical above we decide not to impose any
tax burden on Jill, we have effectively shifted her burden not to Jack, who is
judgment proof because he cannot be located, or to the IRS as a government
agency, but to other taxpayers, both married and single, who did report all of
their income, paid all of their taxes due, and managed their lives on the
income left over. This selective lowering of tax burdens should only be per-
mitted if it accomplishes a just objective.
Third, the current system (including changes implemented by the Trea-
sury Department in January 2012)16 and any expanded version thereof advo-
cated by some scholars would reward spouses who were not coerced but
chose to sign the return as prepared. These spouses often benefit from (1) the
decision to file jointly and receive certain rate schedule and other tax bene-
fits, (2) the marital division of labor they negotiated with their spouse, and
(3) the tax savings from filing the false return or failing to pay the taxes due.
For spouses who were not coerced into signing their returns, failing to recog-
nize these benefits dismisses the choices they made. Embedded in some cur-
rent arguments about innocent spouse relief are visions of spouses',
especially wives', roles that may not reflect the reality of their individual
agency." Moreover, these arguments equate certain divisions of marital du-
ties with presumed incapacity on the part of women as the group most often
requesting innocent spouse relief.
The review of this issue's effect on wives is made difficult because
wives are not a cohesive group, and they do not always share economic
interests with respect to taxes. Anne Alstott has illustrated how feminist the-
ory does not, and cannot, provide a clear agenda for the development of tax
policy.8 A single feminist position on most tax issues is impossible because
of conflicts within the feminist camp. 9 As long as liberal feminists argue for
ceived as inappropriate income shifting. McMahon, To Have and To Hold, supra note 11,
at 723-38.
16 I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309. This notice has been followed by a new
Revenue Procedure implementing most of the changes proposed in 2012. Rev. Proc.
2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397.
1 The gendered implications of joint and several liability and innocent spouse relief
are now more complicated because married same-sex couples can file joint returns. Rev.
Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. This paper does not discuss this added dimension.
* Anne Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996).
' For discussion of race and sexual orientation bias and the tax laws, see generally
Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
787 (1997); Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805
(2008); Anthony C. Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 319
2014] 145
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
measures to increase equality between the sexes and cultural feminists argue
that females and males are simply different, there will be different conclu-
sions on most policy matters.
The form of the debate between protectionist and equality models of
feminism has changed over time; however, the options remain largely the
same.2 0 And despite the debate, society has failed to ease women's vulnera-
bility, especially within the confines of marriage. Theories of inequality de-
veloped by feminists challenge the legal and non-legal forces that reinforce,
either explicitly or implicitly, an economic and power structure that disad-
vantages women.2 1 Thus, even where women are formally equal under the
law, a continuing question for feminist scholars is why women are still dis-
advantaged relative to men.22 Part of that question for scholars must also be
how best to raise the government revenue necessary to help redress that ine-
quality when government action is required. This Article explores these is-
sues and, in doing so, highlights the risks of reinforcing wives' vulnerability.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines existing innocent
spouse relief as part of the larger tax system. Innocent spouse relief must be
evaluated as one of several relief provisions in the Code that allows taxpay-
ers, such as Jill, to avoid paying the taxes they legally owe. Part II analyzes
the administrability concerns of innocent spouse relief, its inter-taxpayer eq-
uity, and whether this relief operates in ways detrimental to the group it was
intended to help: wives. Innocent spouse relief raises important questions of
how the government judges taxpayers; the spouses most often judged are
wives as they have always claimed and received the vast majority of relief.
Part III proposes a more administrable form of relief for spouses who file
joint returns that maintains the strict liability of the income tax and respects
filers' agency when signing joint returns. This revised innocent spouse relief
provides an easier path to relief but only for those spouses who are coerced
into signing a joint return, either through abuse or through deception. The
article concludes that this revised relief is part of a necessary balancing of
individual equity and administrability that should be undertaken for all as-
pects of the income tax if the tax system is to function fairly for all
taxpayers.
(2010); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV.
129 (1998); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal
Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751 (1996).
20 Martha Albertson Fineman, Grappling with Equality: One Feminist Journey, in
TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THE-
ORY 47, 49-50 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011).
21 Feminists have articulated many theories of inequality including liberal, radical,
dominance, difference, and postmodern theories. See generally NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT
R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 15-39 (2006); Martha Albertson Fineman,
Introduction to FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY 1, 2-4 (Martha Albertson Fineman
et al. eds., 2009); Karen J. Maschke, Introduction to FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES Vii, iX-Xi
(Karen J. Maschke ed., 1997).
22 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004).
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I. STANDARD RELIEF FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The taxes due on a joint return are not "his" or "her" taxes but "their"
taxes in the same way that if both spouses sign a mortgage, it is their joint
obligation. 23 This joint liability for joint returns exists even if only one
spouse earns the income reported on the return and even if only one spouse
participates in the preparation of the return. The question then becomes how
the government collects their taxes.24 Under existing law, either spouse may
be pursued for the tax due but not paid on a joint return, whether or not the
income is properly reported.
This Part evaluates current innocent spouse relief as a means of accom-
plishing its congressional objective of selectively mitigating joint and sev-
eral liability. From a review of its legislative history, the provision was
intended to help certain spouses, namely wives, who were thought unfairly
burdened by the joint return. In drafting this relief, however, Congress did
not parse exactly what it meant by an unfair burden. Although case law
demonstrates that many of the spouses Congress intended to relieve of their
taxes are, in fact, relieved, the balancing of factors required for relief has led
to complexities in the provision's application when the unfairness of the bur-
den is less clear. Finally, this Part examines innocent spouse relief as one
part of the statutory safety net that assists taxpayers unable to pay, or un-
justly required to pay, their legally owed taxes. Because innocent spouse
relief is only one form of relief a taxpayer might seek, when evaluating the
provision, we should consider how it operates within the larger system of tax
compliance and tax relief.
A. The Innocent Spouse Law
Until the late 1960s, joint and several liability had been imposed on the
joint return with little, if any, complaint about the lack of relief for joint
filers.25 In the early period of joint filing, the only way to negate joint and
several liability was if a spouse successfully claimed to have signed a return
under duress, which invalidates the joint return. To win a duress claim,
courts require that the victim spouse prove the joint tax return was actually
signed under duress.26 In 1971, Congress responded to claims that the duress
defense was insufficient after several cases held wives liable for taxes on
23 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(b) (as amended in 2002).
^ An alternative regime is transferee liability. See I.R.C. § 6901 (2006). However,
transferee liability prescribes the order of spouses from whom the IRS may collect and
restricts the IRS to collecting in limited circumstances. Id.
25 I.T. 1575, 2-1 C.B. 144 (1923); see also T.D. 1882, 15 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 203
(1913) (indicating that husband and wife may file as a single unit).
26 See In re Hickley, 256 B.R. 814, 828 (2000); Wiksell v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2360, 2368-69 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 90 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1996). For
an article arguing the duress defense needs to be broadened, see Claire 0. Finkelstein,
Duress, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 251 (1995).
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funds their husbands had embezzled, including one in which the husband
embezzled from his wife.27 This new relief was a hardship relief provision
for those spouses in serious financial difficulty; it was not intended to apply
to all joint filers.28 Although innocent spouse relief was somewhat liberal-
ized in 1984,29 the provision continued to operate as narrowly defined relief
until it was greatly expanded to its current form in 1998.30
The 1998 change in innocent spouse relief was enacted as part of a
general restructuring of the IRS, during which Congress required the IRS to
give renewed attention to taxpayers as customers.3 1 Congress expanded
many relief provisions, and late in the process added greater innocent spouse
relief.3 2 The inquiry was no longer whether innocent spouse relief worked for
those spouses suffering economic hardship from their tax obligations but
whether it provided "meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is ap-
propriate."33 Unfortunately, however, Congress did not define exactly when
relief was appropriate. Moreover, Congress did not attempt to fit this provi-
sion within the existing network of tax relief but considered this part of the
Code in isolation. One objective of this Article is to push Congress to define
exactly what it takes to negate the otherwise strict liability for one's taxes.
Congress indicated whom it wanted to help in broad strokes but did not
make important differentiating distinctions. For example, Congress did not
define whether it wanted to help spouses who are truly innocent (which I
interpret as coerced into filing the return), spouses who negotiated bad deals
with their spouses or former spouses over allocating family tasks, or spouses
who are otherwise suffering financial hardship (if the latter, Congress did
not explain why measures available to all taxpayers were insufficient). Com-
mittee reports and many statements made on the congressional floor did
stress that an innocent spouse had no knowledge of his or her spouse's ac-
tions in submitting the false return or failing to pay the taxes due.34
27 Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063.
2 See S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 3 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, at 3 (1971); STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105th Cong., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RE-
LATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF "INNOCENT SPOUSES," JCX-6-98 (1998); Treasury De-
partment Report on Innocent Spouse Relief: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 50 (1998) (statement of Lynda Willis,
Director, Tax Policy and Administration Issues, General Government Division).
29 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 801
(1984).
30 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685, 734-40 (1998); I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (2006).
' H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 252-55 (1998). 144 CONG. REC. 3234 (1998) (statement
of Sen. Grassley).
32 H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 252-55.
3 H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 7-8 (emphasis added). For more of the legislative his-
tory, see Stephanie Hunter McMahon, An Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse Relief, 12
FL. TAX REV. 629, 636-45 (2012). [hereinafter McMahon, Empirical Study].
' See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 56-58 (1997); H.R. REP. 105-599, at 251-55; 144
CONG. REc. 8509 (1998) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer); 144 CONG. REc. 8509
(1998) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); 144 CONG. REc. 14,689 (1998) (statement of
148 [Vol. 37
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Regardless of the unanswered questions, Congress was clearly worried
about wives." "Nine out of 10 innocent spouses are women. Maybe that is
because they are more likely to pay up when confronted by the IRS. Maybe
it is because women sometimes have fewer resources available to defend
themselves. In either case, singling out women for abusive collection effort
is just plain wrong."36 As I have shown in an earlier article, the resulting
tripartite relief provision was cobbled together with the intent of granting
relief from liability to divorced or separated wives who were left crushing
tax burdens by their nefarious husbands.3 7 Congress "referr[ed] to wives
who were deceived before being left" struggling under large tax bills, "often
while caring for the couples' children."" There was no discussion of less
sympathetic cases.39
One reason for Congress's choice not to answer fundamental questions
of innocence is the cost of doing so. It is more costly for the government to
draft rules that provide those answers with the necessary specificity.4 Ex-
isting innocent spouse relief does not assume the cost of securing society's
agreement (or even Congress's) as to when relief should be granted. Instead,
the IRS and the courts examine the facts and circumstances of each request-
ing spouse in order to determine if relief from joint and several liability
should be granted under a holistic review. 41 This ex post relief from taxes
risks inconsistent application and means that spouses cannot know the con-
sequences of their choices until after they have filed their returns, been
found to owe tax, and sought relief.
Section 6015 contains three means of relief that have degenerated into
more or less three separate evaluations of equitable standards, each of which
contains ambiguity. Two subsections provide standards that expressly call
Sen. William Roth); 144 CONG. REC. 14,715 (1998) (statement of Sen. Carol Moseley-
Braun).
* All but one mention of innocent spouse relief in the Congressional Record referred
to wives, most often divorced wives. For example, see 144 CONG. REC. 14,711 (1998)
(statement of Sen. Max Baucus); 144 CONG. REC. 2045 (1998) (statement of Sen. Bob
Graham); 144 CONG. REc. 2043 (1998) (statement of Sen. Al D'Amato); 144 CONG. REC.
8510 (1998) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham); 144 CONG. REC. 7694 (1998) (state-
ment of Sen. Mike DeWine); 144 CONG. REc. 8492 (1998) (statement of Sen. Kent Con-
rad); 144 CONG. REC. 13,968 (1998) (statement of Rep. William Archer). For a rare
reference to husbands as victims, see 144 CONG. REc. 8521 (1998) (statement of Sen.
Olympia Snowe).
36 144 CONG. REC. 1417-18 (1998) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
3 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 636-42.
* Id. at 642.
9 Id. at 636-42
4 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 73 (1983) (explaining that rulemaking incurs costs of gathering information and of
securing agreement among authorities).
1 One critic of innocent spouse relief argues that Congress should adapt a more
refined, equitable standard that provides a "fuller, more textured view of real people's
lives and motivations." Stephen Zorn, Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and Di-
vorce, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 426 (1996). This would increase the law's cost of
creation and application.
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for the evaluation of the equity of granting relief, but the statute does not
define how equity is to be judged.42 That power is delegated to the Treasury
Department, which has included in Treasury Regulations various factors to
be balanced. 43 A third subsection provides relief that is meant to function as
a clear allocation of liability for divorced, widowed, or separated spouses
unless the spouse is proven to have actual knowledge of the tax evasion."
However, this third test is not applied mechanically. Not only do courts con-
sider equitable factors before applying this last form of relief, in 15.4% of
reported cases in which a spouse won under this third test the requesting
spouse was found to have actual knowledge of the tax evasion contrary to
the test's statutory requirement. 45
With this broad statutory power for granting relief, the IRS is charged
with wading through the myriad factors for each of the approximately
55,000 requests submitted each year. 46 Of those seeking relief, it is not ab-
normal for taxpayers to prevail, even in part, less than 30% of the time.47 The
practice of wading through who should and should not be granted relief is a
costly practice for the IRS and, unlike in many areas of the law, the IRS
cannot ignore § 6015 when its resources are limited because this is not an
issue of whether or not the IRS imposes tax but an issue of whether the IRS
must mitigate taxes that are legally owed. The IRS must affirmatively grant
or deny relief to applicants, creating a minimum amount of resources that
must be spent each year.48
In addition to the direct cost in lost revenue, estimated to be in the
hundreds of millions of dollars annually, processing relief requests com-
mands a considerable amount of government resources. 49 Although not all of
the agency's costs are known, innocent spouse relief is one of the top ten
most litigated issues, and there is room for litigation to increase because of
the relatively small percentage of denied claims that currently go to court.50
4 2 I.R.C. § 6015(b), (f) (2006).
43 I.R.C. § 6015(h) (2006). The Treasury Department's guidance includes: Rev. Proc.
2003-61, 2003-32 C.B. 296; Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(d) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-4(c)
(2002); I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309; Notice 2013-32, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397.
4 I.R.C. § 6015(c) (2006).
45 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 675-76.
6 I NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS § 1, at 329
(2006), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0A4XNtmhDf6 [hereinafter NTA, 2005 AN-
NUAL REPORT § 1].
47 Id.
48 See Barton Massey, IRS Receiving Rising Number of Innocent Spouse Relief
Cases, 83 TAX NOTES 1543, 1543 (1999).
49 See sources cited supra note 13.
so See reports cited supra note 14. Some of these cases were frivolous. See McMa-
hon, supra note 33, at 657 (discussing taxpayers filing for innocent spouse relief without
having filed joint tax returns). In collection due process, another relief measure, frivolous
arguments are raised in between 5% and 37% of cases. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 108th Cong., REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 15,
JCX-53-03 (2003), archived at http://perma.cc/07KfjZ6aVpb; Bryan Camp, The Failure
of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 57, 104 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process].
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When taxpayers disagree with a denial of relief by the IRS, they have a right
to pursue relief in courts even if their claim is frivolous.51 Despite its cost,
there is evidence to show that current relief is satisfying some goals. 52 The
question is whether it is meeting the most goals in the most efficient manner.
For the same reason § 6015 is costly, it is unfair in its application. Be-
cause the application of the regulatory factors is so fact intensive, it is hard
to predict a priori who will be granted relief. Some winning spouses fit the
congressional stereotype, but others do not. From court opinions decided
under § 6015, the gender and marital status of successful claimants generally
conformed to Congress's expectations but with significant variations. As
Congress had anticipated, almost 90% of successful spouses were wives and
were separated, divorced, or widowed at the time of trial.53 This is consistent
with congressional expectations. However, unlike congressional expecta-
tions, 25% of requesting spouses were still married when they sought inno-
cent spouse relief. 4 Similarly, Congress depicted the spouses it was helping
as vulnerable, but how this description is applied varies widely. Although
spouses won more often when the court noted that their education level was
high school or less, some highly educated spouses nonetheless won relief as
did some self-employed spouses and some spouses who controlled family
finances and completed the tax returns themselves.
One factor that goes to the heart of whether a spouse was coerced into
filing a joint tax return is whether the spouse was abused. Abuse is currently
recognized in the regulatory factors and since 2012 has been given greater
weight in the balancing of factors; however, the role it plays in securing
relief is unclear. 6 In almost two-thirds of the opinions mentioning abuse,
judges mentioned abuse only to state that it was not alleged in the case."
When abuse was alleged, it did not have a consistent impact on the result of
the case: in "60.71% of the cases in which abuse was alleged, the judge
found that there was no abuse, but in 14.75% of those cases the requesting
Although 71.5% of requests were denied by the IRS, only 1.7% of those not
deemed ineligible on their face were litigated. NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT § 1, supra
note 46, at 329-30.
52 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 705-07.
5 Wives sought relief in 85.4% of cases brought under § 6015 and won 37.4% of
their trials and 21.6% of subsequent appeals. Id. at 662. Husbands, on the other hand,
won 25.4% of their trial cases and 0.0% of their subsequent appeals. Id. As a result of the
disproportionate number of wives bringing suit, wives won 89.5% of total taxpayer victo-
ries. Id.
54 Id. at 663. However, only 14.2% of still married spouses won. Id. at 664.
5 Id. at 666, 670-71. A wife requesting relief when her husband prepared the return
won 52.4% of the time, and a husband requesting relief when his wife prepared the return
won 75% of the time. Id. at 671. However, in 13.3% of cases where both spouses were
found to participate in family finances, a requesting spouse won relief; and in 30% of the
cases where the spouse seeking relief also prepared the return, the requesting spouse won.
Id.
56 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, 298-99. See also I.R.S. Notice 2012-8,
2012-4 I.R.B. 309; Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B 397.
1 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 695.
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spouse was, nevertheless, granted relief."ss In 27.3% of the cases in which
the judge found abuse, no relief was granted.59 Unfortunately for the scholar
and policy analyst, there is insufficient information in the opinions to know
exactly how abuse influenced these decisions.
Another important factor that, under current law, is impossible to fully
examine is when the requesting spouse claims to have been deceived over
the joint return because the issue is hidden in questions of whether the
spouse knew of the tax evasion. Lack of knowledge of the tax deficiency
may or may not equate to deception by the other spouse. Although a claim of
deception should aid a requesting spouse's claim under current law, it does
not have to be alleged and is not specifically asked about on the IRS's form
for requesting relief. Until 2012, deception alone was insufficient to cause
the lack-of-knowledge factor to weigh in favor of relief and recent changes
to the IRS's factors are unlikely to change this result. In several cases,
spouses were even required to exercise greater diligence than requesting in-
formation. In Cheshire v. Commissione-6o and Wiksell v. Commissioner,61
wives noticed either an ineligible deduction or unreported income on the
return and asked about the tax consequences of the mistakes but were
deceived by their husbands' responses. Because they asked about the items,
the wives were held to have actual knowledge of the deficiency and, ulti-
mately, denied relief.
As an illustration of inconsistencies in the application of the § 6015
factors for relief, courts have struggled to determine whether the requesting
spouse significantly benefited from the tax evasion. Judges have not agreed
on what it means to create a significant benefit. The example provided in the
Regulations is of a spouse receiving life insurance proceeds beyond normal
support that is traceable to items omitted from income. 62 In the two cases
involving life insurance, one found there was a significant benefit and the
other did not.63 Similarly, improving cash flow, even if the money was rein-
vested in the tax shelter generating the cash flow, is sometimes, but not
always, a significant benefit to both spouses." Finally, paying for one's chil-
dren's college can be, but is not always, a significant benefit to both.65
Thus, the application of the rules is hard to assess definitively. Some
relief is granted to those Congress intended but at times the provision is both
under- and over-inclusive. As a result of Congress's overall poor job of ex-
plicating what it meant by an innocent spouse, some spouses winning relief
58 Id.
59 Id.
282 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2002).
61 90 F.3d 1459, 1462-63 (9th Cir. 1996).
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(d) (2002).
63 Bozick v. Comm'r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1244; George v. Conun'r, 86 T.C.M.
(RIA) 1 2004-261.
6 4 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 681.65 Id.
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are clearly not consistent with the stereotype portrayed by Congress when it
expanded relief in 1998. Relief has been granted to those whom Congress
would likely not have labeled as "innocent" in 1998 and denied to some
who would almost certainly be innocent under the congressional analysis.
Recent changes to how the Treasury Department applies the law have
not made the application of the law clearer or more consistent with its legis-
lative history. Although the IRS considered questions not answered with its
regulatory factors "relatively infrequent situations," 66 in January 2012, the
IRS announced it was making it easier to qualify for relief.67 The new guide-
lines, interpreted again in 2013, contain additional ambiguities, but the IRS
showed a new willingness, consistent with this Article's proposal, to make
abuse or lack of financial control outweigh other factors.68 However, the IRS
has not gone far enough in reforming the system.69 Moreover, the burden
imposed by this provision is likely to grow with the broadening of the equi-
table factors. New, streamlined procedures available to some requesting
spouses are likely to allow the IRS to perform a less intensive balancing, but
some balancing of factors is still required by the statute.7 0 It will require an
act of Congress to get us out of this burdensome balancing test.
Although it is the Treasury Department and the courts that struggle to
apply these facts-and-circumstances tests, as discussed in Part II it is other
taxpayers who bear the cost of this relief. With the available information it is
impossible to know exactly how much revenue is at stake in innocent spouse
cases. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that for
fiscal year 2004, 6,555 requesting spouses were granted relief in the amount
of $117.6 million and 10,439 were denied relief of $260.8 million.71 These
numbers are not insignificant.
I Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 17 (1998) (state-
ment of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of
Treasury).
67 I.R.S. Notice 2011-70 removed the two-year statute of limitations imposed on
§ 6015(f) applications. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 C.B. 296, § 4.01(3). I.R.S. Notice
2012-8 liberalized many of the factors, which were further liberalized in Rev. Proc. 2013-
34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397.
68 I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, § 4.03(2)(c)(i); Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
2013-43 I.R.B. 397, § 4.03(2)(c)(i)(A) and (ii).
69 The revised factors are to be considered in their totality and whether relief is to be
granted remains a facts and circumstances test. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397,
§ 4.03(2). This increases, not decreases, uncertainty regarding the evaluation of often-
murky facts because relief may be granted or denied despite the number of factors weigh-
ing for or against relief.
0 Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, § 4.02.
1 TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., Ref. No. 2005-40-075, TiE INNOCENT
SPOUSE REVIEW FUNCTION ENSURED ACCURATE RELIEF DETERMINATIONS, BUT IMPROVE-
MENTS COULD INCREASE CUSTOMER SERVICE, at 7-8 (2005) [hereinafter TIGTA, INNO-
CENT SPOUSE REVIEW].
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B. As Part of a Relief System
What happens to those who are not granted innocent spouse relief?
First, there are other statutory relief provisions available to all taxpayers,
most relief being available if a requesting taxpayer is suffering economic
hardship. Second, even if the requesting spouse is not granted mitigation
from the government, the spouse can request contribution from the non-tax-
paying spouse. Thus, the 71.5% of requesting spouses (only 0.0007% of
joint filers) who fail to win innocent spouse relief may still not have to pay
the taxes they legally owe.72 These relief measures exist outside of innocent
spouse relief and provide the backdrop against which we must measure the
innocent spouse system. However, there is no assurance that these tax provi-
sions will mitigate every requesting spouse's tax liabilities."
Congress has created relief measures available to all taxpayers who are
unable to pay, or are determined that they should not pay, the taxes they
owe. These other relief provisions are not contingent upon the type of return
that is filed. The IRS currently administers this relief according to criteria
established by Congress and the Treasury Department. Some of this relief is
need-based and some is not.74 Because these other provisions are broadly
applicable, use of these provisions does not carry the same gendered
problems as does innocent spouse relief, as discussed in the next Part, and
any taxpayer who satisfies the requirements of these provisions may be re-
lieved of liability.
First, taxpayers who are experiencing economic hardship and cannot
pay their taxes have collection alternatives available." We as a society may
or may not think these alternatives are sufficient or that the measures may
have a disparate impact on vulnerable taxpayers, but that is a matter for
another article. This relief from tax collection is limited to those taxpayers
Congress deems most burdened. For example, tax levies can be released if
the levies are shown to produce an economic hardship for the taxpayer.76
Similarly, the National Taxpayer Advocate, an independent office within the
IRS tasked with assisting taxpayers, can issue taxpayer assistance orders if it
concludes that the taxpayer has suffered or is about to suffer a significant
hardship due to collection and if certain other requirements are met." In
72 NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT § 1, supra note 46, at 329; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERv., SOI TAX STATS-INDIVIDUAL STATISTICAL TABLES BY FILING STATUS, TAX YEAR
2005, Table 1.3, archived at http://perma.cc/0ihhDE4QAtX.
7 There is insufficient research on the gendered impact of other relief measures to
evaluate them from a gendered perspective. This Article is a first step in evaluating tax-
payer relief in this manner.
74 For a discussion of IRS relief, see Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses?,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (2012); Camp, Failure ofAdversarial Process, supra note 50;
Steven R. Mather & Paul H. Weisman, "Federal Tax Collection Procedure - Defensive
Mechanisms," 638 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income (2005).
* See Oei, supra note 74; Mather & Weisman, supra note 74.
6 I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) (1995).77 I.R.C. § 7811 (2006).
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response to the latter, the IRS must release a levy on the taxpayer's property
or cease or refrain from taking collection or other actions."8
Additionally, relief is not limited to preventing collection but may
come earlier in the audit process. During negotiations with the IRS over
payment of tax liabilities, if certain requirements are met taxpayers have
three alternatives: installment agreements, 79 in which a taxpayer pays the full
amount of the liability including interest but pays these amounts over time;
offer-in-compromise, 0 in which the taxpayer and the IRS agree to a payment
of a percentage of the liability and interest; and designation of the liability as
"currently not collectible," in which the liability remains on the books but
there is no attempt made to collect from the taxpayer." Taxpayers can have
multiple bites at these apples. For example, in 2005, 40% of taxpayer offer-
in-compromise submissions were repeat submissions.8 2 Moreover, the
amount of taxes relieved is significant. With offers-in-compromise, for ex-
ample, amounts written off ranged from $2.15 billion in 2000 to $1.13 bil-
lion in 2004.83
Not all of these relief measures provide absolute relief. If the IRS deter-
mines that a tax liability cannot be collected, the IRS may report the account
as "currently not collectible"4; however, the IRS reserves the right to renew
collection efforts should the taxpayer experience a windfall, such as winning
the lottery.15 On the other hand, the offer-in-compromise procedures release
the taxpayer from the obligation by allowing the taxpayer to settle unpaid
tax debts for some lesser amount after an assessment has been completed. 6
The compromise is granted if the claim falls within one of three categories:
(1) doubt as to collectability; (2) doubt as to liability; or (3) the promotion of
effective tax administration.8 7 Although doubt as to collectability requires
economic hardship, for either doubt as to liability and the promotion of ef-
fective tax administration, the taxes need not create an economic hardship
78 I.R.C. § 7811(b) (2006).
7 I.R.C. § 6159 (2006).
80 I.R.C. § 7122 (2006).
81 I.R.C. § 6404(c) (2006); Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 50, at
65.
82 U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-525, IRS OFFERS IN COMPROMISE:
PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MIXED; BETTER MANAGEMENT AND SIMPLIFICATION COULD
IMPROVE THE PROGRAM, 13 Fig. 2 (2006), archived at http://www.perma.cc/
OKmmZxFjZP5 [hereinafter GAO-06-525]. See also note 89.
* GAO-06-525, supra note 82, at 12.
8 I.R.S. Policy Statement 5-71, IRM 1.2.14.1.14 (Nov. 11, 1980) ; I.R.C.
§ 6343(a)(1)(D) (2006).
8 I.R.S., IRM 5.16.1.6 (May 22, 2012), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0b4L9u7
e32j.
86 I.R.C. § 7122 (2006). For a discussion of offer-in-compromise, see Shu-Yi Oei,
Getting More By Asking Less, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (2012).
8 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b) (2002); GAO-06-525, supra note 82; Information on
Selected IRS Tax Enforcement and Collection Efforts: Testimony Before the Comm. on
Finance, U.S. Senate (2001 (statement of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues) [herein-
after Brostek statement].
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for the taxpayer."8 Similar to the procedure in cases of innocent spouse relief,
the IRS is required to consider the facts and circumstances of each case and
independently review all rejections of relief. 9
As a final backstop to these relief provisions, Congress has imposed a
statute of limitations for collecting the taxes that a taxpayer legally owes.
This statute of limitations ensures that the IRS cannot collect from taxpayers
on a liability that is more than ten years old.90 Although the period may be
extended in limited circumstances or with the agreement of the taxpayer, it
generally operates as a deadline after which taxpayers are released from their
tax obligations.9'
Even if a spouse does not satisfy the requirements of the statutory relief
provisions, if the IRS collects a couple's taxes from one spouse, that spouse
has the right to demand at least a partial payment from the other spouse. The
state law right of contribution generally allows the apportionment of liability
when one tortfeasor pays more than her appropriate share of liability.92
Whether a state court judge would apportion the tax liability according to
spouses' relative responsibility for earning the income or committing the tax
evasion depends on state law.93 Thus, through the right of contribution, the
paying spouse explains to a state judge that the nonpaying spouse is the one
who earned or enjoyed the income and, therefore, should pay some portion
of the taxes owed. If the state judge agrees, the nonpaying spouse is required
to pay the paying spouse whatever portion of the taxes the judge thinks is
fair to reallocate. Although there are problems with the right of contribution,
taxpayers have won most of the decided cases in which they sought contri-
bution for taxes paid.94
88 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (2002).
89 Brostek statement, supra note 87, at 8-9. In some circumstances, spouses may seek
an offer-in-compromise and, if it is denied, request innocent spouse relief, requiring a
second analysis of much of the same information by a different department within the
IRS.
I I.R.C. § 6502(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.6502-1(a) (2006). This is in addition to
the three-year statute of assessment for the IRS to complete the assessment process.
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2006).
91 I.R.C. § 6501(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-i (as amended in 2000).
9 2 See Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 194 (1955). For a
discussion of contribution, see Richard Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Re-
sponsible Causes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1141, 1182-85 (1988). In addition, I.R.C.§ 66(c) may provide relief for community income if married persons did not file joint
returns. See also IRS, Pub. 971 (I.R.S.), 2008 WL 1704156.
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2013).
9 See Murchison v. Murchison, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963);
Bormaster v. Bormaster, 274 P.2d 757, 760 (Kan. 1954); In re Cooper, 83 B.R. 544, 547(1988); Estate of McClure v. United States, 288 F.2d 190, 192 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Richter v.
Henningsan, 42 P. 1077, 1077 (Cal. 1895); Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859, 860-62
(Wash. 1960); Strange v. Rubin, 456 S.W.2d 416, 416-19 (Tex. App. 1970); Miller v.
Miller, 310 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20-21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); Rocha v. Rocha, 297 P.2d 505, 507
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956). But see Gillman v. O'Connell, 574 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (concluding no right of contribution existed because spouse requesting contri-
bution created the liablity); Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So.2d 281, 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971) (disallowing setoff against alimony for payments of joint tax liability); McDermitt
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A legitimate complaint about this form of relief, although arguably true
of all legal creations, is that the right of contribution is imperfect in its oper-
ation. Several problems may motivate paying spouses not to exercise their
right even if it is appropriate to do so. Use of the court system means incur-
ring legal fees that may or may not be assigned to the nonpaying spouse,
state court judges may be relatively ignorant of federal tax law and taxpayers
may fear judicial mistakes, and some nonpaying spouses may be judgment
proof.95 These and other factors make the right of contribution less than a
perfect solution for some spouses.
However, contribution places the cost of equalizing the tax burden be-
tween spouses or former spouses on the people signing the incorrect return
or failing to pay the taxes due. Through this process, the cost of allocating
the liability between spouses is not indirectly placed on other taxpayers as it
would be by absolving the less culpable spouse of liability. For spouses who
are not coerced into filing joint returns, they are in the best position to pre-
vent the tax evasion in the first place and should bear its cost.
Within this framework of possible relief, not all spouses who sign joint
returns will be, or are intended to be, relieved of the taxes that they legally
owe. A relatively more innocent spouse who does not suffer economic hard-
ship or meet the requirements of the other relief provisions will still owe
100% of the taxes due on the joint return if the other spouse is judgment
proof, and so the right of contribution cannot be exercised. The reason this is
a just result is that the spouse is only relatively more innocent as discussed
in the next Part. Vis-A-vis other taxpayers and the government, the relatively
more innocent spouse should pay the taxes on the return unless the spouse
qualifies for the relief provided in Part III that absolves taxpayers who were
not culpable in the joint filing.
II. THE GROUNDS ON WHICH TO JUDGE
Unlike most laws that are underpinned by a belief in a fundamentally
just world, innocent spouse relief is based on the desire to create such a
world. However, innocent spouse relief's contribution to this endeavor is
contingent upon how one frames the issue. One way to look at innocent
spouse relief focuses on which spouse is most culpable for a particular bit of
tax evasion on a joint return. Alternatively, one can look at the joint return as
part of the larger tax system. With the latter perspective, the critical question
v. United States, 67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-324 (S. D. Ohio 1991) (disallowing contribution be-
cause spouse requesting contribution was responsible for the penalty); Gooden v. Wright,
No. 14823, 1991 WL 57230 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991) (finding separation agreement
assigned liability to spouse requesting contribution). For complaints about contribution,
see Kahng, supra note 6, at 264; Christian, supra note 6, at 588. Richard Beck proposes a
bad loss deduction if the right of contribution does not result in payment. See Richard
Beck, The Deductibility of a Worthless Right to Contribution for Joint Income Taxes, 9
VA. TAx. REv. 313 (1989).
9 Christian, supra note 6, at 588-89.
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is not the relative interests of husbands versus wives or the government ver-
sus spouses requesting relief. Rather, the interests that must be balanced are
those of different taxpayers and recipients of government services when
some taxpayers pay their legally owed taxes and others do not. If the govern-
ment is to raise revenue to fund social policies with a progressive income
tax,96 that one gender may be the one most often requesting innocent spouse
relief from that tax should not protect the relief from critical review in the
quest for an improved world.
Interests conflict because innocent spouse relief selectively absolves re-
questing spouses from the strict liability on their joint returns that is nor-
mally imposed on taxpayers." As discussed in the Introduction, this Article
does not debate whether spouses should file jointly (as opposed to married
filing separately) or whether the United States should adopt individual filing.
Instead, this Part assumes, consistent with the current political and economic
environment, that joint returns will be retained and focuses on how we
should evaluate the joint and several liability imposed on those returns.
This Part analyzes the consequences of innocent spouse relief from
joint and several liability in the quest to make the world more just. First, it
examines innocent spouse relief's impact on the administrability of the fed-
eral income tax. Only with an administrable tax can the government raise
sufficient revenue to fund its operations. Second, this Part analyzes the eq-
uity of granting innocent spouse relief. Equity must be separately judged
both as between spouses and as between taxpayers. When one spouse is
relieved of liability under innocent spouse relief, as opposed to the other
forms of relief, the other spouse becomes solely liable, possibly shifting the
burden inequitably from one to the other. If the other spouse cannot or will
not pay, the couple's effective tax rate is also lowered relative to comparable
taxpayers. Finally, this Part looks specifically at innocent spouse relief's im-
pact on wives as they are the spouses Congress intended to request, and win,
most innocent spouse relief.98 To the extent there are consequences, albeit
unintended that disadvantage wives, the innocent spouse regime is not ac-
complishing its objective.
A. Administrability of the Tax System
The tax system does not operate on paper alone. Taxpayers must com-
ply with the law when filing their returns and the IRS must enforce it. There-
fore, the income tax should be judged, at least in part, based on its
adminstrability. 99 The National Taxpayer Advocate has complained regard-
96 Maorie Kornhauser, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the Progressive In-
come Tax, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 153 (1997).
9 I.R.C. § 6151 (2006).
98 See supra note 35.
9 Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567,
568, 572-74 (1965); Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695,
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ing the system's administrability that "tax code complexity [is] the most
serious problem facing taxpayers and the IRS alike."'" Any rules or regula-
tions that add to the law's complexity also increase the administrative burden
on taxpayers and the government, and they need to be evaluated in this con-
text. Expansive innocent spouse relief, a complex determination as discussed
above, removes a central tenet of the federal income tax system, the strict
liability for the taxes a person owes. Thus, current relief makes it harder to
collect the taxes owed and increases the cost of administering the tax system.
The numbers of taxpayers and the amount of revenue involved in the
federal income tax system require an honest assessment of the workability of
any proposed changes to the tax collection process. In 2012, the IRS
processed over 237 million tax returns, of which approximately 53 million
are likely to be joint returns, and 2.2 billion information returns (such as W-
2s and 1099s).01 Most returns were accepted as filed, although the IRS was
left collecting the taxes owed on over eleven million returns.102
Collection is made easier by imposing strict liability on taxpayers.103
As a result of strict liability, the IRS does not have to prove taxpayers were
negligent with respect to their failure to pay taxes or to accurately file a
return, unless the IRS seeks to collect penalties.'1 Movements away from
that liability, such as innocent spouse relief, increase the complexity and cost
of the tax system because they provide opportunities for taxpayers to contest
the liability based on some factor other than the law. 0 To be clear, innocent
spouse relief, and most other forms of relief, does not involve a question
whether the liability exists, only whether the contesting spouse should have
to pay it.
Although the IRS has powers that other creditors do not possess, tax-
payers are not without due process of law when the IRS determines that they
owe taxes. If the IRS disagrees with the return a taxpayer files, the IRS
assesses all taxes owed through a process within which the taxpayer may
709-10, 742 (2007); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV.
1, 1 (2006); Steven B. Johnson, Administrability-Based Tax Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J.
573, 583 (2004).
0 1 NATI'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, § 1, at 4
(2012), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0fhvxe2mJ42.
I0 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2012 PUBLICATION 55B, at 4, 37
(2013). 2012 data is not yet available for the number of joint returns, but 2011 saw more
than 53 million joint returns. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra
note 2, at 37 (2012).
102 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, supra note 101, at 41.
"
3 I.R.C. § 6151 (2006).
I.R.C. § 6662 (2006).
105 That there are spouses to whom Congress desires to grant relief does not mean
that joint and several liability is bad. It simply means that there are some spouses who do
not have the requisite agency over their tax filing document. Moreover, the fact that some
spouses win § 6015 relief does not mean that joint and several liability is to blame for
creating an unfair tax obligation. Instead, it is an indication that the system works to
mitigate the liability of those whom Congress does not want to hold liable for their joint
returns.
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participate and from which the taxpayer may appeal. 06 The IRS generally
has three years to complete this assessment.0
An assessment of tax liability permits the IRS to pursue three avenues
for collecting the taxes owed: (1) to issue a tax lien, (2) to levy taxpayer
property, and (3) to offset refunds or other amounts received from the gov-
ernment. 0 Each collection method has requirements aimed to protect tax-
payer rights. For example, tax liens arise automatically; however, in order
for the IRS's lien to be perfected, and take priority over competing creditors
to the extent that it can, the IRS must file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.5 9
Thus, a lien attaches by operation of law to all property but has limited value
without further action as to specific property. Moreover, the Code requires
the IRS give the taxpayer notice of its intent to use its levy power to seize
property and certain types of property are exempted from the IRS's power to
levy." 0 Except in limited circumstances, the IRS must complete its collec-
tion within ten years or the authority to pursue these avenues lapses."'
Much of the collection process is automated, largely for reasons of
cost."2 A computer performs the audit and makes all contact with the tax-
payer for two or three years before an IRS employee enters the process."'
The queue for field operators is so long that, in 2005, 788,083 delinquent
accounts were removed from the queue without payment and without human
contact.114
The review of the facts and circumstances necessary for the mitigation
of taxes cannot currently be made through an automated process. From a
specially created Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operation, IRS
agents rule on each innocent spouse relief request."' Unlike in the auditing
process, in which the IRS can assume taxpayers are compliant if it does not
want to invest the resources to question their liability, the structure of the
law requires the IRS perform the balancing of equity or the allocation of
liability for each request. This system generally operates well, with the In-
'- I.R.C. § 6201 (2006). For a discussion of the process of collection and collection
due process, see Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 50.
107 I.R.C. § 6501 (2006).
108 I.R.C. §§ 6212, 6321, 6331, 6402 (2006). See also United States v. Munsey Trust,
332 U.S. 234, 239 (1947); Field Serv. Adv. No. 200213012 (Mar. 20, 2002).
' I.R.C. § 6323 (2006). Without perfection, tax liens take precedence over all credi-
tors but for purchasers for value, mechanic's lienors, holders of security interests, and
judgment lien creditor.
10 l.R.C. § 6331(d) (2006).
" I.R.C. § 6502 (2006).
112 Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 50, at 68. One may question
how well flexibility works in an automated system.
113 Id.
114 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. No. 2006-30-055, TRENDS
IN COMPLIANCE THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 26 (2006), archived at http://perma.cc/
Oa2hDpNSFMX.
" I.R.S., IRM § 25.15.8.2 (2010).
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spector General of Tax Administration finding that the IRS properly resolved
94% of the cases it reviewed, but it is a drain on the resources of the IRS." 6
When the IRS collects from a spouse as a result of joint and several
liability, the spouse is not being held liable for the other spouse's actions or
for greater damages than she caused. Instead, this system of liability results
in one spouse being held liable for the damages that she caused by filing an
inaccurate return. Critics who prefer to split the liability fifty/fifty between
spouses, or according to some other proportionate regime, focus on the crea-
tion of the income and not its report to the government. The result, however,
is that critics are effectively stating that one spouse is 50% negligent or 50%
responsible for the return. However, neither spouse's actions in signing an
inaccurate return caused the government to miss out on 50% of the revenue
owed. Rather, each spouse was 100% negligent with respect to the return
and each spouse is therefore fully responsible for the entire tax obligation
the return triggers."' A spouse's full responsibility for an injury to other
taxpayers that was an actual and proximate result of her submitting an inac-
curate return does not become partial or minimal because the other spouse's
behavior seems worse.
If one spouse pays the taxes owed on a joint return and is unable to seek
contribution from the other spouse because of the insolvency or unavailabil-
ity of the other spouse, an unfair result has occurred. However, the govern-
ment is not a part of and is not responsible for that unfairness. The
unfairness results from the taxpaying spouse's unfulfilled equitable claim
against the judgment-proof spouse. That claim is secondary to the govern-
ment's claim against each spouse. Limiting the collection of the taxes legally
owed from the less guilty spouse unjustifiably shifts the unavailable spouse's
immunity (for example, his bankruptcy) to the available spouse, who has no
such immunity.
This immunity was estimated to cost $1.4 billion in its first decade and
led to substantial IRS litigation."' Despite the high cost, those seeking inno-
cent spouse relief are a small subset of all taxpayers. With more than 53
million joint tax returns filed annually, the possible group seeking relief is
much larger than those filing approximately 55,000 applications annually
"6 TIGTA, INNOCENT SPOUSE REVIEW, supra note 71, at 5-6. See also id., at 4.
'" This is the case even if a spouse does not know that the return is inaccurate.
Currently there is no good faith or mistake-of-law or mistake-of-fact exception to tax
filing. Although people debate joint and several liability in a comparative responsibility
regime, most agree that joint and several liability should be retained for defendants acting
in concert. See U.S. A-rr'y GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT
POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 33 n.29, 64-65
(1986) (recommending the elimination of joint and several liability in comparative re-
sponsibility context but not when defendants act in concert).
"' See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105th Cong., ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT RELATING To H.R. 2676, JCX-51-98 (1998);
Reports cited supra notes 13-14.
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today.'19 Few joint filers are audited and, of those, fewer are assessed a lia-
bility, and even fewer contest the liability. Expanding relief risks opening
the floodgates even as the IRS awaits potential budgetary cuts.12 0
Innocent spouse relief's more flexible approach to tax collection may
well reflect postmodern life, where liability for taxes may actually be a mat-
ter for negotiation. If true, we are atop a slippery slope of individualized tax
relief. A difficulty with this approach is that the tax system is complicated,
and many people rely on accountants or software to prepare their returns. 2'
Allowing spouses, or any taxpayer, to limit responsibility for their legally-
valid returns on the basis that they did not know or understand what was on
the return calls into question holding anyone strictly accountable for their
returns, particularly those returns completed by tax return preparers.'22 Fur-
thermore, if innocent spouse relief increases awareness that tax relief is se-
lectively available, it might increase other taxpayer groups' demands for
additional relief or, worse, their tax evasion if relief is not granted.'23
Thus, not only are the direct effects of policies at issue but also the
public's perception of those policies. 2 4 Attempts to assess individual equity
in the application of the federal income tax risk undermining the efficient
operation of the tax system for the public as a whole. This risk, in turn, may
upset the critical balance between administrability and equity that underpins
our tax regime. Instead of favoring one good over the other, relief from
legally owed taxes should protect the balance of the system by providing
relief in ways that are reasonably administrable.
B. Equity as Between Taxpayers
It is not enough for a tax system to be administrable; it must also be
equitable. With respect to joint and several liability for joint returns, we must
measure equity both as between spouses and as between taxpayers. Success-
ful requesting spouses win mitigation of their taxes vis-A-vis their spouses
and other taxpayers who report their income, pay their taxes, and live off
"9 See NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT § 1, supra note 46, at 329; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 2, at 37.
120 Howard Gleckman, House GOP's Solution for Short-Staffed, Poorly Trained IRS:
Slash Its Budget 24%, FORBES, July 11, 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/03fUWw6
famK.
121 U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-297, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MANY
TAXPAYERS RELY ON TAX SOFrWARE AND IRS NEEDS To ASSESS ASSOCIATED RISKS
(2009), archived at http://perma.cc/0Q2KPzUTgrv.
122 Return preparers are liable for penalties for negligent disregard of rules and regu-
lations. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2006).
'23 For a good review of material, see generally Ingrid Wahl, Barbara Kastlunger &
Erich Kirchler, Trust in Authorities to Enforce Tax Compliance, 32 L. & POLY 383
(2010); Marjorie Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance, 8 FLA. TAX REV.
599 (2007).
124 Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 350-51 (1997).
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their remaining income. Thus, innocent spouse relief from that liability is not
pitting the requesting spouse against the government, as some black box or
blank check, but against other people. That the majority of those winning
relief are women does not make it any less necessary to recognize this poten-
tial injustice. Considering relief in this light, for spouses who were not co-
erced into signing joint returns, the selective lowering of their tax burdens
produces inequitable results.
First, looking at the equity as between spouses: for a variety of reasons,
and a significant one is a reduced tax burden compared to being married but
filing separately, joint filers choose to file their tax returns as marital units.'25
Although this Article does not rehash arguments regarding the equity of the
joint return, the Treasury Department's initial justification for the imposition
of joint and several liability was that a joint return was a single filing by a
couple and not two individual returns on one sheet of paper.126 To the extent
that the joint return amalgamates both spouses' incomes, the liability reflects
the singularity of the return.
Although studies show that most couples pool some amount of their
earnings either by choice or because they have no other option, joint filing,
and with it joint and several liability, does not mean, or theoretically require,
that spouses pool their income.'27 Instead, joint filing simply accepts that
ownership as between spouses is ambiguous. In other words, it is a sufficient
justification for the joint and several liability on joint returns to find that
within most marriages (if not within most relationships) people who earn
income are not always the only ones who feel as though they "own" or "co-
own" the income in something other than a strictly legal sense.128 When a
couple files a single return containing both spouses' incomes, the spouses
forgo the burden of defining who owns what within the marriage. Innocent
spouse relief, on the other hand, requires that the IRS or the courts determine
who "owns" income and should owe tax on that income. That the answers to
these questions are often ambiguous as between spouses does not negate the
fact that answers must be concluded and that real world economic conse-
quences flow from that determination.
125 See supra note 2.
126 See supra note 25.
12 PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 96 (1983); JANET
STOCKS ET AL., MODERN COUPLES SHARING MONEY, SHARING LIFE 49 (2007) (noting
that, in Sweden, where economic independence and gender equality are explicit public
policy goals, pooling is still overwhelmingly the practice for established couples); Judith
Treas, Money in the Bank, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 723, 729 (1993); Lawrence Zelenak, Mar-
riage and the Income Tax, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 348-54 (1994). See also JAN PAHL,
MONEY AND MARRIAGE (1989); Shelly Lundberg, Robert Pollak & Terence Walles, Do
Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources?, 32 J. Hum. RESOURCES 463 (1997). But see
BARBARA BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 211-12 (1986); VIVIANNA
ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 3-65 (1994); Marjorie Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 80-91 (1993).
128 But see Dennis J. Ventry, Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis
of Family Taxation, 86 IND. L.J. 1459 (2010).
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To dismiss this understanding that ownership might be messy risks
making the exceptional couple the rule. Focusing the tax on the couple for
whom ownership of property is clear and divisible does not mean that the
average couple will be better served. Instead, the couple that shares re-
sources or delegates tasks will no longer be recognized as doing so. Their
real situations will be dismissed in order to give deference to those couples
who keep financial matters separate and either do not perceive themselves as
an economic unit or do so in order to game the tax system.
Consider Edith and Frank. Frank works at home caring for the children
and Edith works many odd jobs throughout the year to earn the couple's
income. When preparing their tax return, the couple fails to notice they did
not receive a W-2 from one of Edith's employers, and the accountant fails to
properly report the income. At some point the couple divorces. In the di-
vorce, each is given one-half of any amount saved from Edith's wages. If the
joint return is ever audited and if Frank did not have reason to know of the
omission of the income on the couple's joint return (for example if he could
reasonably fail to keep track of the number of her employers), Frank can
claim innocent spouse relief, keep the savings, and Edith will owe all of the
tax due.
In this example, we may not blame this couple for tax evasion, but they
nevertheless failed to pay the taxes that were owed. Holding Edith liable for
all of the taxes, even amounts she spends with and even on Frank or trans-
fers to Frank in the divorce, seems inequitable. 129 However, that is the likely
result under the innocent spouse rules. Extending innocent spouse relief fur-
ther than it exists today as some advocates propose, for example by requiring
liability based on who earns the income, would guarantee the shifting of the
tax burden from Frank to Edith. Even if the couple shared all the family's
earnings and made all financial decisions together, the fact that Edith earned
the income would require the government to shift the entire tax burden to
her.13 0 This is not unexpected based on the operation of innocent spouse re-
lief; one spouse is more often granted relief while the other remains liable
for the entire tax.'13
However, inequitable divisions of resources and burdens do plague
many marriages. 3 2 Couples do not always view themselves as equal, even if
129 This also illustrates how individual filing clashes with the idea of not taxing
household labor because the value of the wage earnings is effectively being shifted to the
non-wage earning spouse without being taxed as such.
30 If the couple lived in a community property state, 50% of the earnings would
legally belong to Frank from the time they were earned. Still, if he did not have reason to
know of the omission, Edith would be responsible for 100% of the taxes owed. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6015-1(f)(1) (2002).
' In the context of divorce, there is no notion of unclean hands in the granting of
relief. I.R.C. § 6015(c) (2006). A study of innocent spouse relief showed that only 4 of
444 cases involved both spouses seeking relief. McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note
33, at 662.
132 If one spouse has disproportionate control over the other spouse's earnings, a tax
system that operates on spouses as individuals is unlikely to change that power dynamic.
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they pool some amount of income, which raises questions as to how the
income tax system should treat these spouses.'33 Spouses are acting as
though their income is joint property, that ownership is in some sense com-
bined; however, one spouse might not know the extent of the family's finan-
cial situation. The government can recognize the jointness of the couple, and
thereby possibly collect tax from a spouse who does not know the couple's
financial position, or tax each spouse separately, and possibly create artifi-
cial divisions of ownership. This is the fundamental choice before us.
Many spouses, even among those who perceive themselves as equals in
their marriages, make the choice to delegate financial obligations and re-
sponsibility to one spouse, and in doing so limit the other spouse's awareness
of financial information.13 4 For couples for whom this is true, neither spouse
genuinely lacks agency in the sense that a spouse desires to exercise a role,
is willing to take on the responsibilities and burdens of that role, and is then
denied the opportunity. Rather, the spouse not delegated responsibility for
financial tasks exercises an element of choice. To the extent Frank in the
prior example does not ask the designated return preparer about the couple's
tax return, he is culpably failing as a tax-paying member of society. And
even to the extent that he cannot know because neither spouse knows, as in
the example, he is as culpable as his wife. Frank should not receive a free
pass on the legal document that he signed, the tax return, because of the
delegation. Of course this does not mean that all spouses have agency over
their returns. As discussed in Part III below, the inability to assume the role
should result in relief from joint and several liability.
Unless spouses are coerced when they allocate responsibility for joint
tasks among themselves, they assume the risk associated with that alloca-
tion.135 For example, despite the fact that I (the author) am a tax professor in
a self-proclaimed equal relationship, as a couple, my husband and I have
delegated to him the work of completing our tax returns. Not only do I save
the time necessary to complete the forms when I designate my husband as
"our" return preparer, but I have exercised a choice. With that choice come
See generally Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 113 (2008). Many marriages do not have two earners and wives produce less than
half of most families' total earnings. Sara Raley et al., How Dual are Dual-Income
Couples?, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 11, 11 (2006).
113 Amy Kroska, Examining the Husband-Wife Differences in the Meaning of Family
Financial Support, 51 Soc. PERSP. 63, 65 (2008). The annual division of income neces-
sary for separate liability would also illustrate which spouse is economically better off
and which one is not. This might reinforce gendered divisions within the marriage.
134 See generally Bryndl Hohmann-Marriott, Shared Beliefs and the Union Stability
of Married and Cohabitating Couples, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1015 (2006).
'3 An argument has been made that wives do not contest their husbands' actions
because of a willingness to forgive or because they wish to preserve the marriage. There-
fore, the government should relieve wives of their taxes. Bryan Camp, The Unhappy
Marriage of Law and Equity in Joint Return Liability, 108 TAX NoTEs 1307, 1318
(2005). This alleged willingness may be commendable, but why should the cost of that
willingness be borne by other taxpayers if husbands do not pay their taxes? Should we
not respect a wife's choice and impose the cost on her?
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risks. If I trust my husband to cook dinner for me and he is a bad cook, I risk
a bad meal or, worse, food poisoning. If I trust my spouse to negotiate the
purchase of our house, I risk overpaying if my husband is the weaker negoti-
ator. There is nothing intrinsic to the federal income tax that suggests I
should be insured against the risk of allocating my taxpaying responsibility.
If a spouse does not want to assume the risk, the spouse does not have to
accept the division and can file a return as married filing separately. And if
she signs the return because she is coerced, she should have relief available,
as described in the next Part.
Some critics argue that requiring both spouses to prepare or understand
the return is "wasteful and inefficient" and that we should support the allo-
cation of responsibilities.13 6 It is implied that the allocation of tax responsi-
bility should, therefore, come with an isolation of liability to whomever was
allocated the task. However, it is unlikely the critic would say that only one
spouse should understand the family's financial position or understand
whether the other spouse is committing a crime in both of their names. Re-
quiring the creation of two versions of the same document might be waste-
ful, but having enough working knowledge of the family's finances to
confirm the other's work on the return is just good planning. If a couple
chooses not to do so, this is not something the government should encourage
or needs to insure.
Thus the reality of joint and several liability is different from how the
story is often told. Frequently, spouses who are being held liable are de-
picted as tragic figures deserving the mitigation of their taxes. However,
putting aside spouses who are coerced into signing their returns, spouses
who file joint returns have a choice. Those reading this Article might not
agree with the choices that any particular couple makes, but that disagree-
ment does not mean these are not legally valid choices. Moreover, that we
might not agree with a choice does not mean that those who make a choice
to defer proper evaluation of the family's finances or the tax return should be
insured against the risk of improper tax filing when those who are aware of
family finances and do participate in the preparation of the return are not so
protected.
In addition to considering potential inequity as between spouses, it is
important to examine the equity of innocent spouse relief as between taxpay-
ing groups. Other taxpaying groups may have equitable claims because inno-
cent spouse relief allows a spouse to enjoy the benefit of filing jointly while
avoiding its attendant burdens. With joint filing, spouses avoid potentially
erroneously allocating income between themselves. In addition, they are
taxed using wider tax brackets so that more income is taxed at lower rates,
and they can claim certain tax credits not available to spouses filing sepa-
rately. With relief, both spouses (the innocent spouse and the one guilty of
tax evasion) enjoy lower taxes because they filed jointly, even though with
116 Richard Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 369 (1990).
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relief they will be taxed separately. The innocent spouse is then relieved of
liability for the other spouse's income and, in some circumstances, her
own. 137
Thus, not only does innocent spouse relief potentially create inequities
as between the spouses who sign the joint return, the taxes that are paid are
no longer drawn equitably from all members of society. Spouses who are
able to mitigate the taxes they owe pay less in tax than those with the same
amount of income who pay their taxes. As a result, the tax rates applicable to
different taxpayers are no longer the rates Congress enacted. Consequently,
increasing innocent spouse relief benefits some taxpayers at the expense of
others by decreasing some people's taxes but not others. Similarly situated
taxpayers are not taxed similarly. Whether the spouse given relief is unjustly
enriched depends on the spouse's particular facts and circumstances; never-
theless, in all instances issues of inter-taxpayer equity are raised.
Compare two couples: Alice and Ben versus Cathy and David. Both
couples earn $150,000 per taxable year. Ben invests in a tax shelter that
generates $50,000 of unauthorized deductions, reducing Anne and Ben's re-
ported tax obligation by $12,719. Cathy and David, on the other hand, pay
all of their taxes owed, increasing their effective tax rate compared to Alice
and Ben by approximately 8.5%. Alice and Ben, with the money that was
legally owed to the government, buy a house that they otherwise could not
have afforded. Cathy and David, lacking those resources, rent an apartment.
After a number of years, both couples divorce. In their divorce, Alice
gets the house and, as a result, Ben owes less in alimony. By contrast, there
is no house for Cathy to receive, so she is entitled to more alimony from
David. The innocent spouse rules provide that if Alice did not actually know
of the tax evasion, she keeps the house, although Ben should owe penalties
and interest on his tax evasion.'38 Therefore, not only do Alice and Ben have
years of enjoyment of a house they could not have afforded without the tax
evasion, but also, in their divorce, one spouse keeps the house forever and
the other spouse benefits by owing less in alimony. Finally, throughout their
marriage Alice has no interest in checking their returns because, even if the
couple is caught and Ben is judgment proof, she is still better off.'39
'37 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-16 (2007); Yakubik v.
Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-74 (2008); Campbell v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (RIA) 1
2006-024 (2006). The availability of relief from taxes on one's own income was ex-
panded in 2012. See I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, § 4.01(7); Rev. Proc. 2013-
34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, § 4.01(7).
138 I.R.C. §6015(c) (2006).
"3 Recent changes to the innocent spouse rules by the Treasury Department illustrate
inequities in the system. Under the new rules, a requesting spouse only needs to "reason-
ably expect[ I" that the nonrequesting spouse will pay the tax liability "within a reasona-
bly prompt time." Notice 2012-8, supra note 16, at § 4.03(2)(c)(ii); Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
2013-43 I.R.B. 397, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii). This changes the rule for when payment of tax is
due. All other individual taxpayers must pay by April 15, unless an extension is granted,
and a reasonably prompt payment thereafter results in interest due. Not only are innocent
spouse recipients not held to the same rule as other taxpayers, they do not have to expect
1672014]
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
These rules encourage cheating: keeping the tax evasion from Alice
was the best thing Ben could do for his wife and possibly himself.'" The
couple that complied with the law is worse off and might even see their tax
rates increase if a sufficient number of couples take the path of Alice and
Ben. The unjust enrichment that results from the tax evasion must be mini-
mized to preserve an equitable tax system even if the spouse who benefits
the most (by getting the house and being relieved of tax) is more often the
vulnerable spouse.
Considering again Jill from the Introduction, she has assets other di-
vorced taxpayers do not have because, during her marriage, Jill's family did
not pay the taxes they legally owed. 141 It is important that we not cast Jill in
the role of a victim of tax oppression simply because she owes taxes. She
might be in a hard position and we might justly sympathize with her as a
divorced woman, but her position is a better position than it otherwise would
be as a result of tax evasion. And if the taxes are too great for Jill to pay,
there are generally applicable hardship provisions available to her.142
A question that arises from this inter-taxpayer inequity is the extent to
which we are comfortable allowing either spouse to benefit from tak eva-
sion. With innocent spouse relief, it is unavoidable that some spouses who
benefit from tax evasion will be unjustly enriched after avoiding paying the
taxes the couple owes. Critics who want expanded innocent spouse relief
often disagree with this characterization of the inter-taxpayer comparison.
One critic of joint and several liability on the joint return has argued, "in the
tax context, it does not seem particularly unfair that the victim (the govern-
ment) should bear the burden of collection and the risk of insolvency." 43
However, although the government receives the tax revenue, other taxpayers
are the ones funding the collection process and will bear the loss of govern-
ment expenditures if the revenue is not collected.
C. Effect of Relief on Wives
Innocent spouse relief is gender-neutral in form, as is all of the Internal
Revenue Code.'" Nevertheless, not only was the provision gendered in in-
their spouse to follow the rules either. An innocent spouse is able to avoid interest on
taxes that she knew would not be paid on time.
140 A similar problem troubled Senator Chafee in 1998. Senate Committee on Fi-
nance, Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearing on Innocent Spouse Tax Rules, 98 TNT
32-23, 34-35.
141 A nonrequesting spouse can have transferred "disqualified assets" to the request-
ing spouse, and the requesting spouse will win relief and keep the assets if (i) the nonre-
questing spouse abused the innocent spouse or restricted her access to financial
information or (ii) the requesting spouse did not have actual knowledge that disqualified
assets were transferred. Notice 2012-8, supra note 16, at § 4.01(5); Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
2013-43 I.R.B. 397, § 4.01(5).
142 See supra Part I.B.
143 Kahng, supra note 6, at 282.
'" I.R.C. § 7701(p)(1)(3) (2006).
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tent as discussed in Part I, it is gendered in its impact: 85.4% of spouses
requesting relief and 89.5% of spouses winning relief are wives. 145 There-
fore, it is appropriate to examine what innocent spouse relief does for this
targeted group. This issue, which intersects wives' public and private lives,
offers an opportunity to explore how the government views women in these
roles. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to reexamine the complexity of
the very question of how best to promote wives' well-being. A significant
risk of expansive innocent spouse relief is that, for wives who are not co-
erced into signing the joint return, the government dismisses wives' valid
choices and equates their divisions of marital tasks with presumed
incapacity.
Regardless of whether or not one accepts that a goal of the income tax
system should be to help the vulnerable, which this author does, it does not
necessarily follow that all wives should be relieved of tax liability because
of their vulnerability. With respect to tax filing, the question is not as simple
as either (1) absolving wives from taxes or (2) treating them as equals with
their husbands but (as is often feared) subjecting them to disproportionate
liability. A narrower relief draws a line at the degree of vulnerability we as a
society accept negates liability.
For Congress to engage in this line-drawing, however imperfect, it must
recognize that wives are not in a homogenous position within their mar-
riages. To do so is a positive step for wives because recognizing the different
positions of wives validates the gains that have been made by some women
while trying to develop those gains further and for more women. To con-
clude that all wives are sufficiently vulnerable within marriage so as to ne-
gate their taxpaying obligations risks reinforcing a culture of dependence
that does not hold true for all wives. Although wives are often the more
vulnerable spouse within marriage, not all wives are equally vulnerable. The
government should recognize some spouses' vulnerability but encourage
them, when possible, to minimize the vulnerability, in this case the vulnera-
bility that results from the lack of information about the couple's financial
position and inability to perform the civic and legal obligation of filing an
accurate tax return and paying their taxes owed.146
145 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 662.
146 Particularly troubling is that if Congress eliminates joint filing or joint and several
liability, spouses will likely lose innocent spouse relief. For example, Bryan Camp argues
that the elimination of joint liability "fully resolves the tension" created between
spouses. Camp, Unhappy Marriage, supra note 135, at 1314. However, if spouses allo-
cate tax filing to one spouse, abused and deceived spouses will lose relief without gaining
independence. Strangely, even those who recognize that spouses may specialize within
marriage think "it is likely" that each will prepare their own return. Larry Jones et al.,
For Better, For Worse or For Taxes!, 6 J. TAX PRAc. & PROc. 35, 38 (2004). If there is a
concern that the current system does not properly recognize the plight of some wives, and
it for better or worse recognizes that wives are often in vulnerable positions within mar-
riage, we should not expect a system in which the underlying theory is that wives are
independent taxpayers and not liable for anything but their own income to give them
more sympathy.
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Moreover, a limited innocent spouse relief recognizes the complex
roles that wives play by reinforcing the idea that wives retain their role as
taxpayers even when they marry. If one thinks of marriage as a contract, this
view seeks to put each contracting party in the marriage on an equal footing
before the government. On the other hand, if one accepts that marriage is
more fundamentally a status that spouses assume, the government is expres-
sing its view that wives retain multiple statuses and do not lose these other
statuses when they marry. Wives are taxpayers, and as part of their obliga-
tion to society they cannot have that obligation subsumed by their husband
any more than they can have their obligation to be jurors or voters
subsumed.
That Congress has created this type of tax system sends a message to
married couples because law has an expressive function.147 In its best light,
the expressive function of joint and several liability holds that wives are
equal members in the marriage and capable of being held liable for the
couple's debts, as are their husbands. Couples who choose to file a joint
return are making the tacit statement that they have such unity, as opposed to
spouses who file separately. That equality comes with burdens. Both spouses
are deemed to be equally aware of marital finances, at least with respect to
the return. Both are deemed to double-check joint tax returns for their accu-
racy. That this does not always happen is really no different from the fact
that taxpayers do not always double-check their tax return preparers' work.
In short, simply because the law acts on the principle and expresses a belief
that people should be aware of their own tax obligation does not mean that
everyone is.
This expression made by the law of joint returns exists even if couples
are unaware of the joint return's potential consequences. Taxes and other
laws have an expressive function regardless of whether people are aware of
how the laws operate. For example, the unrelated business taxable income
rule, which taxes otherwise tax-exempt entities engaged in for-profit busi-
ness, expresses a congressional desire to protect the market from unfair com-
petition.148 Similarly, the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act,
which imposes a withholding tax and reporting obligations on non-U.S. tax-
payers who buy U.S. real estate, expresses a congressional desire to mini-
mize foreign holdings of U.S. real estate.14 9 Both laws increase the cost of
those who want to thwart Congress's expressed will, even if they have not
heard of the laws. Therefore, even if only fully understood by Congress, the
147 See, e.g., Matthew Adler, Expressive Theories of Law, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363,
1364 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 948 (1995); Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2045 (1996).
148 See generally Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History
and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475
(2005).
1 See generally David J. Herzig, Rethinking FIRPTA, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. (2013)
(forthcoming) (proposing ways to increase the amount of tax collected under FIRPTA).
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IRS, tax advisors, and academics, the law shapes how the government inter-
acts with people and expresses a vision of how society does (and should)
function.
This is not to ignore the fact that wives, and husbands, would benefit
from better education of what it means to sign a joint return. The expressive
function of the law can be made more salient to taxpayers.1so Nevertheless,
much as joint elections can have "an information-forcing function,""' so too
can the joint return inform married couples of the ideas Congress intends to
express with respect to their presumed equality.
Through the expression of jointness, the government encourages both
spouses, but particularly wives, to learn about their family's finances. Stud-
ies have found that, regardless of race or class, economic and perceived de-
pendency by wives on their husbands is positively correlated to abuse of
those wives.'52 However, it is the economic dependency that keeps wives in
these relationships.'53 For their independence, wives need access to wealth
while married, access to marital assets upon divorce, and access to informa-
tion regarding the wealth to which they might be entitled. 5 4 The joint return
helps fulfill the last function by providing information regarding at least re-
ported income, and the government needs to continue to promote this infor-
mation sharing."'
On the other hand, current innocent spouse relief as administered by the
IRS and the courts is not conducive to the free flow of information: if wives
ask about the family's economic position but are told nothing, they are more
likely to be granted tax relief. For example, in Wiener v. Commissioner, the
Tax Court granted the wife of the still-married couple innocent spouse relief
in part because her husband denied her financial information.' 6 One com-
mentator noted, "in general, the more the requesting spouse was kept in the
dark regarding the family's tax and financial matters, the greater the chances
ISO For example, Form 1040 could state above the signature line that, by signing,
spouses are assuming joint and several liability.
"1 Heather M. Field, Tax Elections and Private Bargaining, 31 VA. TAX REv. 1, 39
(2011).
152See generally Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and
Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552 (2007); Lisa
Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Vic-
tims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359 (1996); Debra S. Kalmuss &
Murray A. Straus, Wife's Marital Dependency and Wife Abuse, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
277 (1982).
1 See generally sources cited supra note 152.
14 Spouses who file joint returns have a right to copies of those returns, but no right
to see a spouse's separate return. See I.R.S. Form 4506-T.
'1 Under proportional liability, there is no reason for one spouse to double check the
other, and it is reasonable to expect that some spouses would refuse to explain tax items
if the other spouse cannot be held liable for them. This cabining of information is risky
for wives who might have few other means to financial information.
16 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 227, 238 (2008). Although it cannot be known for sure, it is
possible that the husband in the case was judgment proof, so that thereafter neither
spouse paid the tax.
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of gaining relief.""' Perversely, husbands are doing wives a favor by with-
holding information.
Those wives with the power to understand their family's finances
should do so and government relief programs should encourage them to do
so. To undo the consequences of their choices means that society is insuring
wives against the risk of not exercising a power they have. This is not to say
that all spouses are capable of demanding this information, but spouses who
file under duress are already recognized not to have filed a valid joint return.
Consequently, the tax system already recognizes spouses as not equally cul-
pable in the case of duress."' Moreover, for those who are granted innocent
spouse relief, the government holds that the relieved spouse should not be
treated as an equal within the marriage, at least with respect to the return.
For all other couples who are jointly and severally liable, the government is
treating both spouses as equal members of the economic unit.
Much as law has an expressive function, so too does Congress changing
the law. A change in the regime would require the federal government to
change this law and the message sent by the law. The rhetoric justifying the
change is likely to be similar to that used by its critics today. Scholars have
claimed that "the current tax system exacerbates dependent spouses' vulner-
ability"'59 ; that "it is unfortunately only a slight exaggeration to describe the
wife who is assessed with her husband's taxes as doomed to exploitation and
abuse"60; and that the tax system's structure "produces a powerful structural
bias against wives."' 61 This rhetoric states that all wives should not be held
liable because of their vulnerable position within marriages, and it risks rein-
forcing that vulnerable position through its reiteration.162
An expansive innocent spouse relief does not simply imply that wives
are the more vulnerable spouse but also releases them from an obligation to
third parties (the IRS and, subsequently, other taxpayers) because of any
degree of vulnerability, whether or not it directly impedes a spouse's ability
to meet the obligation. Wives, as the spouses targeted for relief, will be de-
fined as those who lack the ability (either by choice or by force) to accu-
rately file a joint return. As a result, the change signals to the nation the
lower value and rights of the country's wives.
" William P. Brown, Recent Cases Expand Potential for Obtaining Innocent Spouse
Relief, 83 PRAc. TAx STRATEGIEs 86, 90 (2009).
'" Some critics argue that Congress should expand procedures for challenging
whether a purported joint return was filed jointly or was the product of forgery or duress.
See Carlton M. Smith, How Can One Argue 'It's Not My Joint Return' in Tax Court?, 124
TAX NoTEs 1266 (2009).
'" Motro, supra note 6, at 1533.
160 Beck, The Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform, supra note 6, at 939-40.
'61 Christian, supra note 6, at 537.
162 This does not mean that we should not call attention to problems of inequality
when they arise, but we must be concerned about the message that is sent by the rhetori-
cal and expressive function of proposed changes.
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Even if there were a tabula rasa upon which to write the tax law, many
alternatives to the current regime reinforce the notion that wives, as the
lower earning spouse, are not equal within marriage. First, in any regime that
imposes the initial tax liability based on earnings, husbands, as the higher
earning spouse on average, would have more money reflected on their re-
turns. Annual filings would show who is economically better off and who is
not. Second, alternatives also validate those marriages in which husbands do
not tell their spouses about the family's finances. This risks providing the
state's endorsement of such behavior.
Third, and perhaps most critically, alternatives risk assuming that be-
havior changes just because the tax law does. 163 If spouses allocate tasks
between themselves based on interest or abilities, an individual filing regime
or a regime allocating liability in some fashion is unlikely to result in each
spouse completing his or her own return. Moreover, if husbands dominate
their families' finances, they may simply fill out their wives' returns or pro-
vide their wives' information on joint returns in the new regime, which no
longer has a theoretical justification for innocent spouse relief. Thus even the
panacea for wives as taxpayers, individual filing, is not a perfect answer for
the reasons discussed herein. It is not, and cannot be, a perfect solution for
all taxpayers. Although it would likely protect some spouses whose returns
only reflect their wages and whose families have no jointly owned assets, for
all other spouses the risk is run that a spouse will complete the return im-
properly, opening the innocent spouse to liability. And with individual filing
or allocated liability it is likely to be liability without any innocent spouse
relief.
For Congress to isolate liability based on the theory of isolated owner-
ship interests between spouses is also troubling because the nation is moving
to valuing both spouses as equal contributors to the marriage in other areas
of the law. Proportional liability, under which many wives as the lower-
earning spouse would be liable for less than half of the tax due, seems at
odds with the movement towards equal divisions of assets at divorce (al-
though the movement is certainly not complete).'" To the extent we want to
move to greater equality of assets, it might be unwise as a political matter to
seek protection from the tax liability for those assets.
As a final concern for wives, if wives succeed in having Congress limit
their tax liability, it potentially bodes ill for wives in other arenas. Limiting
liability signals that wives (or at least increasing numbers of them) are not to
be held responsible for the legal documents that they sign. If women want
equal access to markets, they must be accountable for their agreements. If
Congress legislates that wives cannot be held accountable for the tax returns
they sign, it is a small slide on a slippery slope to say that wives should not
163 See supra note 146.
'6 See AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
815-20 (2008).
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be held liable for the mortgages or leases that they sign, if only within the
context of marriage.'65 Without their signature and their legal obligation,
wives are likely to have less access to markets.
Thus, this movement towards a new coverture is a dangerous message
for the government to send, not only to wives and their husbands, but also to
third parties. Attempting to protect wives by selectively invalidating their
signatures or holding the government to a higher standard when it comes to
their signatures as opposed to their mates' is a costly protection, not only in
federal revenue but also in women's rights. This dismissal of women's inde-
pendence may be justified in some cases, but it should be limited with re-
spect to joint filing to the modified innocent spouse relief proposed in the
next Part.
III. How TO IMPROVE RELIEF By LIMITING IT
That joint and several liability on a joint return can be a good thing for
married couples, society, and even wives, does not mean that spouses should
always be made to pay the taxes they owe. As discussed in Part I, there are
times when we, as a society, do not want to hold people liable for their taxes.
In addition, society agrees that some marriages are sufficiently unequal to
relieve one spouse of responsibility for her actions because of the dominance
of the other spouse. The question is how to provide relief to those spouses in
such a way that relief does not subsume the general rule of strict liability for
a taxpayer's return. This Part proposes two forms of relief: a right to implead
the other spouse in matters involving the joint return and a revised innocent
spouse relief provision.
The IRS's Internal Revenue Manual requires agents to seek taxes from
the most culpable spouse first.'66 It is impossible to know for certain whether
this process is always applied correctly or that agents can correctly deter-
mine a priori which spouse is more culpable. When this process fails, in the
period before a paying spouse wins a right of contribution, the nonpaying
spouse enjoys the time value of nonpayment. To help joint filers for whom
the Manual's ordering does not work appropriately, signers of joint returns
should be given a right to implead the other in any proceeding, whether on
audit or in litigation, for the liability due on a joint return.16 7
165 This movement has already begun by denying credit cards to non-wage earning
wives. See Blake Ellis, Stay-at-Home Mom Fights New Credit Card Rule, CNN MONEY
(May 16, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/16/pf/credit-cards-stay-at-home-moms/,
archived at http://perma.cc/OQvaQLCewbP.
'" See supra note 4.
'67 For a discussion of the right to implead in the context of personal injury torts, see
generally W.E. Shipley, Uniform Contribution Among Torifeasors Act, 34 A.L.R.2d 1107
(2011); E.H. Schopler, Right of Defendant in Act for Personal Injury or Death to Bring in
Joint Tortfeasor for Purpose of Asserting Right of Contribution, 11 A.L.R.2d 228 (2010).
Congress has created a similar right, at least in litigation, for taxes due on trust funds.
I.R.C. § 6672(d) (2006).
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This proposal has broader reach than the right to implead granted in
Federal District Courts or the right of intervention in current innocent spouse
law.16 8 The proposal would apply not only in the U.S. Tax Court, which is
not currently governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also
before litigation has begun. Moreover, although under current innocent
spouse rules, a nonrequesting spouse may intervene in a case involving inno-
cent spouse relief either on behalf of the requesting spouse or opposing the
grant of relief,'6 9 the requesting spouse has no legal power to demand an
intervention. If one spouse successfully impleads the other in a proceeding,
the requesting spouse compels the participation of the nonrequesting spouse.
Thus, this proposal fills in gaps in current law.
An expansive right to implead a spouse with respect to a joint tax return
would reduce the collection cost and increase the equity as between spouses
or former spouses. Thereafter, payment of the joint liability could be based
on relative guilt for the tax evasion or, if there is no culpable conduct, on the
relative ownership or benefit of the income. The government would receive
its revenue, and the spouses or former spouses, with the aid of the IRS or
court as arbiter, could work out how to settle liability between them. Unlike
a system of proportional liability that allocates liability for taxes at the time
the return is filed, impleading would only apply after the IRS challenges the
return and more information is available. Therefore, impleading would not
be invoked by the great number of joint filers, reducing its cost of operation.
In addition, impleading could be designed to put the burden of locating and
allocating the liability on the taxpayer seeking to avoid liability instead of on
the IRS or, more accurately, other taxpayers.
Because some spouses will be unable to implead their spouses or for-
mer spouses because of the difficulty or expense of locating them, it may be
reasonable to require the IRS provide minimal research services to joint
filers seeking to implead their spouses, in the form of phone numbers or
addresses of last filed tax returns and/or information from driver licenses and
passports. This would require amending § 6103 of the Code, which provides
that this information is confidential. Congress should evaluate the burden
this would impose on the agency and privacy risks to the impleaded spouse
before creating this new obligation. Regardless of the IRS's role in the im-
pleading, with this right a greater number of spouses liable for the returns
they file should not be left solely responsible for the taxes due.
Relief from the other spouse is unlikely to be sufficient for innocent
spouses if the other spouse is judgment proof; therefore, Congress should
revise innocent spouse relief for all of the reasons described in Part II. Re-
questing spouses who win relief under existing innocent spouse relief fall
168 Fed. R. Civ. P. 14; I.R.C. §§ 6015(e)(4), 6015(h)(2) (2006).
169 See Van Arsendalen v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 135 (2004); Fretty v. Comm'r, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2008-76 (2008); Coleman v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2004-165 (2004).
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into one of two groups.'7 0 The first group includes spouses who are incapa-
ble of validating the information on the joint return because they were co-
erced in some form. The second are spouses for whom the IRS or the courts
show mercy by relieving them of their legally valid tax obligation. The pro-
posal explained in this Part extends greater relief to the former while deny-
ing innocent spouse relief to the latter. Under this proposal, this second
group who would otherwise be shown mercy is denied relief in order to
preserve the fairness of the tax regime. The cases for which relief is to be
granted need to be clearly defined if all taxpayers are to be equal under the
law.'' Furthermore, to grant a taxpayer reprieve from taxes for reasons unre-
lated to the act of filing creates arbitrariness in the application of the income
tax and "makes it seem more unjust to apply the rule rigidly in the next
case . . . ."172
Thus, this Part proposes that Congress tailor relief to those requesting
spouses who were coerced into signing a joint return."' This revision to
§ 6015 would generally grant relief in the event that the requesting spouse
was either deceived about the family's finances as it relates to the tax filing
or was abused.174 Spouses who were not coerced into the filing retain the
other generally applicable relief measures discussed in Part I. The critical
element of this revised relief is the determination of what it means for a
spouse to be coerced and, therefore, innocent of the tax evasion. Not every-
one will agree with this proposal's definition of coercion or any other defini-
tion of that term. However, even if everyone does not accept this definition,
it is for Congress and not the IRS or the judiciary to give meaning to the
term "innocent" for congressionally-created tax relief. This proposal pushes
Congress to craft a test that measures innocence in an administrable way.
This proposal's definition of coercion derives from situations in which a
spouse does not have agency over the joint return. For example, the group of
cases that led to the enactment of the current innocent spouse relief involved
wives who were held liable for taxes on money that their husbands had em-
bezzled and from which the wives did not benefit.' 5 Similarly sympathetic
70 As mentioned previously, if there is duress as to the signing of a joint return, there
is no legally valid joint return. See In re Hickley, 256 B.R. 814, 828 (2000).
"' Dan Merkel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1421, 1445 (2004).
172 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1701 (1976).
173 Adopting this revised rule, relief would only apply to those who sign a joint return
with some degree of freedom. For spouses who sign returns under duress, the returns are,
and remain, invalid. See In re Hickley, 256 B.R. at 828.
174 If society chooses to give greater aid to the abused, that aid should be available to
all abuse victims and not just those whose spouses cheated on their taxes.
"7 Wissing v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1428 (1971); Abrams v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 230 (1970);
Sharwell v. Comm'r, 419 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Huelsman v. Comm'r, 416 F.2d 477
(6th Cir. 1969); Scudder v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 36 (1967); Scudder v. Comm'r, 405 F.2d
222 (6th Cir. 1968); Davenport v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 921 (1967); Wenker v. Comm'r, 25
T.C.M. (CCH) 1237 (1966); Hackney v. Comm'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 655 (1965); H.R.
REP. No. 91-1734, at 2 (1970). The innocent spouse relief laws were amended again in
1984 and 1998. See supra, text accompanying notes 29-30.
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are the cases of spouses who signed returns as a result of physical or emo-
tional abuse from their mates that was not directly related to their signing of
the tax returns. '7 Relief from joint and several liability on the joint return
should be tailored to these two instances because the inequality in the rela-
tionship between the spouses makes it impossible for a requesting spouse to
verify the information on the return. However, under existing law, these is-
sues are often overshadowed by others in the determination of relief as a
result of the complex balancing of factors that is required.'"7 This proposal
more appropriately confines relief to its original purpose by focusing on the
causes of the inequality that troubled Congress.
The result is also a simpler provision. Focusing on the causes of
spouses' inability to meet their tax-filing and tax-paying obligations allows
Congress to eliminate the complex weighing of factors that has been created
to evaluate the innocence of a requesting spouse. By narrowing the group
that can win relief, revised innocent spouse relief provides specific rules for
those situations in which there is sufficient inequality of power between
spouses to make it impossible for the requesting spouse to have control over
the joint return.
Therefore, in the event of a threshold showing of abuse or deception by
a requesting spouse, this Article proposes shifting the burden of proof to the
IRS to either disprove the claim or to prove an exception discussed below if
the IRS seeks to collect from the requesting spouse.'78 To disprove the re-
questing spouse's claim, the IRS does not need to prove a happy marriage
existed, only that the requesting spouse did not meet the requirements pro-
vided below regarding abuse or deception at the time the joint return was
filed. This shifting of the burden is unusual for most civil tax litigation in
which the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, where the taxpayer must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the IRS's determination of liability
is erroneous.'
There has been a movement away from this traditional allocation of the
burden of proof. For example, in the Tax Court, the most frequent location of
§ 6015 litigation, if the taxpayer proves that the IRS's determination was
arbitrary and excessive, the burden to show the correct amount of tax liabil-
176 Some critics of joint and several liability argue that abuse should be given greater
weight than other factors. Gary Fleischman & Sean Valentine, How to Improve Equitable
Relief for Innocent Spouses, 96 TAX NOTEs 874, 877 (2002).
"7 Only 12.6% of cases requesting relief alleged abuse, and it is impossible to deter-
mine how many contained claims of deception. McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note
33, at 695.
"I For a discussion of the burden of proof in tax cases, see Janene Finley & Allan
Karnes, An Empirical Study of the Change in the Burden of Proof in the United States
Tax Court, 6 Prrr. TAX REV. 61 (2008); John Gardner & Benjamin Norman, Effects of the
Shift in the Burden of Proof in the Disposition of Tax Cases, 38 WAKE FoRES T L. REV.
1357, 1364 (2003).
"7 Tax Court Litigation Detailed Analysis, VII. Trials, D. Burden of Proof, BNA 630-
4th T.M. VII-D.
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ity shifts to the IRS.s 0 Also, § 7491 provides that if the taxpayer introduces
credible evidence relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability, the burden
of proof shifts to the IRS.'8 ' In this latter instance, however, there are ques-
tions regarding whether the burden is shifted in practice. 82 For this Article's
proposal to operate justly, a true shifting must occur so that, if someone
makes the threshold showing, the default position is tax relief.
A tension exists as to the requirements of the threshold showing. If the
threshold is high, few spouses will meet the burden, even if they are the
victims Congress intends to relieve of taxes. If the showing is low, common
behaviors may qualify for relief and more taxpayers may be induced to com-
mit fraud in order to mitigate their tax obligations. Recognizing these risks,
this proposal favors a minimal showing that includes specific allegations of
the behaviors targeted for relief that meet the definitions described below.
This accomplishes the twin goals of granting relief to deserving applicants
while improving the administration of relief.
To be clear, under this proposal, the initial showing by the requesting
spouse is minimal. When this initial showing is made, the burden of persua-
sion shifts to the IRS. For example, a requesting spouse would meet the
burden by submitting an affidavit signed under penalties of perjury that
claims deception about the facts of the return or abuse at the time of the
filing. However, it is insufficient for a spouse to claim a power differential in
the marriage at the time the return was filed. Something more specific is
necessary to demonstrate that the requesting spouse could not be expected to
know or seek to know about the accuracy of the return the spouse signed.
For purposes of this threshold showing, the claim of abuse should be
defined broadly to include physical and non-physical abuse, a position the
Treasury Department recently endorsed.13 Congress should define abuse to
include efforts to control, isolate, humiliate, and intimidate the requesting
spouse or to control family finances by preventing the requesting spouse
from gaining access to financial information through reasonable channels.
Under existing relief, it is hard to decipher from the cases what claim or
level of abuse is sufficient to outweigh other considerations weighing
against relief. Details of abuse are necessary and, preferably, result in police
involvement, although the opinions rarely note a significant amount of detail
'so Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities
of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IoWA L. REv. 413, 417 (1999). The burden is
higher on the taxpayer in a refund case. Id. at 417-18. For more information on the
burden of proof, see Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General
Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 183 (1996).
"I The taxpayer must have substantiated items, maintained records, and cooperated
with the IRS. I.R.C. § 7491 (2006).
182 Johnson, Dangers of Symbolic Legislation, supra note 180; Philip N. Jones, The
Burden of Proof 10 Years After the Shift, 121 TAx NoTEs 287 (2008).
'3 Notice 2012-8, supra note 16, at § 4.03(2)(c)(iv); Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43
I.R.B. 397, § 4.03(2)(c)(iv).
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regarding the abuse.'1" This lack of guidance for abuse victims puts undue
pressure on them in weighing their chance of success before seeking relief.1'
For purposes of the threshold showing for this proposal, details of abuse at
or before the time of the filing should be sufficient to shift the burden of
proof to the IRS.
Although the Treasury Department recently adopted a broad definition
of abuse, under the current balancing required to win innocent spouse relief,
abuse can be outweighed by other factors."' Thus, despite a taxpayer having
been coerced into signing the return, relief might be denied. This denial is
more likely if a requesting spouse is not experiencing economic hardship.
From a theoretical perspective, it is unjust to say that wealthier abused
spouses are less victims of abuse than poor abused spouses, even though
wealthier victims may have some amount of economic resources to leave the
abusive relationship. The issue of coercion over the joint return is the same
for each victim. That judgment should be taken out of the equation at least
with respect to this issue; if abuse is the trigger for relief it should trigger
relief for everyone equally.'
Potentially the more troubling showing from Congress's perspective is
the deception showing, because spouses looking to escape liability might be
more willing to claim deceit than abuse. To minimize the number of taxpay-
ers who exploit the provision, deception must be framed in terms of whether
a spouse was coerced into signing a faulty return or into believing the tax
obligation was paid when it was not. For this showing, the requesting spouse
must have reviewed the return and the guilty spouse must have made an
overt statement with respect to specific items on the return that was inaccu-
rate, except in the limited context that the nonrequesting spouse committed
fraud without the requesting spouse's knowledge. In the case of fraud, the
requesting spouse must deny knowledge of the fraud. It is insufficient for the
nonrequesting spouse to have stated that the return was accurate because this
would absolve the requesting spouse from her obligation to review the
return.
Some additional restrictions should be imposed before allegations of
deception shift the burden of persuasion. First, the nature of the deception
184 See, e.g., Knorr v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2004-212 (2004); Collier v.
Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (RIA) T 2002-144 (2002); Fox v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (RIA) 2006-
024 (2006).
"I The initial showing may present a difficult choice for some abused spouses who
are deciding whether to seek relief. Even though the threshold is purposefully low, a
requesting spouse with children who lives with an abuser risks losing her children if she
admits the abuse. There is no equitable alternative if joint and several liability is to be
retained. If spouses want mitigation of their taxes under a regime that does not require
economic hardship, they must admit the problem.
"' Notice 2012-8, supra note 16, at § 4.03(2); Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B.
397, § 4.03(2).
87 The IRS may collect from a wealthy abused spouse if the spouse has property that
is traceable to the evasion. This source of liability eliminates the class-based judgment of
who is abused.
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must be such that it would cause a reasonable person to think the return was
accurate as filed. The default is that the IRS accepts the requesting spouse's
determination of reasonable reliance; however, using the same common law
theories of reasonable reliance as otherwise apply, the IRS must be allowed
to challenge the reasonableness of the reliance. Second, the deception must
be as to fact and not to law. Although the tax law is complicated, and some
may complain unknowable, for our tax system to work people cannot be
allowed to claim ignorance of the law as an excuse for tax evasion."'
At this time, only a small subset of the 55,000 annual cases involve
abuse or deception, although either allegation would improve a taxpayer's
chance of winning under the current balancing of factors for relief.189 There-
fore, although it is possible that there would be an increase in requests alleg-
ing abuse and deception if the proposal is enacted, the increase should not be
large. So that Congress can learn whether joint filers are likely exploiting
this provision, Congress should require that the IRS calculate how many
requests have included these allegations in the past three to five years and
compare this data to future requests. If the number of requests grows signifi-
cantly, there is a greater chance that people are inappropriately claiming
these factors; and the definitions of abuse and deception may need to be
refined.
Of course, there remains a chance for the exploitation of this provision
as it exists under current innocent spouse relief and any mitigation provision.
However, under the proposed regime, the IRS will be able to devote its re-
sources to those who are inappropriately claiming relief instead of evaluat-
ing every request under the myriad facts and circumstances tests. This
proposal's categorization of ruled relief frees the IRS from the burden of
detennining for all requesting spouses whether relief should be granted. In-
stead, the IRS must engage in substantial fact-finding only when it seeks to
challenge a claim for relief. Only if the facts raise questions regarding the
validity of the request should the IRS invest the resources to confirm or deny
relief. The default position would no longer demand government action. This
does mean that some premium in the form of unwarranted tax relief will be
paid to requesting spouses who complete a good affidavit and that some
inequity will be created. This is, however, similar to the current premium for
those completing the relief form requesting existing innocent spouse relief.
To the extent that the IRS chooses to expend its resources seeking un-
paid taxes from a requesting spouse, this proposal provides the IRS two
avenues to do so. The IRS could challenge the initial showing by disproving
the existence of abuse or deception at or before the filing of the joint return.
Alternately, the IRS could prove one of the following three situations in
which it is equitable to collect from an otherwise innocent spouse. First, the
18' This is not currently an excuse in other types of tax cases because of strict liabil-
ity. See supra note 103.
1' See supra note 63.
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IRS should be able to collect from a spouse who successfully passes the
initial threshold to the extent that it can prove that the requesting spouse
earned the income and that the nonrequesting spouse did not abusively con-
trol the family's finances. Second, the IRS should be able to collect to the
extent that it can prove that the requesting spouse significantly benefited
from the tax evasion through the acquisition or retention of property. Finally,
the IRS should be able to collect to the extent that it can prove that the
requesting spouse created the error on the return or caused the underpayment
of tax.
The first exception to relief is self-evident. A strict liability tax system
requires that taxpayers pay taxes on their own income. However, under this
proposal, some requesting spouses will avoid tax on income they have
earned themselves if the other spouse abusively controlled the family's fi-
nances. Although this negates strict liability for one's taxes, all relief mea-
sures do this when their criteria are satisfied. In this version of innocent
spouse relief, the exception is created for abused spouses on the grounds that
the requesting spouse had insufficient agency to make a choice with respect
to taxes for the period covered by the return. Unless there is property or the
proceeds of property from that period, the greater social good is produced by
offering relief, even from taxes on the spouse's own income.
The second exception to relief is in the event the requesting spouse
significantly benefited from the tax evasion through the acquisition or reten-
tion of property. This exception reduces the unjust enrichment enjoyed by
requesting spouses who would otherwise be relieved of the taxes they legally
owe. If a spouse benefits from the evasion of tax, the spouse's property that
is traceable to that tax period is collectible as long as the spouse has the
same property or property that was purchased with the proceeds from the
sale of the property. Because money is fungible, the requirement of tracing
is suspect. However, to allow the IRS to collect in every case unless the
nonrequesting spouse absconded with the funds seems unjust as well as po-
litically infeasible.
A balance is therefore necessary between the desire to prevent unjust
enrichment to ensure that all taxpayers are treated the same and the two
desires to make relief administrable and to relieve coerced spouses who ei-
ther did not choose or did not enjoy the prior consumption. Therefore, even
though a requesting spouse might have benefited from expensive dinners or
European vacations, this Article's proposal would relieve that spouse from
paying the taxes on those benefits. On the other hand, if a requesting spouse
owes taxes for a given year and, during that year, made house payments, the
IRS would be able to exercise its normal collection powers against the
house. Whether the IRS can force the sale of the house depends on the gen-
erally applicable rules for collection discussed in Part I. To the extent that a
requesting spouse receives property that is necessary to maintain a basic
level of income, protection of that property is available with the other relief
measures also discussed in Part I.
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Third, under the proposal, the IRS can collect from an abused or
deceived spouse if the spouse instigated the tax evasion or underpayment of
tax. The purpose of this exception is to recognize that the requesting spouse
may perform the culpable conduct. An empirical study of innocent spouse
cases decided between 1998 and 2011 found that in seventeen cases wives
prepared the return and sought relief (six winning) and in thirteen cases hus-
bands prepared the return and sought relief (three winning).19 0 It is not the
intention of this exception to require a requesting spouse to pay taxes if the
spouse completed the return incorrectly because the nonrequesting spouse
forced the requesting spouse to do so. Instead, this exception, like the others,
focuses on the spouse's level of control over the completed return.
Even with the three exceptions to relief, some spouses will misuse this
revised innocent spouse relief. That this proposal shifts the burden of proof
onto the IRS increases the cost to the IRS of collecting from spouses inap-
propriately requesting relief. As a result, it creates an incentive for some
who are not abused or deceived to claim abuse and deception.'9' This propo-
sal also makes it unlikely that, except in blatant cases of taxpayer misuse, the
government would pursue spouses who make the threshold showing, espe-
cially if the IRS can pursue the other spouse. Therefore, some spouses who
should not win relief under a complete facts-and-circumstances review will
avoid liability. To the extent that we accept the need for administrable relief,
this is a cost that we must accept, the goal being to minimize the ease with
which the relief provision can be cheated. There is also no reason to think
that similar, or even worse, cheating does not occur under the current relief
system.
To reduce the amount of cheating under the proposal, nonrequesting
spouses must retain the right to intervene.' 92 Because one of the objectives of
the proposal is to get the IRS out of the job of contesting abuse or deception,
the burden of proving or disproving the existence of the factors should rest
on the nonrequesting spouse when possible and not the IRS. This is despite
the tension in allowing potentially abusive and deceptive spouses an arena to
further abuse or deceive their spouses or former spouses. Although the Tax
Court has held that granting innocent spouse relief does not impose a burden
on the nonrequesting spouse because he was jointly and severally liable, 93
190 McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 33, at 671.
191Admittedly, it is unfortunate that some unscrupulous tax evaders will claim abuse
when they have not been abused while some who are abused will not be willing to claim
relief.
192 After Villela-Wilcoxv. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-75 (2009), it is questiona-
ble whether an intervenor can prevail once the government concedes relief. In Villela-
Willcox, the court found the intervenor to be the more credible witness and the "inter-
venor's evidence show[ed] petitioner's connection and involvement with intervenor's par-
ticipation" in the tax shelter. Id. Nevertheless, the court concluded that "intervenor's
evidence is persuasive, but it is not so compelling to require that the settlement between
respondent and petitioner be disregarded." Id.
19 See Holloway v. Comm'r, 322 Fed. Appx. 421, 423 (6th Cir. 2008); Baranowicz v.
Comm'r, 432 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2005).
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relief can shift the taxes on the income enjoyed by the requesting spouse
onto the nonrequesting spouse as discussed in Part II. The result of shifting
the tax burden is just, if in fact the nonrequesting spouse abused or deceived
the requesting spouse. It is not just if a spouse fabricates the necessary show-
ing. If the nonrequesting spouse does not have the opportunity to present
evidence that the requesting spouse is fabricating a claim for relief because
there is no right to intervene, the injustice cannot be avoided. 19 4 When the
nonrequesting spouse is judgment proof and therefore has no incentive to
intervene, it is up to the IRS to devote the resources it currently spends
investigating all innocent spouse claims to preventing this injustice.
Finally, revised innocent spouse relief should completely negate the
joint return for both spouses, instead of the current allocation of the liability
on that return.195 Each spouse's liability would be recalculated as though the
spouses filed as married filing separately, which has less favorable tax filing
brackets and at the cost of certain tax credits.196 Because joint and several
liability is a cost imposed on those couples who file jointly, eliminating joint
and several liability should come at the cost of the joint return. Therefore, if
a spouse chooses after the fact to claim not to support the joint return, the
couple suffers the consequences of that choice.'97 Eliminating use of the joint
filing brackets may mean that an innocent spouse has a larger tax obligation
for her share of income, but this would have been the result if she had the
ability to refuse to sign the incorrect return ex ante.
The mechanics of this rule-based relief are significantly simpler admin-
istratively than those of current relief. Requesting spouses simply make a
threshold showing that they were abused or deceived to win relief unless the
IRS disproves their claims or there are extenuating reasons to collect from
the requesting spouse. This process makes the method to obtain relief clear
to potential requesting spouses and frees the IRS from investigating every
claim for relief.
194 Of course, couples might collude (for example, a wealthy spouse could claim
abuse if the other spouse is judgment proof). That the IRS has the ability to collect from
the requesting spouse in certain circumstances reduces this risk.
'9 The IRS tried to equate innocent spouse relief with married filing separately but
the Tax Court disagreed. Wiest v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1082, 1085 (2003). At least
one person within Congress objected to this idea in 1998. 144 CONG. REc. 2045 (1998)
(statement of Sen. Bob Graham).
196 This may raise the aggregate tax liability and an abuser might offer to reimburse
the abuse victim for the tax bill if she does not go forward with her innocent spouse
claim. These results do not thwart the objective of the proposal.
197 This does mean that a non-income earning spouse might "stick it" to the income
earning spouse after a divorce, but that risk primarily exists if the income-earning spouse
did not pay the taxes owed on that income and abused or deceived the spouse. Those
factors should reduce the sympathy we have for the income-earning spouse.
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CONCLUSION
Joint and several tax liability raises the issue of whether Congress
should value equity for individuals over administration of the tax system.
This issue pervades the income tax and is one that society is loath to answer.
Should the tax system be made to work for the greatest number, understand-
ing that some people will be treated inequitably based on their individual
circumstances, or should we aim for individualized equity, understanding
that the system will cost more to operate and open itself to greater tax
evasion?
In the case of innocent spouse relief, in the attempt to help wives, relief
might well cause more harm than good. For those spouses targeted for relief,
we are creating a dangerous double standard. The reason for a more protec-
tive tax regime is that advocates worry that it is unfair to presume that wives
can meaningfully evaluate the returns they sign. It is hard to see how this
fails to send a signal to the nation that wives are not, or are at least not
considered to be, equal members in marriage. This is not a message that we
want Congress to send.
More streamlined rules can provide relief in instances in which Con-
gress seeks to provide protection because of the inequality within some mar-
riages. The result balances the objectives of recognizing wives' agency,
protecting coerced wives, and defending federal revenue. In the process, it
also encourages wives to become educated about the couple's finances. Un-
fortunately, as will always be the case with tax laws and tax relief, there will
be stories of inequity in the application of the proposed relief, both by the
government and taxpayers. And, although the proposal would fix many of
the difficulties that arise when couples file joint returns, it cannot be the end
of this debate. As people adapt both their behavior and their claims for relief
to the law, the law may need to change. For now, however, if the govern-
ment introduces this new policy by providing proper information to joint
filers, taxpayers can understand the consequences of their actions and, as a
result, move to a more perfect union.
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I think gender biases work differently for women of different
groups-race/ethnicity, immigration status, class of family of ori-
gin, and language. It's not just heightened for "other" women. For
Distinguished Professor of Law, Hastings Foundation Chair, and Director of the
Center for WorkLife Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. This
Article is adapted from Chapter 11 of JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT
WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK: FOUR PATTERNS WORKING WOMEN NEED TO KNow
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). My first thanks go to Rachel Dempsey, without
whose partnership the book would not exist and who co-wrote an earlier unpublished
draft of this article, "Double Jeopardy? How Gender Bias Differs By Race." I am deeply
indebted, too, to Erika Hall, who did an amazing job on the National Science Foundation
(NSF) interviews, and to Kathy Phillips, for taking the laboring oar in running the Diver-
sity and Inclusion for All Working Group, before which I presented a version of this
project. I received help from many others while preparing this Article, including Nicole
Witt, Jessica Dummer, Hilary Hardcastle, Erika Rist, Katherine Ullman, Susan Rebecca
Fisk, and Harvard JLG editors Elizabeth Jensen, Jean Ripley, and Rebecca Liu. My
thanks as well to my colleague Osagie Obasogie, who gave me detailed comments at a
very busy time for him, to the anonymous reviewers at the DuBois Review for helpful
comments on a prior version of this paper, and (again for their comments) to the members
of the Diversity and Inclusion for All Working Group, which was co-sponsored by Work-
Life Law and-at Columbia University-the Business School, the Center for Institu-
tional and Social Change, and Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies.
* Because the consent form used in the NSF study imposed strict confidentiality re-
quirements for the protection of the interviewees, JLG editors were not permitted to re-
view the NSF interview transcripts during the cite-checking process. Although all
quotations were double-checked by an authorized member of the author's research team,
the Harvard Journal of Law & Gender cannot independently attest to the content of the
cited material.
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example, the stereotype that women of certain groups have "too
many babies" affects perceptions of which women take time for
family leave. (Focus group participant, 2007)
INTRODUCTION
This Article reports on an empirical study undertaken with funds from
the National Science Foundation, which involved interviews of sixty women
of color in science, technology, math, and engineering (hereafter, the "NSF
study"). 2 My research started with an extensive literature review of experi-
mental social psychology studies of gender bias, which I have organized into
the Four Patterns of Gender Bias and will explicate further later in the Arti-
cle.' Then, I ran two studies. In the first, I interviewed sixty-seven women
whom I met through my networks and who had impressed me with their
professional savvy (hereafter, the "Wise Women study"). Of these, fifty-six
were white women and eleven were women of color. I then obtained a grant
from NSF to do a similar study of women of color. The NSF study inter-
views, conducted by Erika R. Hall, then a graduate student at Northwestern
University's Kellogg School of Management, included twenty interviews of
Africans or black Americans, twenty of Asians or Asian Americans, and
twenty of Latinas or women born in Spanish-speaking countries. The meth-
odology used for both studies was designed to build a bridge between exper-
imental social psychology and women's everyday workplace experience.
While this Article focuses on the NSF study, the Wise Women study is the
focus of a forthcoming book, What Works for Women at Work: Four Patterns
Working Women Need to Know, co-written by Rachel Dempsey and myself.4
The NSF study has important implications for two ongoing debates
within the literature: the controversy over implicit bias and the ongoing in-
vestigations of intersectionality. Regarding the first, the implicit bias debate
explores a particular strain of research in cognitive psychology that mea-
sures bias by using the implicit association test, or IAT.s The IAT measures
the existence and strength of racial, gender, and other biases by measuring
"response latency" (i.e., how long it takes to make a stereotype-consistent
association, such as "black men" and "crime," as compared with the time
2 The author gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the NSF through NSF
Grant #EHR 1106411, which funded the research reflected in this Article. The views
expressed here are those of the author, not those of the NSF.
For more on the Four Patterns, see GENDER BIAS LEARNING PROJECT, http://
www.genderbiasbingo.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/OYB
vVUSt67L; THE NEW GIRLS' NETWORK, http://www.newgirlsnet.com (last visited Nov.
25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0yJeE4BPgj4 (including an extensive bibliography
of the social science behind the Four Patterns).
4 WILLIAMs & DEMPSEY, supra note 1 (discussing both the Wise Women Study and
the NSF Study).
' See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edulimplicit (last visited Nov. 8,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0j8QDxGPxun.
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needed to make a stereotype-inconsistent association, such as "black men"
and "crochet").' IAT advocates often stress that, while discrimination used
to be open and explicit, today it is subtle and unconscious.' In fact, IAT
critics take this claim at face value. To illustrate, Gregory Mitchell and
Philip Tetlock assert that "prejudice, once overt, is now largely covert, in-
deed, so covert that possessors of the new prejudice are themselves unaware
both of the contents of their own minds and of how these contents bias their
judgments of protected-category groups."' Another prominent critic, Amy
Wax, asserts that unconscious discrimination is the "most pervasive and im-
portant form of bias operating in society today."9 Wax further argues that the
law should not allow for recovery on the basis of bias that is subtle and
unconscious, contending that it incentivizes employers to expend resources
to eliminate bias without yielding any benefits to employees.'0 After all, peo-
ple cannot change behavior of which they are not even aware."
While the IAT is an important tool, it has significant weaknesses as
applied to the law that can be remedied by a deeper qualitative examination
of how bias plays out in everyday life. The NSF study is designed to accom-
plish this goal. It remedies some key problems posed by law reviews' recent
over-emphasis of the IAT. Perhaps most importantly, the NSF study pro-
vides a succinct answer to a central question raised by those who have chal-
lenged the use of implicit bias evidence in court cases. These critics have
worried that experimental studies, either performed online or in university
labs, do not reflect actual experiences in workplaces.12 The NSF study sug-
gests, however, that they do. This implication is shown by the fact that when
the NSF study asked working women whether they had encountered any of
the previously mentioned patterns of gender bias, 96% reported they had.
The NSF study also draws into question the common assertion that
most gender and racial bias is now subtle. As this Article will show, some of
6 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypi-
cality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383,
384 (2006) [hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy] (finding that a defendant
who is perceived as more stereotypically black is more likely to be sentenced to death in
cases involving a white victim); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime,
and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 876, 880 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black] (finding that subjects primed with "black face" were
faster to recognize crime related-objects than those primed with "white face").
7 See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans:
Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 316,
316-17 (2000) (stating that while racism in America has declined, subtle forms of
prejudice remain); John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third
Wave, 57 J. Soc. IssuEs 829, 845 (2001) (stating that "overt" forms of prejudice have
declined while subtle forms of prejudice continue).
I Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1023-24 (2006).
9 Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130 (1999).
'old. at 1180-91.
"Id.
12 See, e.g., id. at 1140-41; Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1028-34.
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the bias women reported was subtle, but much was not subtle at all. Further-
more, the NSF methodology addresses problems that have resulted from IAT
advocates' tendency to blur the distinction between the relatively few and
recent studies that use the IAT and the much larger universe of experimental
social psychology.13 Conflating these two quite different universes has had
negative consequences for the development of equality law. Most notably,
IAT critics Mitchell and Tetlock have attacked the use of stereotyping evi-
dence in general through a critique of the methodology (i.e. the IAT).14 Their
attack has been influential." By reconnecting IAT studies with earlier stere-
otyping studies and by presenting experimental social psychology as a long-
established field of study that has well-replicated findings, the NSF method-
ology has obvious advantages. These advantages are especially pungent
given the law's reliance on precedent and its stringent rules for the admit-
tance of expert testimony.
Regarding the intersectionality debate, the approach to stereotyping evi-
dence developed in this Article has important implications not only for the
debate about implicit bias, but also for the debate about how the experience
of women of color differs from that of white women.16 An early contribution
to this debate was the "double jeopardy" hypothesis, which posits that mi-
nority women's membership in two subordinated groups adds or multiplies
their disadvantage." The double jeopardy metaphor, having originated in the
1970s, has been largely replaced by "intersectionality" theory, first ad-
vanced by law professor Kimberld Crenshaw in 1989.11 Intersectionality the-
orists have further argued that the double jeopardy model is too simple 9
1 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scien-
tific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945, 946 (2006); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L.
Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society,
94 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1182 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:
A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1063, 1064
(2006).
14 Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1029-34.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 166-78.
16 See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 139, 143 (1989), for discussion of the lack of protection
black women endure when their experience of discrimination differs from that of both
white women and black men.
"1 See, e.g., Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Black and Female: The Double Whammy, 7
PSYCHOL. TODAY 57 (1973); Elizabeth Almquist, Untangling the Effects of Race and Sex:
The Disadvantaged Status of Black Women, 56 Soc. Sci. Q. 129 (1975); Pamela Trotman
Reid, Feminism versus Minority Group Identity: Not for Black Women Only, 10 SEX
ROLEs 247 (1984); Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The
Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNs 42 (1988). Similarly, expectation states
theory in social psychology posits that women of color face the aggregated performance
expectations for race plus gender, weighted by relevance to the task at issue. Cecilia L.
Ridgeway, Gender, Status, and Leadership, 57 J. Soc IssuEs 637, 642 (2001).
" See Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 140.
19 See, e.g., Ange-Marie Hancock, When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addi-
tion: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 63, 70
(2007); Valerie Purdie-Vaughns & Richard P. Eibach, Intersectional Invisibility: The Dis-
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with two basic points emerging: one, that gender bias is a common experi-
ence for women of color, and two, their experience of gender bias often
differs from that of white women. The NSF study suggests that the first point
is indeed correct: 100% of the women of color who were interviewed recog-
nized one or more patterns of gender bias. The NSF methodology also con-
firms that the experiences of women of color differ from those of white
women. Yet, the NSF study goes further and allows us to identify some
specific ways in which the experience of gender bias differs for blacks,
whites, Latinas, and Asian Americans. This new level of specificity shows
the promise of a turn to social science in critical race theory.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the findings of the
NSF study, explicating how women in each group experienced gender bias,
often in ways that differed from each other. Part II examines the implications
of these findings for the debate in the legal scholarship over the use and
value of evidence of implicit bias in employment discrimination cases. Part
III then discusses the implications of the NSF study for the ongoing debate
on intersectionality, a discussion that has particular implications for women
of color who sue their employers for employment discrimination.
I. THE NSF STUDY
A. Methodology
The NSF study involved interviews of sixty women of color in science,
each lasting about one hour and fifteen minutes. Most of the interviewees
were professors in science, technology, engineering, or math, also known as
"STEM." Of the women interviewed, twenty were black, twenty were Asian
American, and twenty were Latina.
The interview protocol was based on an extensive literature review of
over 100 studies of gender bias, most of them involving paper-and-pencil
studies performed in a lab. These studies were organized into four basic
patterns of gender bias: Prove-It-Again!, the Tightrope, the Maternal Wall,
and Tug of War.
Prove-It-Again! refers to the fact that women as a group must provide
roughly twice as much evidence of competence as men in order to be seen as
equally competent.20 As a result, women often find they have to prove them-
selves over and over again. Prove-It-Again! lumps together many forms of
descriptive bias that reflect assumptions about how women will behave, in-
tinctive Advantages and Disadvantages of Multiple Subordinate-Group Identities, 59 SEX
ROLEs 377, 380 (2008).
20 Karen S. Lyness & Madeline E. Heilman, When Fit Is Fundamental: Performance
Evaluations and Promotions of Upper-Level Female and Male Managers, 91 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 777, 778-79 (2006).
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cluding leniency bias,2' attribution bias,22 and casuistry.23 Because the typical
occupant of a high-powered job is and has always been a man, women often
are not seen as good a "fit" for high-powered jobs.2 4 This "Lack of Fit
Model"25 means that women often have to provide more evidence of compe-
tence than men in order to be seen as equally competent.26 The Prove-It-
Again! pattern has been documented by scores of studies that show, for ex-
ample, that people often perceive men's successes are attributable to skill
and women's to luck," that women's mistakes tend to be noticed more and
remembered longer 28 that objective requirements tend to be applied rigor-
ously to women but leniently to men,29 that women tend to receive polarized
evaluations,3 0 and that people tend to value more highly whatever qualifica-
tions men have.3 To illustrate, for jobs requiring both education and experi-
ence, subjects will choose a man over a woman, citing experience as the
reason, if he has more experience and she has more education.3 2 Conversely,
subjects will also choose the man over the woman, citing education, if he has
more education and she has more experience.33
It is important to recognize that Prove-It-Again! stems from status dif-
ferentials.3 4 Consequently, it is triggered by race as well as gender. Blacks,
21 See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup Dis-
crimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS TACTICS
160, 166 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
22 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995), for a
comprehensive introduction to attribution bias.
23 See Michael 1. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 817 (2004). See generally Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida,
Who Women Are, Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stere-
otyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665 (1999).
24 See Peter Glick, Trait-Based and Sex-Based Discrimination in Occupational Pres-
tige, Occupational Salary, and Hiring, 25 SEx ROLES 351, 353 (1991).
25 Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. 269, 269 (1983).
26 See Martha Foschi, Double Standards for Competence: Theory and Research, 26
ANNUAL REV. Soc. 21, 28 (2000) (classic study of double standards); Monica Biernat &
Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-Based Standards of Competence: Lower Mini-
mum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for Devalued Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 544, 550 (1997) (women have to provide roughly twice the evidence of
competence as compared to men in order to be seen as equally competent).
27 Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sanna, He's Skilled, She's Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of
Observers' Attributions for Women's and Men's Successes and Failures, 22 PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 507, 508 (1996).
28 Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What
We Know and What We Don't Know, 10 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 6, 6 (1995).
2 Brewer, supra note 21, at 166.30 Patricia W. Linville & Edward E. Jones, Polarized Appraisals of Out-Group Mem-
bers, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 689, 695 (1980).
' Norton et al., supra note 23, at 821.32 Id.
33 Id.
1 For a discussion of how gender functions as a status differential, see Cecilia L.
Ridgeway, Status in Groups: The Importance of Motivation, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 76
(1982).
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too, must provide roughly twice as much evidence of competence as whites
in order to be seen as equally competent." The same may well be true of
Latinos, although I am not aware of any studies. With Asian Americans, the
situation is somewhat more complicated, as will be discussed further later.36
The Tightrope is prescriptive in nature in that it stems not from as-
sumptions about how women do behave but from assumptions about how
they should behave." The Tightrope reflects that high-status jobs, including
that of scientist, are seen not only as male but also as masculine.38 As com-
petence in such work overlaps heavily with traits coded as masculine, wo-
men must behave in traditionally masculine ways in order to be seen as
competent. However, women who behave too masculinely often are seen as
"aggressive" or, more generally, as lacking social skills. 9 Consequently,
women have to "walk a tightrope" between appearing too feminine (liked-
but-not-respected) or seen as too masculine (respected-but-not-liked). 40 Of
course, in order to thrive professionally, professionals typically must be both
liked and respected.4'
The Tightrope actually consists of two quite different types of
problems. First, women face "too feminine" problems when they behave in
ways that display undervalued feminine traits, whether because that is the
way they were brought up or because they face gender-normalizing pres-
sures within the workplace to conform to traditionally "feminine" standards.
Women who contest pressures to remain in service roles, or who otherwise
resist gender pressures to adhere to narrowly cabined feminine roles, may
well walk straight into the second type of problems. These problems consist
of being perceived as "too masculine," including allegations that they are
"not team players" or are "prima donnas" (i.e. not as selfless as women are
expected to be), 42 or that they are "too aggressive" or have "sharp elbows"
11 Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 26, at 554.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 109-38.
" See Burgess & Borgida, supra note 23, at 665-66. See generally Deborah A. Pren-
tice & Erica Carranza, What Women and Men Should Be, Shouldn't Be, Are Allowed to
Be, and Don't Have to Be: The Contents of Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes, 26 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 269, 279-80 (2002) (providing an informative introduction to prescriptive
bias); Laurie A. Rudman et al., Status Incongruity and Backlash Effects: Defending the
Gender Hierarchy Motivates Prejudice Against Female Leaders, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 165, 166 (2012) (discussing gender stereotypes as "gender rules").
31 See Glick, supra note 24, at 364.
9 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35, 251 (1989)
(describing the "catch-22" that women face as "out of a job if they behave aggressively
and out of a job if they do not").
40 See Susan T. Fiske et al., (Dis)respecting versus (Dis)liking: Status and Interde-
pendence Predict Ambivalent Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth, 55 J. Soc. ISSUES
473, 476-77 (1999).
41 See generally Susan T. Fiske et al., Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition:
Warmth and Competence, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 77 (2007).
42 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1188
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (referring to discrimination plaintiff as a "prima donna").
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(i.e. are not as amiable and yielding as women are expected to be). 43 Women
leaders, in particular, often encounter "too masculine" problems because the
attributes expected of leaders do not overlap with the attributes expected of
women." One particularly striking study found that women described as ef-
fective managers were also seen as bitter and selfish despite the lack of sig-
nals of such qualities in the scenarios presented to experimental subjects. 45
Women of color walk a Tightrope that differs from that walked by white
women in complex ways. 46
The Maternal Wall consists of both descriptive and prescriptive bias.
The descriptive bias aspect reflects the perception that if women in general
do not seem a good fit for the "hard driving professional," mothers seem an
even poorer one. Consequently, motherhood triggers powerful negative
competence and commitment assumptions.47 When subjects were given iden-
tical resumes and one but not the other was a mother, the mother was 79%
less likely to be hired, only half as likely to be promoted, offered an average
of $11,000 less in salary, and held to "harsher performance and punctuality
standards." 48 If women encounter descriptive bias based on the assumption
they will behave like "typical" mothers, they also face strong prescriptive
bias if they do fail to behave as mothers "should." Consequently, mothers
who are indisputably competent and committed face more workplace back-
lash than mothers who portray ambiguous information regarding their level
of competence and commitment.49
The Tug of War occurs when gender bias against women turns into
conflicts among women. The most obvious example is when women per-
ceive that there is room for only one, or a few, women at the top. They may
well end up undercutting each other to be that one woman. As a result, the
Tug of War can play a role in shaping office politics, especially considering
women who experience gender bias early in their careers tend to distance
themselves from other women and resist identification based on their gen-
4 See Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 70-72); Pamela J. Bettis &
Natalie G. Adams, Nice at Work in the Academy 2, 16 (Feb. 3, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). Alice Eagly and Stephen J. Karau describe the Tightrope,
which they define somewhat differently than I do, as two types of prejudice facing wo-
men: negative evaluations of women's potential for leadership and negative reactions to
actual leadership behavior by women, due to the conflict with expectations for women's
behavior. See Alice Eagly & Stephen J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice To-
ward Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REv. 573, 576 (2002).
" See Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis,
111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 16-19 (1992).
4 Madeline E. Heilman et al., Has Anything Changed? Current Characterizations of
Men, Women, and Managers, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 935, 941 (1989).
46 See id.
4 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
48 Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM.
J. Soc. 1297, 1316-17 (2007).
4 Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Mother-
hood Penalty, 24 GENDER & Soc. 616, 639 (2010).
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der.s0 At a subtler level, as each woman tries to navigate her own path be-
tween assimilating into masculine traditions and resisting them, women's
different strategies divide them. While some women are "tomboys" who
just want access, to play the game the boys play, others are "femmes" who
want to preserve more of the traditions of femininity.' These varying strate-
gies often pit women against each other. So, too, can motherhood, as re-
flected in "mommy wars" in which women often engage in conflict about
the "right" way to be a mother.
Some provisos: the analysis that follows is an exploratory study that
simplifies the experience of women of color in many ways. It lumps them
into three groups-Latinas, Asian Americans, and black women-that erase
many important differences within each group. This erasure is easiest to see
with Asian Americans, a group that includes descendants of people from
China, Japan, Korea, and India, to name just a few of the highly diverse
Asian countries from which individuals have emigrated to the United
States.52 Latinas include women from a wide range of racial and ethnic iden-
tities, ranging from Americans in Puerto Rico to Portuguese-speaking
Brazilians. The group of black women includes everyone from recent immi-
grants to women whose ancestors were brought to the United States in the
seventeenth century." The categorization of minorities into categories like
Asian American, Latina, and black often does more to describe stereotypes
white people have of people of color than it does to describe identities exper-
ienced by individual people; although, of course, it is complicated consider-
ing the role that the experience of stereotypes can play in the shaping of
identity. Nonetheless, these categories are widely used in the study of race
bias, and I will be using them here.
In addition, because the study interviewed scientists, it involved not
only Americans but also immigrants and foreigners teaching in American
universities. For reasons of confidentiality, we do not distinguish between
Americans and non-Americans even though the two groups' experiences are
often very different. Furthermore, because the climate for women is particu-
larly chilly in science, some of the findings reported here may not hold for
women in other professions. Of course, the workplace climate for hourly
so See Belle Derks et al., Do Sexist Organizational Cultures Create the Queen Bee?,
50 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 519, 530 (2011).
1' Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 196-99).
52 Compare Nazli Kibria, The Construction of 'Asian American': Reflections on In-
termarriage and Ethnic Identity Among Second-Generation Chinese and Korean Ameri-
cans, 20 ETHNIC & RACIAL STuD. 523 (1997) (examining the development of a Pan-
Asian identity among Chinese and Koreans Americans), with Lisa Lowe, Heterogeneity,
Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Differences, in CONTEMPORARY ASIAN
AMERICA: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 505 (Min Zhou & J.V. Gatewood eds., 2007)
(exploring the dynamics of Asian American experiences).
13 While the drawbacks of lumping immigrants in with Americans are obvious con-
sidering the experiences of the two groups may well differ in important ways, there are so
few women of color in science that this aggregation was necessary to protect the confi-
dentiality of my informants.
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workers no doubt differs in important ways from the situations faced by
salaried professionals.
B. No Surprise: Women of Color Encounter Racial as well as
Gender Bias
Although our focus is on gender bias that women of color share with
white women, women of color also share similar experiences of bias with
men of color that they do not share with white women. The centrality of race
is highlighted by the fact that although the interviews specifically focused on
gender, the informants also reported experiences of racial bias. A black wo-
man recalled being deeply offended when a college professor joked that she
must know all about rats because she came from the inner city. An Asian
American woman born in the United States described a "forever foreign"
experience commonplace among Asian Americans in which she keeps being
asked what country she grew up in and complimented on her English. A
Latina commented, "There seems to be this stereotype that, if you are from
Mexico, you are lazy, and you only like to either sleep by a cactus or party.
And I have battled extremely hard [against] all of these stereotypes." An-
other Latina recalled raising her voice only to have a colleague joke, "Oh, be
careful, she's Puerto Rican, and she may be carrying a knife in her purse."
Again and again, women of color described their interactions as
"demeaning" or "disrespectful," words that did not come up in the inter-
views with white women. One woman recounted hearing that a white male
senior professor threw a board eraser at a colleague of color and said, "Hey,
you, why don't you write this down?" She also heard from students that
other professors in her department did not believe she would make tenure.
"It was just like somewhere somebody sitting in the back and making
armchair comments like that to a student. And it just-it felt so wrong."
Although racial bias was not the focus of the NSF study, it is important not
to erase this disrespect, which was most commonly reported by black wo-
men; no white woman interviewed for What Works for Women at Work re-
ported feeling demeaned, a feeling bound to have a profound effect on one's
experience at work.5 4
Another distinctive theme that emerged was that many women of color
reported feeling a sense of isolation. "This has been a very lonely life," said
one black woman. Another reported "feeling inadequate, some depression"
because "you really don't have the support you need." The most striking
story was of an Asian American woman whose department chair put up on
the blackboard a diagram with three circles depicting the interrelations
within the department. She was way out, isolated, on the extreme edge. "I
said, 'You know, if I was a little bit to the right, I'd be out of the depart-
ment," she quipped. But, she admitted, "It gets to me. It's hurtful." A black
4 Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 224-25).
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woman explained why she avoided socializing with her colleagues: "If it's
too social, then I think there's a great risk of you being put in that sub-
servient position and being looked at that way." No white woman from
What Works for Women at Work reported a similar sense of anxiety that
socializing with her colleagues would threaten her authority, or the same
tone of desolate isolation.55
Racism is an important factor in the lives of women of color. Neverthe-
less, the focus in this Article is on the experiences women of color share
with white women. The interviews show they share quite a bit. As one black
woman stated upon hearing the description of the four types of gender bias,
"I can identify with each of the four buckets. I can identify with each." All
informants identified with one or more of these patterns.
C. Black Women
Prove-It-Again! and Again and Again and Again. Studies have docu-
mented the stereotype that blacks are generally perceived as less competent
than whites.56 According to experimental social psychology studies, more
generic racist stereotypes of blacks-that blacks are lazy, ignorant, stupid-
may also work against them in employment. 7
A complex picture emerges when one throws gender into the mix.
Black women often trigger two sets of negative competence assumptions:
one because they are women and another because they are black." One strik-
ing study found that a job candidate with a black-sounding name needed
eight additional years of experience in order to get the same number of
callbacks as someone with an identical resume but a white-sounding name.59
In one 2006 study, some black women responded to the study survey
with comments about strong "expectations for their failure."a Another study
found that black women are punished more harshly than white women or
black men for making a mistake.' A study of black professional women
5 See id.
56 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimina-
tion, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 991, 998 (2004).
* See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 379, 385 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, Gardner
Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).
58 See Biemat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 26, at 554.
9 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 56, at 998; see also M.A. Hitt et al., Discrim-
ination in Industrial Employment: An Investigation of Race and Sex Bias Among Profes-
sionals, 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONs 217, 223-27 (1982) (showing that employer
expectations vary based on prospective employees' race and gender).
I See Isis H. Settles, Use of an Intersectional Framework to Understand Black Wo-
men's Racial and Gender Identities, 54 SEx ROLES 589, 595 (2006).
61 See Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Robert W. Livingston, Failure is Not an Option for
Black Women: Effects of Performance on Leaders with Single Versus Dual-Subordinate
Identities, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1162, 1165-66 (2012).
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found that they often felt stereotyped as incompetent and unqualified. 62 One
black woman responded to the survey by saying, "It is difficult being a
black woman because everyone expects you to fail, or if you didn't fail, they
think it was because of charity. Not your own merit."63
The NSF study confirmed these findings. "I absolutely agree with the
statement that for African American women it is prove it again, and again,
and again, and again. It's interesting-I have to say, I've always thought
about it more just as being African American as opposed to being a wo-
man," said one lawyer. Another woman agreed: "I think people expect that I
got here by some fluke, by some series of affirmative action things and set-
aside programs and that I may not be as strong a scientist as others." A
scientist noted that at the two yearly conferences in her field,
When I go to give presentations, it's not that I feel like the audi-
ence doesn't necessarily believe my results, but I do feel as though
I have to, at times, defend it before I can even present it. I really
don't think it's just because I'm a female. I think that that's secon-
dary to my race.
This sense that Prove-It-Again! problems stemmed from race but not gender
was only expressed by black interviewees but not by Latinas or Asian
Americans."r
A black doctor who originally had been an engineer contested the
"race, not gender" interpretation. She highlighted the importance of context.
As a doctor, she felt that people's initial reluctance to take her seriously was
more because of her race than her gender. She attributed this reluctance to
the fact that, in medicine, women are common but black people are rare.
When she was in engineering, though, where women are rare, she felt her
Prove-It-Again! problems stemmed from gender. Perhaps the conviction that
race, not gender, explains black women's Prove-It-Again! problems reflects
that black women scientists feel more isolated as blacks than as women.
Black women's experience of Prove-It-Again! differs significantly from
that of both white women and black men. A study by social psychologists
Ashleigh Shelby Rosette and Robert W. Livingston found that black women
are rated more harshly when things go awry than either black men or white
women.6 1 "There's just no room for error," said a highly respected and ac-
complished lawyer. "It's just so deeply ingrained in you that I don't even
62 ELLA L.J. EDMONDSON BELL & STELLA M. NKOMO, OUR SEPARATE WAYS: BLACK
AND WHITE WOMEN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY 145 (2001).
63 See also Anita Jones Thomas et al., Gendered Racial Identity of Black Young Wo-
men, 64 SEX ROLES 530, 537-38 (2011) (describing the pressure of overcoming
stereotypes).
* Accord Isis H. Settles, supra note 60, at 598 (citing earlier studies that establish a
"stronger relationship . . . between black and black-woman identity importance than be-
tween woman and black-woman identity").
I Rosette & Livingston, supra note 61, at 1165-66 (confirming that black women
are disproportionately sanctioned for mistakes).
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think about it anymore. To the extent that other folks might feel that they can
have a bad day. . . I never feel I have that luxury. You're just always on, and
if you're not on, you'd better make people think you're on." I commented
that that sounded exhausting.
"It is. It absolutely is," she replied.
A black woman lawyer echoed similar sentiments in the outstanding
report Visible Invisibility: Women of Color in Law Firms: "'White associates
are not expected to be perfect. Black associates ... have one chance and if
you mess up that chance, look out. There is no room for error." 66
A vice president at a major company felt the same way:
You need to be on your A game, and when you are, you can turn
the liability of stereotyping into an advantage. Frequently enough,
some white men do not expect someone who looks like me-or so
visibly different from them-to speak the way I speak or show up
the way that I do. They seem initially disarmed by the common
ground that we may share. Frankly, I just don't observe the same
reaction with women or people of color for the most part. If they
[the white men] can see a common history or experience, you get
extra brownie points. But if you're not showing up with your A
game, the consequences seem more severe given the scrutiny and
presumptive challenge of your intellect, vocabulary, and back-
ground. I don't have that margin for error," she continued. "And,
on the other hand, to be frank, I recognize that I'm probably given
more kudos than your average male or, perhaps, white woman,
because I am relatively eloquent, presentable, and articulate. Re-
gardless, the stakes are big.67
This pattern is documented in what social scientists call "shifting stan-
dards": when we perceive that someone does well for a woman or for a
person of color. Most women of any race have heard some variation of "You
climb [or throw or negotiate] well for a girl."68
Since success is so precarious for women of color, performance pres-
sure becomes "a self-fulfilling negative prophecy," to quote a company vice
president. This paradigm is called stereotype threat: when one's knowledge
of the stereotype leads to decreased performance.6 9 Another black NSF inter-
viewee said, "In my more cynical moments, it's an unrealistic expectation to
think that one can consistently be as good as you feel you need to be." Such
' JANET E. GANS EPNER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN
THE PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMs 25 (2006).
67 Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 228-29).
68 Cf Diane Kobrynowicz & Monica Biernat, Decoding Subjective Evaluations: How
Stereotypes Provide Shifting Standards, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 579, 584-87
(1993) (documenting shifting standards in perceptions of mothers versus fathers).
69 CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: How STEREOTYPES AFFECT US AND
WHAT WE CAN Do 11 (2010).
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sentiments were similarly expressed by other interviewees: "I've been doing
this now for almost 20 years. You never feel as though you have a comfort
level where you're not on your toes because you have to prove it and prove
it," said a lawyer. A vice president added:
The Prove-It-Again! is, I think, exponentially increased when you
have double minority status. I certainly feel like that is the reality
of my experience. Notwithstanding the 'halo' effect, you're as
good as your last . . . trial, deal, or novel. Women and people of
color may face the additional obstacle of a presumption of less-
than-competency. More precisely, white men may have an unwar-
ranted presumption of legitimacy. For many of our well-inten-
tioned 'white' brothers, this presumption is not promoted or self-
created. It's deeply embedded within our culture.
She recounted her experience with the 'stolen idea':
Typically, in my experience, it tends to be a male who will speak
over the point, rather than allowing for the question to be ad-
dressed and attributed to you. Someone may bring up the same
issue later in the conversation and restate precisely, or close
enough, what you offered up to the audience, without attribution
or acknowledgment that . .. they were parroting you or adding on
to your thesis.
My instinctive internal reaction to these events is "Was I not
clear? Was there something deficient in my communication? Was I
not forceful or authoritative enough? Did I not speak with suffi-
cient authority? Was it me? Or was it them?"
She said it gets easier to be more forceful and commanding if you work with
enough men and whites "to realize they're as much of a nincompoop as you
are."
Similarly, the scientists interviewed reported Prove-It-Again! problems
both with colleagues and with students. As one said, "I have always had the
impression when I start a class, a course, it is always an uphill kind of battle.
I get the impression that students don't believe that I know what I'm sup-
posed to know."70 Another scientist recalled that when she was a student and
assigned to work in a group, her contributions fell on deaf ears. "And it
wasn't until the professor came around and said, 'Are you guys listening to
what [she] is saying?' where it hit home to me that, you know, it didn't
70Accord Caroline Sotello Viernes Turner, Women of Color in Academe: Living with
Multiple Marginality, 73 J. HIGHER EDUC. 74, 83 (2002) ("Faculty women of color per-
ceive that they are more likely to have their authority challenged by students than are
White male professors.").
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matter what I was saying. But it was just the fact that it was coming from my
mouth."
Colleagues, too, often assumed the worst. One scientist recalled that
when a student called to complain about a professor, an administrator auto-
matically assumed that the problem professor was her. She further reported a
classic Prove-It-Again! Pattern, "Even when I get really good evaluations,
then the next thing that follows is, 'Well, you're an easy grader, and so that
must be why.'" Note how casually her success was discounted and written
off.
The Tightrope. The bad news is that black women are in double jeop-
ardy on the Prove-It-Again! axis. The good news is that black women may
experience fewer Tightrope problems than other groups of women. The evi-
dence, however, remains tentative and somewhat contradictory.'
Black women may have more leeway to behave in masculine ways be-
cause black people, as a group, are seen as more masculine than whites. 2
Thus, masculine-type behavior may seem less jarring when presented by a
black woman. Another explanation may rest in the idea that black women
might be less threatening to the power structure simply because they are so
marginalized. As noted by a black academic, "When a black woman speaks
up and asserts herself-that's cute."
No matter the reason, many black interviewees felt that the option of
"walking the tightrope" was not even available. When, as part of the NSF
study, I asked a focus group of black women scientists whether they had felt
they had to choose between being liked-but-not-respected or respected-but-
not-liked, several women looked at me pityingly. The option of being liked
but not respected, they said, was never open to them. Their only choice was
to be respected-but-not-liked. These interviewees' observations are consis-
tent with what has been found to be the case -more broadly in the context of
interracial interactions; blacks in general seek to be respected more than
whites, who are more likely to seek to be liked.71
However, this is not to say that black women do not face any Tightrope
problems. A black woman in medicine described it in classic terms:
I've learned how to speak my mind without pissing people off. I
don't come across as too masculine, that bitch with the chip on her
shoulder. I've just figured out how to hold my ground and not be
pushed over but, at the same time, not be considered a witch.
An important question, upon which I have found no systematic evidence, concerns
whether women of color face different gender norms and biases depending on whether
they are interacting with white men or men of other racial groups. I can only encourage
more study of this crucial issue.
72 See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., "Ain't I a Woman?": Towards an Intersectional Ap-
proach to Person Perception and Group-Based Harms, 59 SEx ROLES 392, 400 (2008)
(finding a correlation between perceived "blackness" and perceived "masculinity").
7 Hilary B. Bergsieker et al., To Be Liked Versus Respected: Divergent Goals in
Interracial Interactions, 99 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 248, 261 (2010).
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Additionally, like white women, the scientists of color interviewed reported
feeling tremendous pressure to do committee work, a classic example of
office housework. Such committees play an important role in academic gov-
ernance, but service on them is severely undervalued. What gets professors
tenure and accolades is research, not serving on committees. The most
poignant story was of a black scientist whose mentors were "very adamant"
that she did not "need to sit on every blasted committee." So, in a meeting
with her respective provost, she pointed out that whites as well as people of
color could be tapped to serve on diversity committees. The provost clue-
lessly responded by inviting her to serve on another committee. "Of course
I'm not going to say no to the provost. This is the man who basically has my
tenure in his hands."
Office "housework" aside, black women interviewed in the NSF study
were less likely than white women to report feeling that they could not be
their authentic selves because of their loyalty to feminine traditions, with
two exceptions. One was self-promotion, which may present an even bigger
hurdle for black than white women. A lawyer pointed out that black people
are taught as children to be humble: "You do not boast because it's not hum-
ble. And it's important to be humble."7 4 She continued, "You hear over and
over again, nobody is better than anyone else."" A scientist agreed: "Even
those who do it eventually, it takes a very long time to learn that. And you
pay a price for it."
The second "too feminine" problem black women commonly faced
concerned clothes. If "you come from a culture-Latino, black southerner-
where your grandmother wore a hat every Sunday and/or like [sic] a lot of
loud, flashy colors and big, bling jewelry, there can be a dilemma about how
to fit in and yet be your most authentic self," noted a black professional in
San Francisco.
Black women also reported fewer problems on the "too masculine" end
of the spectrum. This result is not surprising given a truly fascinating study
by Robert Livingston, Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, and Ella F. Washington,
which found that black women are allowed to behave in more assertive and
dominant ways than white women.16 They found that assertive black women
were not evaluated more negatively when they expressed dominance, al-
though both white women and black men were. Similar results have been
found in other studies, such as one in which it was found that black women
74 Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 232).
75 Id.
16 Robert W. Livingston, Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Ella F. Washington, Can an
Agentic Black Woman Get Ahead? The Impact of Race and Interpersonal Dominance on
Perceptions of Female Leaders, 23 PSYCHOL. Sci. 354, 357 (2012).
7 Id. at 356.
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who displayed dominance were judged as more likable and more hirable
than identical white women.78
The NSF study interviews revealed many examples in which black wo-
men used an assertive, non-deferential style at work. A woman lawyer noted
that black women at her firm "are actually lauded for that sort of assertive-
ness, aggressiveness," but said she was "sure it isn't the same for some of
the Caucasian female associates." A scientist agreed: "I've never really dealt
with being thought of as a bitch, but I kind of aspire to that a little bit be-
cause I see, at this university at least, that actually it's a very effective per-
ception [to create]." Noting that she is "very outspoken in meetings," she
said she felt she was rewarded for assertive behavior. Said a black lawyer, "I
think there's a certain amount of sassiness, if you will, that is oddly enough
even expected." She continued, "I've certainly never been accused of being
too feminine."" "I've been rewarded and praised for dominance," said an-
other lawyer. "It's something people admire about me." 0
A black doctor said she was confrontational when a male doctor of
color attempted to take over a room she needed for patients.
I was using three rooms. He had two. He basically walked up to
me and he said, "I need three, so I'm going to take room three.
You can use two." I basically turned around and said, "No, you're
not. I'm using three rooms." He goes, "I can't have the third
room?" I said, "No, I'm using it." I just turned around and kept
working.
Two nurses nearby said, "You should have seen the look on his face."
Black women's room to be more assertive, however, is not without lim-
its. One black scientist told a truly hair-raising story that occurred after she
had suffered a traumatic brain injury. The people at the hospital observed
one interaction she had with people who worked for her and said that she
was "unnecessarily brusque, undeferential." "Let's remember that these
people worked for me. They were white males." The hospital staff said,
"[I]t was obvious that I needed to stay in rehabilitation longer until I started
acting like a woman." She recalled wryly, "This was in [the South]. I don't
know how to be the southern belle. I'm from [a Northern city]." She felt she
had little choice but to play along. "I dropped my IQ by several points and
started looking for little things to decorate myself with."
1 Erika Richardson, Katherine Phillips, Laurie Rudman & Peter Glick, Double Jeop-
ardy or Greater Latitude: Do Black Women Escape Backlash for Dominance Displays? 2
(May 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Kathrynn A.
Adams, Who Has the Final Word? Sex, Race, and Dominance Behavior, 38 J. PERSONAL-
rrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (1980) (suggesting that black women exhibited more "domi-
nance" than white women).
* Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at 233).
80 Id. Another black woman explained in Visible Invisibility that her white co-work-
ers "expect a Black woman to be extremely aggressive and to do really well on trial."
EPNER, supra note 66, at 26.
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Many women of color noted their awareness of the need to avoid being
seen as an "angry black woman." One black woman in medicine noted "the
stereotype that if you're aggressive, then you're definitely the B word." A
lawyer also noted the risks of anger. "I am allowed to be passionate, even to
demonstrate some level of anger, but it better not be personal. It better not be
about me. If I become angry about anything personal, then that is perceived
as being an angry black woman." This quote perfectly illustrates the findings
of a still-unpublished follow-up study by Robert Livingston, which found
that African American women are allowed more "get it done" agency-but
not more "get ahead" agency."' Our interviews confirmed this proposition.
Black women can use a direct, assertive style, but not to act in ambitious,
self-promoting, or power-seeking ways. Black women have license to be
assertive in achieving the goals of the group but not in seeking power for
themselves.
The Maternal Wall. Black women definitely face the Maternal Wall. A
2006 survey by the American Bar Association found that the same propor-
tion of both women of color and white women-nearly three-quarters-felt
their career commitment was questioned after they gave birth to or adopted a
child.8 2
Women we spoke with reported both hostile and benevolent prescrip-
tive bias. A black scientist recalled an incident in which a colleague was told
to go home and have more babies. Another black scientist recalled her boss
saying, "Wow, why are you here so early? You should be home with the
baby." He meant well, she recognized, but still it troubled her.
One black lawyer told us her boss was telling other people he was not
sure she was going to come back after she had her baby:
I finally had to talk to him about that. I had to tell him, "Please
stop telling people that you're not sure I'm coming back. I'm com-
ing back. I want to come back. I like to do the work. I need to
work, and having a child really puts more pressure on me to be
successful at work so that he can have the opportunities I want him
to have." He was creating problems for me that he probably wasn't
aware of."
At the same time, the contours of Maternal Wall bias are slightly differ-
ent for black women than they are for white women. Some differences stem
from different family patterns. If white women's work-family conflicts typi-
cally stem from motherhood in two-parent families, black women's conflicts
may reflect that they find it harder than white women to find a partner. "I
"1 Robert Livingston, Assistant Professor, Kellogg School of Manage-
ment, Northwestern University, Presentation at a Working Group on Diversity and Inclu-
sion for All at Columbia University (Nov. 30, 2012) (study conducted with Ella F.
Washington and Ashleigh Rosette, to be titled What is Agency? An Examination of Why
Black Women Can Have Moxie but Not Power).
82 EPNER, supra note 66, at 27.
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think it's easier for people to understand work-life balance issues in the con-
text of kids, right? As opposed to 'I'm single and I want to find a mate, so
that's the balance I'm trying to achieve,"' said a lawyer. Among those who
were surveyed for Visible Invisibility, women of color were more than four
times more likely to be single than were white women: 35% of women of
color reported being "single, never married," as compared to 8% of white
women. 3 Only 56% of women of color reported being married, as compared
with 81% of white women.
Family structures of black women are often different from those of
white women. "A lot of women of color don't have husbands or partners, or
their husbands could be in a different kind of career with less flexibility,"
said one informant. Another observed that at her workplace there is a signifi-
cant difference between a man with three kids and a single black woman
with three kids. "The man will be treated like a breadwinner and the woman
like shit," she said bluntly.
The bright side is that wider circles of care offer some women of color
resources unheard of within most white families. A black woman in
medicine met a family through her church.
They said, "We'll be your family away from home," and they were
very true to their word. They kind of adopted themselves as my
surrogate mother and father. .. . When my daughter was born, they
were like, "Oh, we have another grandchild." I can say really that,
for me, I've been really blessed.
One woman noted that women of color have historically not had nan-
nies, leading to a distinctive form of prescriptive bias in which some women
felt criticized for their reluctance to take this path. "We haven't done the
nanny thing a lot. That's kind of new for black folks," said one scientist. One
black woman scientist told us that when colleagues have asked questions
about why she doesn't get a nanny so she can work more, she felt her parent-
ing style was being questioned. In sum, black women's experience of the
Maternal Wall appeared to be profoundly influenced by family patterns and
traditions of family caregiving that differed from those of white women.
Tug of War. African American scientists reported a wide variety of clas-
sic gender wars. "I have seen females trying to be very accommodating and
playing a certain role that made them more likable. I tended to be very pro-
fessional, straightforward, and not stroking people's egos or whatnot," said a
black woman. She recalled "woman wars" where someone strives to prove
"she is better; she can give more, she can do more, and there were games
played along those lines." "That happened over and over again," she said.
Another black scientist noted that at a monthly meeting, the only other wo-
man in her group "pretty much focuses attention on the men." She added,
83 Id. at 72.
8 Id.
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"Rarely she'll look at me. I'm thinking she might be one of those type of
women where, okay, there's only room for one."
The classic "tokenism effect" was also in evidence. Said a black scien-
tist, "I have been in an organization where there was room for one woman,
but one woman decided that she was it and would simply sabotage her col-
leagues, which unfortunately included me." The limitations placed on wo-
men as a group affected the dynamic between them.
Sometimes Tugs of War arise between black and white women based on
different understandings of womanly behavior. One scientist noted strain
with white administrative assistants because, she felt, black women do not
share white women's habit of bonding by sharing personal information. She
expressed relief that black assistants "just do not expect [her] to want to
know anything about their personal business." The same was not true of
their white counterparts. "I think white women share a lot of personal busi-
ness, and it's a bonding with them," she said. This sharing of "personal
business," what Deborah Tannen calls "troubles talk," evidently is a tradi-
tion among white women but not blatk women."
In addition to this race-specific tension, a few women we interviewed
reported other kinds of pushback from administrative assistants that sounded
very similar to what happens to white women. One noted that administrative
staff took longer to complete work given by women than men. Another's
response concurred: "My stuff won't get done first."
Another dimension of the Tug of War can emerge between older and
younger women in the workplace. An African American scientist reflected
on the femmes-versus-tomboys dynamic as she mused about her treatment
of a younger woman. "I would always tell her, 'You need to man up, stop all
that crying, because they are going to keep walking over you and keep criti-
cizing your research and your papers if you don't stand up and take charge."'
She added, "Probably I could have told her in a different way."
Sometimes these tensions take on a disquieting racial dimension. "I
went to my first job, and it was fine. I never got any feedback on my person-
ality," remarked a lawyer. "When I came to my current company, the cul-
ture was so completely different. I immediately got feedback about being a
more empathetic person and being a person who would be easier to relate
to." She continued,
I certainly think that if I was a white man, I would never have been
given so much feedback about being an empathetic person and
how important it would be to try to make people more comfortable
with me. I also think that part of what has been interpreted as my
"hard edges" are attributable to me being a black woman.
"DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND 100 (1990).
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She said, "The feedback I've gotten about being nicer, more empathetic, all
come from white women. No black woman has ever told me that, and no
white man has ever told me that."
As previously discussed, racial conflict is often less subtle. One lawyer
recounted a white female supervisor who, when a white colleague said she
was leaving early one Friday, cordially told the colleague to go get a pedi-
cure and enjoy herself. But when the lawyer, who is black, said she was
leaving too, her supervisor bristled and started cross-examining her about
whether she had gotten all her work done. This interaction was one of many
instances of hyper-scrutiny and hostility by her supervisor. The interviewee
ended up leaving the firm. It is hard to know whether the supervisor's behav-
ior reflected racial hostility, but that is a key point about racism; it is often
hard to tell exactly why someone is acting negatively toward you.
As will be further discussed below, a final key difference between
black and white women in the experience of Tug of War bias is that the black
informants judged older women who offered advice, even unwelcome ad-
vice, far less harshly than was typical of white women. One woman, in dis-
cussing some particularly off-putting advice received from older colleagues,
put it gently. "They didn't mean any harm." she said. "They were trying to
protect me from grief."
D. Latinas
Prove-It-Again! And Again and Again? Latinas also suffer from nega-
tive competence assumptions, and in fact one study quantifying bias indi-
cates that they may be ranked even lower in competence than blacks.86
Commonly held stereotypes are that Latinos "have tendencies to be lazy and
to party" and that they "have a tendency to lose their temper."87 Latina
professionals sometimes feel they operate in an "immigrant shadow" in
which they must counter the assumption that they have recently immi-
grated." As one professional in an alternative study said, "I've had people
say, 'I didn't know that there were any educated people in Mexico that have
a graduate degree.' "89
Adding gender into the equation primes additional race-specific stereo-
types. Today, one of the most prevalent stereotypes of Latinas is that
16 See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Compe-
tence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 878, 891-92 (2002) [hereinafter Fiske et al., A Model].
* See Andrew W. Bribriesco, Latinola Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes,
Unconscious Bias, Race-Neutral Policies, and Personal Injury, 13 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 373, 381 (2010).
8 Min Zhou & Jennifer Lee, Becoming Ethnic or Becoming American? Reflecting on
the Divergent Pathways to Social Mobility and Assimilation Among the New Second Gen-
eration, 4 Du Bois REv. 189, 200-01 (2007).
* Denise A. Segura, Chicanas in White-Collar Jobs: "You Have to Prove Yourself
More," 35 Soc. PERSP. 163, 173 (1992).
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"'[t]hey make good domestics.'"90 "Marfa, the housemaid or counter girl,
is now indelibly etched into the national psyche. The big and the little
screens have presented us with the picture of the funny Hispanic maid, mis-
pronouncing words and cooking up a spicy storm in a shiny California
kitchen." 9' Latino men are subject to parallel but distinct stereotypes:
" 'Spanish is the language of doormen, dishwashers, and fruit pickers . . .
[and English is] the language of doctors, dentists, and lawyers."' 92 Recall
from the introduction of this Article the story of the scientist who had "bat-
tled extremely hard" against the stereotype that Mexicans are lazy and "only
like to either sleep by a cactus or party." The same scientist listed the dy-
namics within the stereotype: "the friendly Mexican or the passive Mexican
or the disorganized Mexican."
Whereas black women tended to attribute their Prove-It-Again!
problems to race, Latinas may be more likely to place gender before race in
the employment context. "'[Y]ou have to prove yourself more just because
you are-number one-a woman, and then [because] you are Latino,"'
noted a Chicana professional in another study.93 Another woman put the em-
phasis less clearly on gender over race: "Some people have these knee-jerk
reactions that people of color or women of color aren't as competent." She
recalled coming upon a group of her colleagues discussing her own experi-
ment-without her. "Guys, are you talking about my project? Then I should
probably be involved," she said to them. She observed, "And it was a sur-
prise to them that I should be involved in the discussions of my project
because I was not considered to be able or capable of offering any useful
information."
The examples offered by interviewees of situations where they felt as
though they were presumed incompetent go on and on. A scientist had her
success in an experiment discounted by male colleagues who attributed her
success to the fact she was using their protocol, as if the precision with
which she had carried out the protocol was of no consequence. A Latina
scientist remembered when audience members actually interrupted her dur-
ing a presentation. A Latina lawyer recalled that she wrote a brief for a
supervisor who gave her a bad review and never gave her a second chance,
although he championed a male associate "who time and time again com-
pletely annoyed him and produced substandard work product. He didn't
write that person off." The same woman recalled with rueful amusement a
somewhat soused colleague telling her she had given a really good presenta-
tion at a meeting:
" Judith Ortiz Cofer, The Myth of the Latin Woman: Just Met a Girl Named Maria, in
RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 295 (Paul S.
Rothenberg ed., 1998).
91 Id.
92 STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGoS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE AMERI-
CAN IMAGINATION 107-08 (2003).
93 Segura, supra note 89, at 163.
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He said, "Yeah, but I mean you were just so authoritative, and like
you really knew your stuff," and went on and on, probably four
times.... And then he said, "You were just really articulate." . . .
It was the funniest thing, and I mean, funny in a sad, sad way.
The clear and painful assumption was that it was completely astonishing that
a Latina could be so accomplished.
The Tightrope. In some ways, Latinas get the worst of both worlds.
They face enhanced Prove-It-Again! bias similar to black women, but unlike
black women they face major Tightrope problems. "How do you portray
yourself?" asked a Latina doctor. "I mean, you are a woman, you don't have
to be a man. But at the same time, if you want to fit in, do you have to
behave like the men?"
Latinas' Tightrope problems cluster predominantly on the "too femi-
nine" side.9 4 Clothing is a particularly charged issue, said one scientist, who
"toned down" her style so that people would take her more seriously. "I
don't want them to be distracted by my earrings or by the loud print in my
shirt or by my hair or whatever. I want them to concentrate on what I am
saying," she said. Another scientist found this issue confusing: "So if you
dress well, sometimes you get less respect."
By far the most common "too feminine" problem is the pressure La-
tinas feel to play the office housewife. One scientist described herself as
"the mother of our research group." Another Latina scientist found herself
in a similar role:
On the too feminine side of things, I think there are times when I
am asked to be kind of the mother of the group. I'm the one who
has to make sure that everybody fills out their paperwork, and I'm
the one who takes care of things, sets up the meetings and things
like that. I mean, I play many roles that could be done by a compe-
tent administrative assistant if we happen to have had a competent
administrative assistant, which we don't. . . . It's assumed that I'll
take care of it because nobody else will.
One of the women who found herself doing administrative work encoun-
tered difficulties in trying to escape this role. "I'm like, 'I told you I'm not
going to be doing that for everybody anymore.' And everybody just kind of
throws up their hands, and simple things like scheduling a conference room
become my problem." She blamed herself, saying that she had trouble dele-
gating. However, from my perspective, she did not appear to have much
choice. "I mean, these kind of administrative duties eat into my time," she
9 Other studies document that Latinas' "too feminine" problems often include sexual
harassment. See, e.g., Cortina, infra note 119, at 167-68; cf Isabel Molina Guzmin &
Angharad N. Valdivia, Brain, Brow, and Booty: Latina Iconicity in the U.S. Popular
Culture, 7 COMM. REV. 205, 218-19 (2004) (discussing the commodification of Latina
sexuality).
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said. This kind of treatment came from all kinds of sources. Not only col-
leagues, but students also "treat you like their mother," said one Latina sci-
entist, "like they can get whatever they can from you and there's no limit."
She mused, "It's natural to go ask for help to Mom." But, she explained, "I
have noticed that if I act like too much of a mommy, I get a lot of kids." She
suggests they go ask someone else, often to little effect. Of one student, she
commented, "I think he is embarrassed, sometimes, by showing lack of
knowledge to a guy but not to a girl." Said another Latina, "Students may
think they could get away with not doing certain things because you're a
woman."
"Too masculine" problems appear less common among Latinas than
"too feminine" ones. However, this overall tendency should not suggest that
they do not exist. One attorney reported losing her temper with a colleague
just once. "I basically chewed him out at work and, unfortunately, lost all
[the] respect of my colleagues. After that, I've been very, very careful about
that." She said, "I just feel like you're never going to get ahead by getting
angry." Men could get angry, she said, but women could not. "I have one
partner who is known to scream and yell at his assistant, and everyone just
says, 'Oh well, that's him.' They've replaced assistant after assistant after
assistant for him." One assistant filed a complaint, and instead of addressing
the problem, people around the office just said, "Well, that's too bad she
couldn't cut it because he's very high maintenance." A female partner at the
same firm would "get really irritated with her assistant and yell at her, and
the interesting thing is that she was perceived as a bitch. . . . There was less
tolerance for her behavior."
A Latina professor iterated similar sentiments. "I got angry because
there was something being done that I thought was inappropriate, and I was
called to the principal's office, to use a metaphor. And I am absolutely sure
that none of my [male] colleagues that get angry at faculty meetings get
called."
It may be that the stereotype of the fiery Latina means that anger is
even more perilous for Latinas than it is for women in general. One woman
certainly thought so:
I'm Latin, so I'm passionate and I could go there. I do rein that in
and make sure that I'm more placid with my responses. I usually, if
someone says something inflammatory to me, will take a few
seconds before I respond, or if it's via e-mail, I will wait a couple
of hours before I respond, just because that is such a feminine
stereotype to have this emotional response to something.... For
those that know my specific background, they'll make comments
about that: "Oooh, she's a fiery Latina."
The Maternal Wall. Latinas not only face high levels of Prove-It-Again!
and Tightrope concerns, but they also reported lots of Maternal Wall
problems. Qualitative studies have documented the close association of La-
208 [Vol. 37
Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study
tinas with motherhood within people's perceptions. Interviewees in other
studies have articulated their sense that being Latina meant that people as-
sumed that they would have children, lots of them:
"[W]e like to be pregnant. We don't like to take birth control.
We're 'mafiana' [tomorrow] oriented. We're easy."95
"Usually people take over the countries with wars but you Mexi-
cans are doing it by having lots of babies." 96
Interviewees also reported experiencing the assumption that Latinas will
drop out of educational and professional opportunities once they have
children.97
A Latina lawyer interviewed for the Wise Women study said she
sensed, after she had triplets, "fixed expectations that I would not resume
my career and not return to work."98 The assumption struck her as odd.9
"My career was not as disposable as other people might have seen it," she
said.'"
Ironically, I worked at the time for a woman who was a Latina,
and it was she who made the most disturbing comments about,
"Oh, honey, I know you're not coming back, are you?" I think she
genuinely intended to be supportive, but as my supervisor, it came
across as an out-of-hand dismissal of what I knew I was capable
of.10
She continued:
We know the workplace will have evolved when instead we hear,
"Wow, your professional accomplishments are being achieved in
addition to all the additional personal responsibilities you have.
Incredible leadership skills at work there! We are going to nurture
your career, because if you can do all this now, you are going to be
a rock star around here in the future."
Latina scientists reported intense family pressures to have children, to
have them early, and to play traditional family roles. "You're supposed to
have kids in your 20s. Every good Mexican woman has kids in their 20s,"
said one. "We have a very firm and entrenched culture of family, of big
95 Segura, supra note 89, at 173.
96 Jody Agius Vallejo, Latina Spaces: Middle-Class Ethnic Capital and Professional
Associations in the Latino Community, 8 CITY & COMMUNITY 129, 146 (2009).
9 See generally id.
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family, and everyone's connected to everyone's last cousin and grandma and
whatever."
"Hispanic women are mothers-we take care of our families. Women
are considered the matriarchs," another scientist said. She continued:
I feel like I have a very specific role in keeping the family running.
And here's another complication for many women of color I know,
particularly those in immigrant families; the cultural expectations
that define family can extend to a caring (sic) for extended family
members, such as elderly parents or grandchildren. At least one
reason for that may be that our values are informed by cultural
expectations, and this is even more true in immigrant families like
mine. On [the] one hand, it's a beautiful thing to live out our
strong family ties; on the other hand, what does this imply for
women of color advancing to leadership in the workplace, espe-
cially when the period for serious career advancement tends to
overlap with the 'sandwich generation' years? Whether it's an issue
of feminism or not, I think you see more women of color juggling
additional cultural expectations. Do we embrace them all and ex-
haust ourselves in the process, or distance ourselves from these
multifaceted roles while risking a loss of important cultural
values?
Interviewees expressed that Latina women sometimes internalized such
pressures. "I think a lot of it is self-imposed," said one scientist. However,
this result is not always the case. A Latina professional in another study
placed the pressure firmly outside herself: "'In order to be valued we have
to be wives and mothers first. That cultural pressure is the most difficult to
overcome.'" 102
For Latina women, the assumption that professionals do not have fam-
ily obligations beyond their nuclear family can lead to particularly negative
reactions due to the sense that these obligations are not important enough to
miss work for. A Latina attorney, as quoted in a Catalyst report, described
having to go to the funeral of a cousin's baby. 103 "'One partner was like,
"Who was this?""' the attorney remembered.'3" "'I don't think she
understood.' o105
Tug of War. Some Latina scientists spoke warmly of the relations
among women in their department. "We bond together. We support each
other a lot. . . . And we're always rooting for each other. We're always hop-
ing there's more of us. So the 'room for one' I definitely have not exper-
1" Segura, supra note 89, at 177.
103 DEEPALI BEGATI, WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. LAw FIRMS-WOMEN OF COLOR IN
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ienced," said one. "We have quite a large number of women in my
department, and we try to have a good collegiality among us," said another.
Others' impressions, however, were not as positive. "I would say that
there's definitely a kind of divide or separation between the female faculty
members, young and old. Those older ones feeling that 'I worked to make
this happen,' whereas the younger ones are reaping the benefits, if that
makes sense," said a Latina scientist. She continued, "And there is a change,
at least in my field, where women are very comfortable with being mothers
as well as go-getters and being great scientists and starting out their labs."
One woman reflected on the interpersonal dynamics that fuel competition
among women as she worried about being compared to another woman in
her department. "She's funded, she's publishing in high-impact journals. I'm
not right now. And I'm jealous and I'm fearful that if we were compared on
the same scale, that I'll come up way short." Similarly, another woman
commented:
I was probably mad at the women who had children, thinking,
'Why should I, who does not have children, pick up the slack for
the women who do have children? It's a choice.' And then, of
course, you think about this for ten minutes and you realize that
it's not the women you need to be pissed off at. It's the men who
make the assignments.
Scientists who participated in the NSF study were asked specifically
about conflict between support staff and scientists. Latina scientists in partic-
ular reported more of it than other groups. "Female bosses have a lot more
resistance from the other females in the group, from everybody, but it hap-
pens especially if there's a difference in race," said one. "They say the
bosses are too demanding," said another, recalling a conversation with ad-
ministrative assistants who worked with her. She said to them, "Well, the
boss that you had before was equally demanding. The guy that you were
working under was equally demanding." The assistants' reaction: "Yeah, but
that's different." Mused another woman, "If a male boss asks, 'Can you
bring me a copy?' they will, and if you ask the same thing, they will say,
'Well, why am I going to bring you the copy?"' Some women just laughed
this kind of treatment off. "The staff call the females by their first names,
but they talk about 'Doctor Such-and-Such' and 'Professor Such-and-Such'
when they refer to the men, which I find very funny," said another Latina
scientist.
Another's statement provides an apt example of how the experience of
gender bias differs by race. "I am absolutely sure that my male colleagues
don't get this type of treatment," she said, describing the pushback she en-
countered from administrative staff about how files should be kept. She at-
tributed the problem both to gender and race. "It may be an overall issue of
respect. For them, having female bosses, it's a whole new thing." But she
felt that there was a racial component as well. "Here they have this Mexican
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woman telling them what to do." She seems to be saying that neither a white
woman nor a "Mexican" man would have the same experience.
The Latinas interviewed were particularly thoughtful about the advan-
tages of being a Latina, pointing out how their heritage helped them negoti-
ate the complexities of being women in traditionally male careers. "I think I
have a huge advantage in having a very refined cultural radar," said a Latina
scientist. A Latina lawyer agreed: "I can read the cultural landscape pretty
quickly and automatically discern the dynamic that's going on and what I
need to address." She felt her cross-cultural background had sharpened her
political radar. "Just reading the dynamics of a room and how you, and
others, are being perceived is very helpful," she said. Said another scientist,
reflecting on her close cultural ties to another country, "You have to be like
context switchers . . . reading the context and then doing what's appropriate
for that context at any point in time." She mused, "It's the same thing
switching between masculine and feminine roles."
E. Asian American Women
Prove It Again? Descriptive biases regarding Asian and Asian Ameri-
can women differ from descriptive biases regarding black women and La-
tinas in that, while there is generally an assumption of negative competence
regarding blacks and Latinas, the stereotypes regarding Asian people are
"ambivalent" (i.e. they lump positive and negative qualities).co6 Further-
more, there is significant overlap between the qualities associated with lead-
ers and with Asian people.10
On the one hand, Asians are seen as a "model minority" that does well
educationally and economically and "stays out of trouble.""0 As a whole,
Asians are seen as equally (or more) competent as whites.0" Common ste-
reotypes include that Asians are quiet, law-abiding, hardworking, and intelli-
1" See Monica H. Lin et al., Stereotype Content Model Explains Prejudice for an
Envied Outgroup: Scale of Anti-Asian American Stereotypes, 31 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 34, 44 (2005). Note that Asian Americans come from very different
cultures. Much of this is lost on most Americans; how much is an empirical question to
which there is, as yet, no clear answer. I have embraced the operating assumption that
Americans do not distinguish between Asians of different heritages not because I believe
it is true, but because the reality is no doubt complicated; some Americans no doubt do
distinguish between Asians of different heritage some of the time. The fact that we know
so little about which Americans distinguish between different Asian heritages, and when
Asians are seen in one global stereotype, and when subtypes enter in, just highlights once
again the need for more empirical studies.
10 Beth G. Chung-Herrera & Melenie J. Lankau, Are We There Yet? An Assessment
of Fit Between Stereotypes of Minority Managers and the Successful-Manager Prototype,
35 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2029, 2046-47 (2005).
" Paul Wong et al., Asian Americans as a Model Minority: Self-Perceptions and
Perceptions by Other Racial Groups, 41 Soc. PERSP. 95, 95-96, 113-14 (1988) (describ-
ing how Asian Americans, as well as other racial and ethnic groups, view Asian Ameri-
cans through a "model minority" lens).
'09 See Fiske et al., A Model, supra note 86, at 892.
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gent,10 all qualities that make them peculiarly suited to high-status careers.
If an Asian American is seen through this lens, perhaps he or she may even
need to provide less evidence of competence than a comparable white per-
son. This dynamic described the experience of one scientist, who said:
There's conflicting stereotypes, if you will, that come into play as
an Asian American woman in STEM fields because there's an
overall sort of, oh, Asians, Asians are naturally talented in STEM
fields, right, bias, and then yet, a different set of sort of norms or
expectations about women . . . [T]here's kind of a play off be-
tween those two different traits and so that in some sense, I have-
I'm more acceptable, if you will, as an Asian woman scientist
rather than a woman scientist.
Yet the results are not always so positive. Asians also are often seen as cold
and lacking in social skills,"' and this low-sociability stereotype of Asian
Americans is stronger than the high-competence stereotype." 2 Moreover,
one underlying facet of the model minority stereotype is that Asians are
suited for backroom technical work but not for leadership positions."3 Thus,
even the apparently complimentary aspects of the model minority stereotype
ultimately end up disadvantaging Asians as compared with whites.
Gender further complicates things. In addition to stereotypes of Asians
and women, there exist a third set of stereotypes specific to "Asian women."
The "Lotus Blossom Baby" stereotype, which paints Asian women as sexu-
alized and demure, sets up stereotypes of Asians as exotic "property" of
white males,' removing Asian American women from the realms of com-
petence and appropriate authority in the workplace. Asian American women
reported to one researcher that white employers and co-workers expected
them to be "passive and deferential," and expressed surprise when they
"spoke up and resisted unfair treatment."'"' Like other women of color,
110 See Fiske, supra note 57, at 379; Grace Kao, Group Images and Possible Selves
Among Adolescents: Linking Stereotypes to Expectations by Race and Ethnicity, 15 Soc.
F. 407, 417-19 (2000); Colin Ho & Jay W. Jackson, Attitude. Toward Asian Americans:
Theory and Measurement, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1553, 1553-54 (2001); Amy
J.C. Cuddy et al., Warmth and Competence as Universal Dimensions of Social Percep-
tion: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map, 40 ADVANCEs EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 61, 77-78 (2008).
Ho & Jackson, supra note 110, at 1564.
11 Lin et al., supra note 106, at 44.
"1 See Albert H. Yee, Asians as Stereotypes and Students: Misconceptions That Per-
sist, 4 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 95, 124-125 (1992).
11 See Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Inter-
sectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race,
Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 801-02 (1996); Minjeong Kim &
Angie Y. Chung, Consuming Orientalism: Images of Asian/American Women in Mul-
ticultural Advertising, 28 QUALITATIVE Soc. 67, 75-76 (2005).
" Karen D. Pyke & Denise L. Johnson, Asian American Women and Racialized
Femininities: "Doing" Gender Across Cultural Worlds, 17 GENDER & Soc. 33, 46
(2003).
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Asian women who trigger the "Lotus Blossom Baby" stereotype probably
have to provide more evidence of competence than white women or Asian
American men in order to be judged equally competent. Implicit in the
racialized gender stereotypes of women of color is the notion of insatiable
sexuality; Asian women are "desirous of sexual domination,"" 6 Latinas are
"naturally sexual,""' and African American women, if not the asexual
"Mammy," are the promiscuous "Jezebel.""' Such stereotypes are particu-
larly harmful in the context of sexual harassment and sexual assault."'
The "Lotus Blossom Baby" stereotype, however, does not appear to be
universal. Some evidence exists that the model minority stereotype may re-
sult in Asian women needing to give less evidence of competence than white
women. "In some sense, I'm more acceptable, if you will, as an Asian wo-
man scientist rather than a woman scientist," one woman observed. Which
stereotype reigns may well be situational. One study showed that when
Asian American subjects' Asian identity was made salient, they performed
better on a test, whereas when their gender identity was activated, they per-
formed worse.120
Yet those among women interviewed who felt they had been helped by
the model minority stereotype were rare. Many more reported Prove-It-
Again! problems. An Asian American lawyer recalled a situation in which a
white man and woman both got promotions in a context where the rules
didn't allow them. "You know that the rule only applies to the people it
applies to," she observed. "Generally speaking, women, and women of
color, would be strictly held to rules and then some."
Other Asian interviewees reported that their successes were discounted
in a variant of the "he's skilled, she's lucky" pattern. One described her
department chair saying that she got grants not due to merit but to politics.
"You have to be ten times better than everyone else; you always have to be
more prepared," said an Asian American lawyer. "My mentors, those prac-
ticing lawyers who have observed my growth in the profession, often say to
116 Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where
the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 191 (1997).
"I Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of
Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 820 (1993).
"' Andrea L. Dennis, Because I am Black, Because I am Woman: Remedying the
Sexual Harassment Experience of Black Women, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 555, 561
(1996).
"9 See Martha Chamallas, Jean Jew's Case: Resisting Sexual Harassment in the
Academy, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 85 (1994); Charles B. Adams, The Impact of Race
on Sexual Harassment: The Disturbing Confirmation of Thomas/Hill, 2 How. SCROLL
Soc. JUST. REV. 1, 16 (1993); Kimberld Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harass-
ment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1469-70 (1992); Tanya Katerf Hernindez, A Critical
Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Com-
plaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (2006); Lilia M. Cortina, Assess-
ing Sexual Harassment Among Ltinas: Development of an Instrument, 7 CULTURAL
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 164, 177-78 (2001).
120 Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 81-82 (1999).
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me, 'One day hopefully you're going to just trust your gut."' She continued
as follows:
I feel men are raised to just basically go with instinct and not even
question it. As an Asian American woman growing up in my
household, I had to validate everything, unlike my brother, and
this experience has transferred to my practice of always explaining
my decisions and actions before diving in. I feel women often feel
that they have to validate their actions before taking them.
"I don't know if it's an Asian thing or a woman thing, but it was definitely a
combination where I felt like I had to get [approval] on different things. I
was definitely less comfortable about going rogue," said another woman.
The Tightrope. An attorney quoted in the ABA's Visible Invisibility re-
port articulated the very thin Tightrope that Asian American women walk:
I am frequently perceived as being very demure and passive and
quiet, even though I rarely fit any of those categories. When I suc-
cessfully overcome those misperceptions, I am often thrown into
the "dragon lady" category. It is almost impossible to be per-
ceived as a balanced and appropriately aggressive lawyer.121
While Asian American women who are seen as too masculine risk be-
ing called dragon ladies, the default stereotype remains that Asians are quiet,
obedient, and courteous.12  Whereas black women are seen as more mascu-
line than white women, Asians tend to be seen as more feminine.123 Thus, it
is not surprising that Asian American women in the NSF study reported "too
feminine" problems at a higher rate than "too masculine" ones. An Asian
American lawyer noted, "There's a mystique about the Asian woman; we're
so cute and so delicate.... You get to the point where you try to 'mannify'
yourself." An Asian attorney remarked to the authors of Visible Invisibility,
" 'I've had opposing parties, opposing counsel, treat me like a little girl and
part of that is the Asian thing, because they see a little Asian doll. .. . It's
really annoying and I'm tired of it.' "124
Furthermore, Asian American women interviewed for the NSF study
reported "too feminine" problems manifesting in a wide range of ways.
Some problems stemmed from expectations that they would do the office
housework, like the consistent reports we heard from Asian women that they
were treated like perennial lab assistants even as postdocs. As with Latinas,
expectations about office housework have a particular flavor; women of
color are expected to perform ministerial tasks in a subservient manner.
121 EPNER, supra note 66, at 25.
122 Ho & Jackson, supra note 110, at 1554.
123 Clara L. Wilkins et al., Racial Stereotypes and Interracial Attraction: Phenotypic
Prototypicality and Perceived Attractiveness of Asians, 17 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETH-
NIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 427, 429 (2011).
124 EPNER, supra note 66, at 10.
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Asian women also reported particular difficulty with self-promotion.
"You're taught to be humble and not boast about your achievements and
give credit to others," said one scientist.125 This Asian cultural norm can feed
into the perception that Asian women are too passive. "All my mentors have
told me, 'You have to be more aggressive because they're not going to re-
spect you if you're not aggressive,"' said an Asian American scientist. "But
I don't like to be aggressive. I like to get along with everybody." Another
said, "I'm not particularly assertive. ... I might be a more assertive version
of a stereotypical Asian woman but a less assertive version of a generic
woman." One self-described "dark-complected" Indian graduate student
was undercut when a fellow student made negative comments about her
work. The head of the lab "never bothered to actually address that with her
or talk to her about it or actually watch her in the lab. He just took the word
of the male grad student in that lab." The negative competence assumptions
seem clear, and the graduate student involved ended up leaving without get-
ting her doctorate. Different cultural traditions sometimes meant that what
Asian Americans saw as due respect for seniority was read by their col-
leagues as a lack of self-confidence. "In our culture, we're raised with the
idea of respecting culture and seniority," said an Asian American lawyer.
"How it plays out at work, for me, is that I always felt that if I was rendering
an opinion, it had to be clearly supported." The result often appeared, she
felt, as a lack of self-confidence. "Self-confidence just seems so second na-
ture to some people, while it is always something I have to build and main-
tain consistently."
As previously mentioned, Asian women reported far fewer "too mascu-
line" problems, which is not surprising, given that whites see Asians in gen-
eral as more feminine. Yet, it is clear that Asians who do not conform with
"China Doll" submission stereotypes often encounter pushback. "I was
never part of the in group," said an Asian American scientist. "I'm very
candid and I do not hesitate to open my mouth, and that was probably not
the submissive female [they were expecting]. . . . I immediately started, I
guess, having the reputation of being a dragon lady."
Within the context of this study, it is important to note that Asian
American stereotypes have changed markedly over time. The model minor-
ity stereotype emerged after 1965.126 Older stereotypes were that Chinese
and Japanese were strange, dirty, tricky, crafty, and sly.127 Today, Asian wo-
men are sometimes seen as a "conniving, predatory force,""' triggering pre-
125 Accord Pyke & Johnson, supra note 115, at 42 ("I feel like when I'm with other
Asians that I'm the typical passive [Asian] person and I feel like that's what's expected of
me and if I do say something and if I'm the normal person that I am, I'd stick out like a
sore thumb.").
126 Lin et al., supra note 106, at 34.
1" See Harry H.L. Kitano & Stanley Sue, The Model Minorities, 29 J. Soc. IssUES 1,
6 (1973).
128 Cho, supra note 116, at 185.
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model minority stereotypes of Asians. My own informal explorations of the
topic suggest that the dragon lady stereotype could indicate that assertive
Asian women are still seen as untrustworthy and conniving, mobilizing pre-
model-minority stereotypes.
Contemporary stereotypes are mixed. Asian Americans tend to be
viewed as nerdy and lacking in social skills and therefore, unsuited to leader-
ship;12 9 rather, or in addition, they can be viewed as competent but dis-
liked.'3 0 One study found that the more unsociable subjects felt Asians were,
the more negatively subjects viewed them."' Furthermore, the low-sociabil-
ity stereotype was stronger than the high-competence stereotype."'
Does this cause the "dragon lady" stereotype to be triggered sooner
than the "bitch" epithet? A 2012 study found that all Asian Americans, men
as well as women, tend to encounter workplace harassment if they act domi-
nantly.'33 This phenomenon, of course, reinforces Asian stereotype conform-
ity by discouraging them from acting dominant. Interestingly, the study also
found that Asian Americans also tend to trigger workplace harassment if
they act warm, a classic double bind. '4 Asian women face this double bind
along both a race and a gender axis, which may make it particularly difficult
for them to "walk both ropes."
The Maternal Wall. Asian mothers, like other mothers, are likely to hit
the Maternal Wall. "If you had a full-blown career, that's inconsistent with
being a mother. I certainly feel that sentiment," said an Asian American
scientist. One scientist commented, "I feel like people think that Asian wo-
men, they are caring, and then they will give up their professions for their
children."
Yet the model-minority stereotype might help shield some Asian Amer-
ican mothers from negative assumptions about their work commitment. As
one lawyer quoted in Visible Invisibility said:
They have a very positive stereotype of Asians, and especially
Asian women. They see us as hard-working; we'll work seven days
a week, 24 hours a day. We're very smart, very dedicated. One of
the Asian women who recently made partner just had twins, and
12'9 See Nazli Kibria, College and Notions of "Asian Americans": Second-Generation
Chinese Americans and Korean Americans, in THE SECOND GENERATION: ETHNIC IDEN-
TITY AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS 183, 186-87 (Pyong Gap Min ed., 2002); Bob H. Suzuki,
Revisiting the Model Minority Stereotype: Implications for Student Affairs Practice and
Higher Education, 97 NEw DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES 21, 28 (2002); Roli
Varma, Asian Americans: Achievements Mask Challenges, 32 ASIAN J. SOC. SERVICES
290, 300-01 (2004).
'3 Lin et al., supra note 106, at 35 (Asian Americans "respected as competent but
disliked").
131 Id. at 43.
132 Id. at 44.
133 See Jennifer L. Berdahl & Ji-A Min, Prescriptive Stereotypes and Workplace Con-
sequences for East Asians in North America, 18 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINOR-
ITY PSYCHOL. 141, 146-48 (2012).
'
34 Id. at 149.
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they're sure she'll keep working, while they think other women
would quit.'
Although Asian Americans are stereotyped as being family oriented, the al-
ternative stereotype regarding their work ethic may trump that one.
The assumption that Asian mothers will continue to be dedicated to
their jobs does not always reign, however. One lawyer said:
The problem I see is that they really don't understand what you're
doing here. They may prize you as a lawyer, they may think you're
a heck of a litigator, but deep down they're wondering, "What's
she doing here? Why isn't she home with the kids like my wife
is?" It's a real problem when people just don't get what you do.
Several scientists interviewed in the NSF study who are immigrants
from Asia had their parents come from abroad to help take care of their
children so they could work full-time. One stated:
I think Asian parents [are] more willing to come over to really
provide this kind of day-to-day help. So, right now, like in [my
university], we really have quite a lot of Chinese faculty. And I
saw many of them do have their parents come over to help them
[in] much, much higher frequency than the Caucasian faculty.
First one parent will come and stay the six months his or her visa permits.
Then the other parent will come, she explained.
As with minorities from other groups, assumptions that Asian families
of color conform to the nuclear pattern common in white professional fami-
lies sometimes disadvantage Asian women. An Asian woman lawyer said
she hesitated to ask for time off to care for her mother's cousin: "I don't
know if they'd understand that context, which I know is normal within the
Asian community, or at least the South Asian community, to always support
extended family."
Tug of War. Asian interviewees reported fewer Tug of War experiences
than other groups of women. "No, no, this is not a pattern I can relate to,"
commented an Asian American scientist. She had always been in groups
with very few women, she said, "but we've stuck together to fight; not to
fight [each other] but to actually share and be a cohort of peers with my
female friends."
Another woman's comment may help explain why Tug of War exper-
iences may be rare among Asian women. She had defused conflict with an
older female faculty member by communicating the importance of the ef-
forts of the older generation: "[Without them], I wouldn't be here. I
wouldn't have made it. So I'm continuously humble." She continued, "It's
the same in general when you express respect and gratitude to your grand-
135 EPNER, supra note 66, at 11.
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parents or even your great-grandparents if they are still alive." This perspec-
tive illustrates a potential explanation for why Asian women reported fewer
Tug of War problems than black women and Latinas: the respect for elders
that is emphasized in so many Asian cultures might lead to an established
means in which to navigate these relationships.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEBATE OVER IMPLICIT BIAS
The debate over implicit bias was first spurred by Linda Hamilton Krie-
ger's influential 1995 article, followed by a germinal symposium issue of the
California Law Review in 2006.136 Since then, a flood of articles has ex-
plored implicit bias in criminal, employment, bankruptcy, and other areas of
law. 137
A sustained and successful public education campaign has accompa-
nied the attention lavished on the IAT in various law reviews. Implicit bias
has been presented as a new breakthrough in social psychology.138 IAT advo-
'6 See Krieger, supra note 22, at 1161; Linda Hamilton, Symposium on Behavioral
Realism, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945 (2006).1'3 See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in Judicial Deci-
sion Making: An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs' Race and Judges' Race, 28 HARV. J.
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 91, 95 (2012) (studying the success rate of race-based hostile
work environment claims depending on the plaintiffs race and judge's race); A. Mechele
Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 623, 626 (2012)
(noting that lawyers steer black families toward Chapter 13 bankruptcy at a higher rate
than they do white families); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit
Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007) (reporting on
an empirical study that found that participants who read about a black story character
were more likely to remember facts denoting aggression than those who read about a
white story character); Justin D. Levinson, Superbias: The Collision of Behavioral Eco-
nomics and Implicit Social Cognition, 45 AKRON L. REv. 591, 596 (2012) (studying the
ways racial stereotypes influence economic phenomena); Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty
by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIo ST. J.
CRIM. L. 187, 204 (2010) (finding significant associations between "Black" and "guilty"
relative to "White" and "guilty"); Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different
Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence,
112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 310-11 (2010) (finding that participants were more likely to
view evidence as indicative of guilt in the case of a dark-skinned perpetrator); Justin D.
Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical
Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2010) (finding that law students associated
judges with men instead of women and women with the home and family); Gregory C.
Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REv. 231, 249 (2012) (finding that Mus-
lims are significantly disadvantaged in Religious Free Exercise and Accommodation
claims).
M3 See, e.g., Ten Minute Test Could Spot Killers, BBC NEWS (May 28, 2013, 6:59
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/2943160.stm (last visited Nov. 27, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/0RC5oEb6kWb; Melinda Henneberger, Hidden Biases-
Mindbugs-Infect Everyone's Brain, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Feb. 13, 2013, at All;
Shankar Vedantam, What Does Modem Prejudice Look Like, NPR (Apr. 22, 2013 5:45
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/04/22/177455764/What-Does-Modem-
Prejudice-Look-Like (last visited Nov. 27, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/OxqGZ
bJAbc1; Matthew Hutson, Only If You Dare, Learn Your Level of Close-Mindedness,
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cates such as Mahzarin Banaji and Jerry Kang often portray themselves as
offering a fresh approach to the entire field of discrimination. 9 In retro-
spect, implicit bias advocates have framed their message in response to aca-
demic imperatives in ways that ultimately undercut their own effectiveness
as agents of change in the law. More specifically, they announced highly
ambitious claims with considerable rhetorical flourish, intimating that im-
plicit bias was a newly discovered form of bias that left prior approaches in
the dust.'* IAT critics are fond of citing a speech in which Banaji appeared
to liken the IAT's influence on psychology to that of Galileo on astron-
omy. 141 These claims represented sincere enthusiasm coupled with a success-
ful attempt to shift the focal point away from social psychologists, trained as
either sociologists or psychologists, towards cognitive psychologists whose
focus is on the brain. The common "story line" was articulated by Anthony
G. Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger, who spoke of "the new science
of unconscious mental processes" replacing an older view that human be-
havior is under conscious control.142
These kinds of claims reflect a tradition within academia of somewhat
mischaracterizing what has gone before in order to make one's claim for the
startling originality of the Next Big Thing. No judgment: I have used this
traditional ploy myself. However, such histories bear about the same rela-
tionship to what actually happened that the American Law Institute Restate-
ments bear to the law on the ground. Both are tales told to achieve a strategic
goal.
In fact, the studies and methodologies that preceded the implicit bias
strain of research did not focus only on conscious-as-opposed-to-uncon-
scious bias. Instead, prior research typically was not that interested in
STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 24, 2013, at 006; Molly McElroy, Racial Attitudes Play Large Role
in Presidential Vote, BOSTON BANNER, May 31, 2012, at 6; Anna Mikulak, An In-
tergenerational Conversation Between Mahzarin R. Banaji and Rebecca Saxe, OB-
SERVER, Nov. 2013, archived at http://perna.cc/0KAG19eHwyh; Christopher Shea, Ideas
Market: Week in Ideas, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2011, at C.4; Shankar Vedantam, See No
Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12.
139 See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 13, at 1064 ("We believe that new facts
recently discovered in the mind and behavioral sciences can potentially transform both
lay and expert conceptions of affirmative action.").
140 See, e.g., Jill D. Kester, A Revolution in Social Psychology, APS OBSERVER ON-
LINE (July/Aug. 2001), http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/0701/family.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (reporting on a speech likening the IAT's influence on psy-
chology to that of Galileo on astronomy), archived at http://perma.cc/OcNahUyUr9Q.
141 See, e.g., Kester, supra note 140.
142 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 13, at 946-47; see also Banks, Eberhardt &
Ross, supra note 13, at 1182 (discussing the movement away from studying explicitly
endorsed beliefs about race towards indirectly measuring racial bias); Kang & Banaji,
supra note 13, at 1064 ("We believe that new facts recently discovered in the mind and
behavioral sciences can potentially transform both lay and expert conceptions of affirma-
tive action. Specifically, the science of implicit social cognition (ISC) can help us revise
the very meaning of certain affirmative action prescriptions by updating our understand-
ing of human nature and its social development.").
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whether the subjects exhibiting the bias in question were self-aware or not.
Arguably, as will be discussed below, lawyers should not be either.
What the IAT offered is less a revolution in psychology than a new tool
to measure bias by measuring response latency times.143 Furthermore, it is
only one tool among many for measuring bias; others include more tradi-
tional paper-and-pencil tests such as comparing matched resumes'44 and set-
ting up social interactions.145 Indeed, the IAT is sometimes used by
psychologists who also use more traditional methodologies.146
IAT advocates' presentation of implicit bias as something revolutionary
reflected not only its academic ambitions but also its social change goals.
IAT advocates aimed to influence not just the law but also the public. Gain-
ing press coverage was crucial to their social change project and, again, the
best strategy for doing so was to announce a scientific revolution. Their pub-
lic education campaign has been very successful as implicit bias and the IAT
received widespread press attention as a chic new thing.147 This interest is
part of a larger neurological trend 48 that includes such influential books as
Blink and Thinking, Fast and Slow. 149 As anyone who has talked with report-
ers knows, they need to report something fresh and new rather than some-
thing dowdy and old.
The incentives in the law are very different. Because law is based on
precedent, the strongest rhetorical position is to present one's arguments as
long-established rather than brand new. Dowdy is the name of the game.
143 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464,
1464-66 (1998).
144 See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra 56, at 991-92; M.A. Hitt et al., supra
note 59, at 221 (sending resumes and cover letters to corporations while varying applicant
sex and race); Jaihyun Park et al., Subtle Bias Against Muslim Job Applicants in Person-
nel Decisions, 90 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2174, 2178-79 (comparing employment
decisions for resumes with typical Muslim or European American applicant names).
145 See generally Cecilia Ridgeway, GENDER, INTERACTION, AND INEQUALITY (1992)
(citing many studies based on social interaction).
146 Compare Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, The Effect of Priming Gender
Roles on Women's Implicit Gender Beliefs and Career Aspirations, 4 Soc. PSYCHOL. 192,
194-95 (2010) (using the IAT), and Laurie A. Rudman, et al., Reactions to Gender Egali-
tarian Men: Perceived Feminization Due to Stigma-by-Association, 16 GROUP PROCESSES
& INTERGROUP REL. 1, 4 (2012) (using the IAT), with Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick,
Feminized Management and Backlash Toward Agentic Women: The Hidden Costs to Wo-
men of a Kinder, Gentler Image of Middle Managers, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1004, 1006 (1999) (having subjects evaluate job applicants), and Laurie A.
Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counter-
stereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 629, 630
(1998) (analyzing interactions between subjects to study motivational influences on im-
pression formation).
147 See Kester, supra note 140.
148 See Adam Gopnik, Mindless: The New Neuro-Skeptics, THE NEW YORKER (Sept.
29, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2013/09/09/130909crbo_books_
gopnik, archived at http://perma.cc/0eEJe4yLbh7.
149 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING(2005); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLow (2011).
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Thus, the strongest rhetorical framework within which to introduce evidence
of bias in court is to insist that courts have always accepted such evidence.
In light of this framework, the obvious tactic is to tie evidence from social
and cognitive psychology to case law stretching back to Reed v. Reed.5 0
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in particular spent a lot of time and energy in
the 1970s inserting insights of stereotyping into equality case law. As early
as 1973, in a brief for Kahn v. Shevin, Justice Ginsburg and her co-authors
criticized a tax exemption available to widows but not widowers, arguing
that the tax "perpetuates sex stereotypes and thereby retards women's access
to equal opportunity in economic life."'"' This language soon found its way
into Supreme Court decisions from Orr v. Orr, which held that states could
not limit alimony to women,'52 to Nevada Department of Human Resources
v. Hibbs, which upheld the application of the Family and Medical Leave Act
to state officials on the theory that "Congress sought to adjust family-leave
policies in order to eliminate their reliance on, and perpetuation of, invalid
stereotypes."' 53 The goal in linking social psychological evidence to this line
of precedent is to signify to courts that they have embraced stereotyping
evidence in assessing claims of discrimination for decades.
Confusion is widespread about the relationship between implicit bias
and the older language of stereotyping. Schemas (e.g., the "good mother"
who is always available to her children) 5 4 drive stereotyping (e.g., "mothers
lack commitment to their jobs"),' 5 which in turn drives both explicit pre-
scriptive bias (e.g., "mothers should not work long hours")156 and descrip-
tive bias that may well be unconscious (e.g., the automatic assumption that a
mother who arrives late was held up by child care responsibilities).15 Dis-
cussion of "stereotyping" lacks the pizzazz of announcing a new, exciting
development in brain science, but it may be a wiser strategic move within
the law.
The NSF study seeks to help remedy the confusion between implicit
bias and the larger field of social psychology. The Four Patterns of Gender
Bias approach reaches beyond IAT studies to summarize findings from de-
cades of social science studies, using a variety of methodologies."' It is, of
" Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
's' Brief for Appellants at 18, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (No. 73-78); see
also Joan C. Williams, Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice Ginsburg and
Reconstructive Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1271 (2012).
152 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283-84 (1979) ("Legislative classifications which dis-
tribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing
the stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection.")
(citing United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-174 (1977)).
M Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 n.10 (2003).
'1- Kobrynowicz & Biernat, supra note 68, at 584-87.
us Correll et al., supra note 48, at 1316.
11
6 See Benard & Correll, supra note 49, at 639.
"I Correll et al., supra note 48, at 1302-03 n. 2.
'51 See, e.g., Amy J. C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, When Professionals Become
Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. Soc. IssuEs 701, 711 (2004) (finding women
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course, a lot harder to master decades of studies than the brief history of the
IAT. This Article attempts to provide a primer that may prove useful not
only to legal scholars but also to employment lawyers. Because the Four
Patterns, along with interview findings, track the ways gender bias plays out
in everyday workplace interactions, the hope is that the Four Patterns ap-
proach will prove helpful to employers' lawyers when they do investigations
or design gender bias trainings, and to employees' lawyers when they inter-
view clients or design discovery questions.'59
The revolutionary-new-idea framing around the IAT had concrete nega-
tive effects concerning its use in courts due to the rules of evidence. In the
line of cases represented by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that, in order to introduce scientific evidence into
court, the evidence needs to be supported by appropriate validation.16 0 "Gen-
eral acceptance" by the relevant scientific community is one factor that
strengthens the validity of a scientific technique.'"' For this reason, too, IAT
advocates would have been far better off presenting the IAT as simply a new
assessment tool that was validating findings long ago established by other
methods, particularly given the IAT is a relatively new tool having only been
invented in 1998.162
The best-known attack against the IAT as an evidentiary basis for dis-
crimination lawsuits was put forth by Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock in
their article, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading.163 Their
article does just what IAT advocates did; it elides the difference between
"implicit bias" (i.e. bias measured by the IAT) and the much larger and
more established literature on bias and stereotyping.'6 This move allows
Mitchell and Tetlock's article to launch an attack on the IAT and intimate
that methodical flaws which they attribute to the IAT prove that stereotyping
evidence in general should not be allowed in employment discrimination
cases.165 For example, Mitchell and Tetlock cite an IAT study by Laurie Rud-
man and Peter Glick, critiquing it on the grounds that it does not show a link
were perceived as warmer but less competent after becoming mothers, similar to the
Maternal Wall); Derks et al., supra note 50, at 530 (finding women who began their
careers with low gender identity and experienced gender discrimination distanced them-
selves from other women more and engaged in more gender stereotyping, similar to The
Tug of War); Susan T. Fiske et al., supra note 86, A Model, at 879, 897 (finding out-
groups are often viewed as "warm but not competent" or "competent but not warm,"
similar to The Tightrope); Lyness & Heilman, supra note 20, at 781 (finding women had
to receive higher performance ratings before being promoted than men, similar to Prove-
It-Again!).
'" Although outside the confines of this Article, there is an obvious need to extend
the Four Patterns approach beyond gender to race and other categories.
'6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
161 Id. at 594.
162 Greenwald et al., supra note 143, at 1464.
'6 See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1030-34.
1" See id. at 1030-35.
165 See id. at 1056-115.
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between IAT scores and judgments about "hireability." 66 Perhaps their as-
sertion is true, but many other studies using more traditional methodologies
do show such a link; a famous example gave people identical resumes, one
of which had an African-American-sounding name (e.g., Jamal) and one of
which had a white-sounding name (e.g., Greg).167 The study found that appli-
cants with white-sounding names received 50% more callbacks for inter-
views than those with black-sounding names,' 8 that both males and females
experienced this racial gap,169 and most troubling, that blacks needed eight
additional years of experience in order to receive the same number of
callbacks as whites. 0 Another matched-resume study found that fathers who
take parental leave were less likely to be recommended for workplace re-
wards ("a leadership role, a promotion, a raise, a fast-track executive train-
ing program, and a challenging, high-profile project") and more likely to be
recommended for workplace penalties ("a salary reduction, a demotion, ter-
mination if the company is downsized, decreased responsibilities at work,
and [encouragement] to work for another organization")."'
Mitchell and Tetlock also argue that lab studies are not dependable be-
cause they are not evidence of what happens in actual workplaces.172 To
quote them, "[T]hose eager to import [IAT] research into the law still must
establish that the correlations between IAT scores and discriminatory con-
duct found in artificial laboratory settings reliably predict behavior in real-
world settings .'... ."17 The NSF study, and the larger interview project of
which it is a part, provide evidence that long-documented patterns of bias
are, in fact, commonplace in today's workplace. Of the sixty women inter-
viewed for the NSF study, every single one reported gender bias of the types
documented in laboratory studies. The interview aspect is important because
it is very difficult and expensive to gather this kind of evidence through
experimental methods, although some studies do.174 For example, one study
of mothers versus non-mothers presented the matched resumes both to col-
lege students (the "class lab" study) and sent them to businesses (the "au-
dit" study), finding that the employers exhibited even stronger bias than the
college students did.171
Mitchell and Tetlock further argue that the IAT, and, by extension, ex-
perimental studies in general, are not valid evidence of bias in actual work-
166 Id. at 1070 (citing Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereo-
types and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. Soc. IssuEs 743, 756-57 (2001)).
'67 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 56, at 992.
161 Id. at 998.
169 Id.
0 Id. at 992.
"'Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a Family
Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma a Femininity Stigma? 69 J. Soc. ISSUEs 322, 329 (2013).
172 Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1033-34.
7 3 Id. at 1033.
174 Correll et al., supra note 48, at 1330.
'
5 Id. at 1309-10, 1315-17.
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places because they Zlon't involve people who know each other well.'76
Again the interview study provides evidence that contradicts the claim that
stereotyping does not occur when people know each other well. This claim
may be true in some contexts. For example, the assumption that a black
worker conforms to the stereotype that blacks are lazy or violent might well
be attenuated by familiarity. Yet women often encounter bias and stereotyp-
ing by people who know them very well, as the NSF shows. For one thing,
there is no reason to suspect that prescriptive bias is attenuated by familiar-
ity. For example, a supervisor who believes that a good mother is always
available to her children can be expected to judge a mother who works long
hours harshly whether or not he knows her."' Another example: if a co-
worker only feels comfortable when women are modest and self-effacing,
even a woman whom he knows well will likely encounter backlash if she is
a "go-getter" rather than a "helpmeet."
Familiarity might seem to have more influence in the descriptive bias
context. However, the NSF study found that Prove-It-Again! bias was com-
monplace among the colleagues of women scientists, even by people they
knew well. I encourage social scientists to further investigate the interaction
between familiarity and preexisting biases.
After first publishing their research, Mitchell and Tetlock went on to
found a company that provides expert testimony in case after case for em-
ployers.17 1 In effect, they led a movement attacking the approach champi-
oned by sociologist William Bielby, who had testified for plaintiffs about
stereotyping and bias in many major class action cases.'7 1 Mitchell and
Tetlock mention Bielby by name without noting that Bielby's testimony typi-
cally does not focus on IAT evidence but instead on the larger social psycho-
logical literature, using a variety of different methods.s 0
The attack on stereotyping evidence has been remarkably successful.
Mitchell and Tetlock have been part of the sweeping, and quite successful,
attack on the use of stereotyping evidence in the federal courts.'"
See id.; accord David Copus, A Lawyer's View: Avoiding Junk Science, in EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION: BEHAVIORAL, QUANTITATIVE, AND LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVES 450, 453 (Frank J. Landy ed., 2005).
"1 See Benard & Correll, supra note 49, at 621, 639.
"1 Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evi-
dence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 39 n.1
(2009).
"' See, e.g., Expert Report of William T. Bielby at 1, Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 2009 WL 196567 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2009), (No. 04CV00171); Expert Report of
William T. Bielby at 1, McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672
F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 05CV06583); Expert Report of William T. Bielby at 1,
Satchell v. Fedex Express, 2007 WL 1114010 (N.D. Cal. April 13, 2007), (No.
03CV02878).
11 Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 9, at 1055; Bielby reports, supra note 179.
"I See generally Christine A. Amalfe, The Limitations on Implicit Bias Testimony
Post-Dukes, Gibbons PC (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/a-
bor law/2013/03/employment rightsresponsibilitiescommitteemidwintermeeting/1_amal
fe.authcheckdam.pdf (stating that courts have been less receptive to implicit bias evi-
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The other most influential article in the backlash against IAT is Amy
Wax's Discrimination as Accident.18 2 As this Article has noted, Wax argues
that the law should not allow for recovery on the basis of unconscious bias
as it will incentivize employers to spend money to no good purpose given
that people cannot change the behavior of which they are not aware. Her
arguments stem from an understandable confusion regarding implicit bias
methodology and theory. The first problem stems from Wax's claim, adopted
from IAT advocates, that all bias today is subtle.'83 What these commentators
mean by this assertion is that modern bias typically is not of the "pernicious,
overt," "no-blacks-allowed" variety.'?4 However, what Wax fails to recog-
dence in recent years, especially following Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct.
2541 (2011)), archived at http://perma.cc/RSG5-GR2W. For examples of cases in which
evidence of stereotyping was unsuccessful, see Peterson v. Seagate U.S. LLC, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 996 (D. Minn. 2011) (granting employer's motion to exclude implicit bias ex-
pert testimony that age stereotyping was a factor in employer's decision to terminate
employees because expert did not analyze whether age stereotypes existed at employer);
E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 2010 WL 583681 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 2010) (holding
testimony of sociologist was irrelevant and inadmissible because testimony about subcon-
scious gender stereotyping did not shed light on whether discriminatory effects were in-
tentional); E.E.O.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 2010 WL 3466370, at 17 (S.D.N.Y. October 25,
2010) (excluding expert testimony about gender stereotyping, finding such testimony did
not meet the requirements for expert testimony because "[glender stereotypes are the
stuff of countless television situation comedies and are the focus of numerous media
treatments on nearly a daily basis. It is unarguable that virtually all adults in our society
know about gender stereotypes," and therefore such evidence did not meet the require-
ments for expert opinion testimony). But see Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D.
492, 500-01, 520, 530, 544 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting employees' motion for class certi-
fication based in part upon implicit bias expert testimony that employer's culture fostered
and reinforced stereotyped thinking, which permitted gender bias to infuse the promotion
process from the top down). One Iowa state court opinion, Pippen v. Iowa, No. 107038,
slip op. at 1-3 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk Cnty. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012), was sharply critical of
plaintiffs' proffered social science testimony. The Pippen court granted judgment in favor
of the employer on employees' discrimination claims based in part on the fact that em-
ployees' implicit bias expert testimony failed to prove causation. Id. The court noted that
plaintiffs' expert "conceded that he would not use the phrase 'implicit bias' in writing a
scientific article," and rhetorically asked, "How, then, should it import more gravamen in
a court of law?" Id. at 53. The court discounted the testimony because it did not establish
any connection between alleged implicit bias and the discretionary subjective employ-
ment decisions at issue in this particular workplace and was simply an "opinion of con-
jecture, not proof of causation." Id. at 54.
182 Wax, supra note 9.
"s3 See, e.g., Dasgupta, supra note 7, at 316-17 ("National surveys indicate that ra-
cism in American society has declined steadily over the past 50 years. Despite this opti-
mistic finding, other research using indirect measures suggests that subtle and implicit
forms of prejudice and discrimination remain pervasive.") (citations omitted); Dovidio,
supra note 7, at 845 ("[A]1though overt expressions of prejudice have declined steadily
and significantly over time, subtle-often unconscious and unintentional-forms con-
tinue to exist."); John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and
Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 510, 512 (1997) ("These
frameworks suggest that, whereas traditional forms of prejudice are direct and overt, con-
temporary forms are indirect and subtle.").
' Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005).
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nize is that just because many examples of modem bias are less overt does
not mean that it is not real.
Moreover, while IAT advocates may be primarily focused on subtle
bias, any employment lawyer can tell you that subtle bias is not, alas, all that
exists today. For example, the strongest form of gender bias-bias against
mothers-is often open and explicit.' "'You don't get people like you
down here in Monroe, Louisiana, who have as much telecom experience and
advertising agency experience that you do with a Master's degree from
Northwestern,"' one Louisiana employer told a mother in a 2011 case.'s
"But you've got a lot of personal distractions right now; you have a new
baby at home and I don't think you have the fire in you to be one of my
leaders." 87
The all-bias-is-now-subtle line of argument places IAT advocates in the
weak argumentative position of disputing the potential significance of milli-
second differences in automatic associations. 8 The citation of experimental
studies that document concrete workplace penalties or interview studies that
show how bias plays out in everyday workplace interactions places advo-
cates of change in a much more persuasive position. That is what paper-and-
pencil studies typically do. As a single example, take Adam Butler and Amie
Skattebo's study, in which subjects filled out a survey in which they assessed
the performance of men who experienced a work-family conflict; the study
found that such men received lower overall performance ratings and lower
reward recommendations than men who did not experience work-family
conflict, and women who did.189
What is defined as "subtle bias" depends on the public's education re-
garding how bias works. The Four Patterns approach documents how gender
bias shapes everyday office politics for women in ways that, once named,
are easy to spot. For evidence of this proposition, one need not look farther
than the interviews in which 96 percent of the women interviewed immedi-
ately recognized one or more of the patterns of bias that have been so pains-
takingly documented by decades of social science.190 Regardless, the subtlety
of the bias is irrelevant. Forcing an employee from a protected group to
provide more evidence of competence than employees from a non-protected
1" See, e.g., Krull v. Centurytel, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (W.D. La. 2011);
Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing situation where man-
ager admitted plaintiff was passed over for promotion because she had children and man-
ager assumed she would not want to relocate); Moore v. Alabama State Univ., 980 F.
Supp. 426, 431 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (describing administrator statement that employee
would not be considered for promotion because job involved too much travelling for a
married mother and that a woman should stay home with her family).
16 Krull, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 476.87 Id.
" See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1032, 1039 n.49, 1047-48, 1092, 1117.
189 Adam B. Butler & Amie Skattebo, What Is Acceptable for Women May Not Be for
Men: The Effect of Family Conflicts with Work on Job-Performance Ratings, 77 J. Occu-
PATIONAL & ORG. PSYCH. 553, 559 (2004).
190 Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1 (manuscript at xxiii).
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group in order to succeed is precisely the kind of discrimination Title VII
should prevent.'91 Proving discrimination by pointing to a "comparator,"
such as to a similarly situated man not subject to the same adverse employ-
ment action encountered by the plaintiff, is perhaps the single most estab-
lished way of proving a Title VII case.19 2
Wax's second confusion underlies her contention that people cannot
control bias that is subtle and totally unconscious, which stems from IAT
advocates' message that "implicit bias" is often unconscious. Although her
confusion is understandable, so is this conflation. In workplace trainings,
minimizing the sense of responsibility for bias by describing it as uncon-
scious can be used as means to increase acceptance of the material, thus
reducing the likelihood that the training will increase bias rather than de-
crease it. '9 In court, however, this kind of "unconscious" framing proves
confusing and counterproductive. From a legal standpoint, it would be more
productive to describe implicit bias as "unexamined bias" rather than "un-
conscious bias." After all, from the plaintiff's viewpoint, whose fault is it if
the perpetrator is clueless?l94
The third issue with Wax's argument arises in her claim that uncon-
scious bias is an "intermittent" and "elusive" phenomenon'95 that only oc-
curs "sporadically in social interactions." 96 No support or explanation is
given for this assertion. 1 Perhaps what she means is that the bias literature
describes tendencies, not inevitabilities (e.g., subjects are 79% more likely to
hire a non-mother than the mother). However, a tendency does not necessa-
rily mean that bias is sporadic; someone who has a tendency toward bias
may well act on it again and again. Moreover, even if a supervisor acts on
her bias only once in a way that results in an adverse employment action
based on sex, that "one instance" of bias is sufficient to show sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII. 98
191 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
192 For a thorough discussion, see Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts' Misuse of the
Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831, 832
(2002); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Com-
parators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 193 n.1 (2009); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 (2011).
19 Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. REV. 589, 611 (2006).
194 Nevertheless, cluelessness should not be a defense. See Joan C. Williams, The
Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimina-
tion Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401,
448 (2003) [hereinafter, Williams, "Cluelessness"Defense]. Under Title VII, employers
must not discriminate "because of ... sex." Civil Rights Act, supra note 191. It says
nothing of exemptions for "subtle discrimination," id., and employers have a legal duty
to recognize and correct disparate treatment regardless.
19 Wax, supra note 9, at 1133.
'96Id. at 1134.
19 Id.
'9 Civil Rights Act, supra note 191.
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Despite the other issues, the most critical problem with Wax's work
remains her conflation of "unconscious bias" with "unconscious disparate
treatment."l 99 As previously discussed, this conflation denotes the challenges
of translating between the language of the law and the language of social
psychology. Take the aforementioned Jamal/Greg study in which it was
found that employment applicants with "ethnic-sounding" names must pro-
vide eight additional years of experience in order to be perceived as on par
with applicants with white-sounding names.2 00 If an employer requires eight
additional years of experience for equally qualified blacks as compared to
whites, that is disparate treatment. Self-aware, malicious intent to discrimi-
nate should not be required.201 For a Title VII claim to be cognizable under a
theory of disparate treatment, all that should be required is that less-qualified
whites are hired over more-qualified blacks.
The term "unconscious disparate treatment" makes no sense. Disparate
treatment entails an adverse employment action based on sex, not a psycho-
therapy session. To take another example, if an employer is only half as
likely to promote a mother as an identical woman without children, then the
employer is discriminating based on the gender stereotype that women are
less competent and committed to their jobs after they have children. This act
is disparate treatment whether she is conscious or not of her underlying
motivations.2 0 2
Wax's final mistake is evidenced in her contention that imposing liabil-
ity on employers for unexamined bias is inappropriate as people unaware of
their own biases cannot possibly correct them.2 03 Thus, the imposition of
liability is inefficient as it increases costs for employers without improving
the workplace for employees.204 This argument rests on quotes from actual
studies to the effect that implicit bias cannot be controlled.2 0s However, other
studies contradict these conclusions through evidence that implicit bias is
199 Wax, supra note 9, at 1138.
200 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 56, at 998 (discussing "matched resumes"
studies with identical resumes of a black and white candidate).
201 See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REv. 741, 756-57 (2005); Krieger, supra note 22, at 1164.
202 Cf Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118-19
(2nd Cir. 2004); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NOTICE No.
915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS
wIH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES (2007), archived at http://perma.cc/OmKkJVlvoXV.
203 Wax, supra note 9, at 1196.
20 4 Id. at 1191.
205 See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1035 n.36 (citing John A. Bargh & Tanya
L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 462, 463-64
(1999)); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 143, 144 n.2 (2004); Wax, supra
note 9, at 1158-60 (quoting John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the
Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effect, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN Soc.
PSYCHOL. 361-62, 370-71 (Shelly Chaiken & Taacov Trope eds., 1999); Timothy D.
Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted In-
fluences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117, 119-22 (1994)).
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malleable. 206 However, this debate is not simply a citation war. IAT advo-
cates' tight focus on implicit bias again disserves us. The IAT measures auto-
matic association, such as the automatic association of women with an apron
and men with a suit. Disrupting these automatic associations-this "implicit
bias"-may well be very difficult. But the issue on the ground is not
whether automatic associations occur but whether, once made, the stereotyp-
ing that results can be overridden.
Stereotypes are reversed all the time. Many whites, myself included,
might experience greater fear upon encountering a black male stranger in a
dark alley than upon an identical encounter with a petite, white woman. 207
Personally, I override that reaction, telling myself that to respond that way is
prejudiced. I override my automatic association by focusing my attention on
the behavior of the man in question, at which point I typically recognize that
the individual is in no way a threat. To say that it is going to be difficult to
eliminate white people's automatic association between black men and crime
does not mean that we as Americans need to resign ourselves to a society
where we shoot innocent black men whose only crime is to remove their
wallet from their pockets. 208 Though stereotype activation is automatic, ster-
eotype application can be controlled.209 Yet the proposed methods of control-
ling bias explored by IAT researchers tend to reflect cognitive psychology's
intensely individualistic focus, a focus that is an uneasy match when the goal
is to change working conditions in organizations. Thus, IAT researchers pro-
pose using de-biasing screensavers, displaying images of outgroup members
in unfamiliar roles, and focusing on counter-stereotypical mental imagery.2 10
206 See, e.g., Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice,
6 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 257 (2002) (arguing that the force of auto-
matic stereotypes can be influenced by context, as well as the perceiver's motives and
approach to the situation); Nilanjana Dasgupta, On the Malleability of Automatic Atti-
tudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals,
81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 800, 808 (2001) (finding that exposure to images of
admired black and disliked white individuals weakens automatic pro-white preferences);
Tiffany A. Ito et al., The Influence of Facial Feedback on Race Bias, 17 PSCYHOL. Sc.
256, 259 (2006) (finding that implicit racial bias of subjects was lessened when they were
repeatedly exposed to black faces while being induced to smile); Laurie A. Rudman et
al., "Unlearning" Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereo-
types, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 856, 865 (2001) (finding implicit bias was
reduced after participants attended a multicultural training course).
207 See generally Craig St. John & Tamara Heald-Moore, Fear of Black Strangers, 24
Soc. Sci. RES. 262 (1995) (discussing fear of black strangers).
208 Amadou Diallo was an immigrant from Guinea, shot 19 times by four plainclothes
police officers who claimed to have mistaken his wallet for a gun. Susan Sachs, U.S.
Decides Not to Prosecute 4 Officers Who Killed Diallo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001,
archived at http://perma.cc/0FLY3TLCamA. Andre Burgess, a 17-year-old student, was
shot by a Federal agent who mistook the candy bar Burgess was carrying for a handgun.
David Kocieniewski, Agent Mistakes Candy Bar for Gun and Shoots Youth, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1997, archived at http://perma.cc/OwKydpkEDCN.
209 Blair, supra note 206, at 248-50.
210 See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of
Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 828,
837 (2001) (finding that mental imagery can moderate stereotype applications); Billy
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At a more basic level, we need to re-design basic business systems-hiring,
assignments, evaluations, and compensation-to interrupt bias. 211 It is well
established, for example, that bias is less likely to be influential in structured
rather than unstructured interviews. 212 In addition, incentives matter; people
who are held accountable if their decisions are influenced by bias are simply
less likely to act on that bias. 2 13 Moreover, organizational and social psychol-
ogists have documented extensively that ambiguity in criteria leaves the
door open to stereotyping.214 These are just a few ways business systems can
be designed to interrupt bias. Others exist, but I will limit myself to discuss-
ing two.
One stems from a study of "casuistry" in which subjects are given a
scenario in which they had to choose someone for a job that required both
education and experience.215 The study found that if the man had more expe-
rience, subjects tended to choose the man and cite his experience, whereas if
the man had more education, they still tended to choose the man, then citing
his education.216 The study also found that subjects' gender bias could be
controlled if subjects were required to pre-commit by saying that they con-
sidered either education or experience to be most important for the job. The
important point, again, is that although bias may be automatic, its effects can
be overcome.
Another approach to overcoming bias involves revisiting the enormous
amount of literature on the "women don't ask" phenomenon,217 including the
Baker, She Explores Inner Workings of Bias, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2008, at 14
("[Mahzarin Banaji] uses the screensaver on her office computer to display images of
people from far-flung places, or in unfamiliar roles (a female construction worker, say),
in an effort to rewire her associations."); Shaki Asgari et al., When Does Contact with
Successful Ingroup Members Change Self-Stereotypes? A Longitudinal Study Comparing
the Effect of Quantity vs. Quality of Contact with Successful Individuals, 41 Soc.
PSYCHOL. 203, 208 (2010) (showing frequent quality interaction with ingroup member
professors reduced self-stereotyping).
211 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 489-518 (2001). See generally MICHAEL ARMSTRONG,
A HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (9th ed. 2003) (listing best
practices for analyzing bias).
212 See Allen I. Huffcutt & Philip L. Roth, Racial Group Differences in Employment
Interview Evaluations, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 179, 186 (1998).
213 See Madeline E. Heilman & Alice H. Eagly, Gender Stereotypes Are Alive, Well,
and Busy Producing Workplace Discrimination, 1 INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL. 393, 396
(2008); Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle C. Haynes, Subjectivity in the Appraisal Pro-
cess: A Facilitator of Gender Bias in Work Settings, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PsY-
CHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 127, 143 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske
eds., 2008).
214 VERONICA F. NIEVA & BARBARA A. GUTEK, WOMEN AND WORK: A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE (1988); Henry L. Tosi & Steven W. Einbender, The Effects of the Type
and Amount of Information in Sex Discrimination Research: A Meta-Analysis, 28 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 712, 721 (1985); SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION
(1991).
215 Norton et al., supra note 23, at 8172 16 Id. at 821.
217 See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'r ASK: NEGOTIA-
TION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE, at ix (2003) [hereinafter WOMEN DON'r ASK] (arguing
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claim that the wage gap between men and women stems not from discrimi-
nation, but from the fact that men negotiate their salaries whereas women
don't.21 But a deeper look at the "women don't ask" literature reveals a
study that finds that when women do negotiate their starting salaries, they
are seen as less likable and they are less likely to be hired.2 19 I suggest that
the reason women do not ask is that they correctly sense that they will be
penalized if they do. It's the Tightrope paradigm; whereas a man who negoti-
ates hard may be seen as "knowing his own worth," a woman who does the
same thing may well be seen as pushy and unlikable.
Once again, this bias can be controlled by a redesign of business sys-
tems. For example, one study found that if both men and women are told that
they are expected to negotiate, then the gender difference in negotiation all
but disappears.22 0 Why? Once people are told that the expectation is that they
will negotiate, women who negotiate are not seen as pushy and inappropri-
ate. They are good girls, just following the rules.
In conclusion, law reviews' excessive focus on the IAT has derailed the
debate over the use of social science to document gender and race bias. The
NSF study reintroduces a distinction between the IAT and the decades of
social psychology that preceded it. In this Article, and in other work,221 I
have sought to provide an introduction to that larger literature, which is de-
cades old and uses a range of methodologies.222 Many of its findings are
"dowdy," "dusty," and long-documented; perfect for a legal system based
on precedent. Law professors would be well advised to stop conflating de-
that women are much less likely to negotiate than men); Allyce Bess, The Biggest Hurdle
for Women that Want a Raise? They Don't Ask for One, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct.
26, 2003 (discussing WOMEN DON'r ASK, supra); Alan B. Kreuger, Economic Scene:
Women Are Less Likely to Negotiate, and It Can Be Costly to Them, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21,
2003 (also discussing WOMEN DON'r ASK, supra); Tessa Mayes, Selfless Women Too
Backward in Coming Forward for Promotion, LONDON TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003 (finding
that women start negotiations less often and ask for less than men); Susan Schwartz,
Women Could Get More, Just by Asking, THE GAzETrE, Dec. 15, 2003, at D3 (discussing
Babcock's theories on women's unwillingness to negotiate); UC Irvine Graduate School
of Management, Ground-Breaking Study: Women's Negotiating Style Leads to Lower Pay
Offers than Men Receive, ASCRIBE NEWSWIRE, July 21, 2003 [hereinafter Women'sNego-
tiating Style] (discussing research by Lisa A. Barron on women's requested salaries).
218 See, e.g., Be a Man, THE EcoNoMIsT, June 28, 2003; Schwartz, supra note 217;
Bess, supra note 217; Kreuger, supra note 217; Women's Negotiating Style, supra note
217; Mayes, supra note 217; Denise Kersten, Women Need to Learn the Art of the Deal:
Pay Gap Linked to Negotiation Skills, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2003, at B07.
219 Hannah R. Bowles et al., Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gen-
der in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951, 960-62 (2005).
220 ANDREAS LEIBBRANDT & JOHN A. LIST, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RE-
SEARCH, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large Scale Natural
Field Experiment 10 (2012).
221 See, e.g., Williams, "Cluelessness"Defense, supra note 194, at 405-447; JOAN C.
WILLIAMS & CONSUELA A. PINTO, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON Wo-
MEN IN THE PROFESSION, FAIR MEASURE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE ATrORNEY EVALUATIONS
(2nd ed. 2008); Williams & Dempsey, supra note 1.
222 See generally Peter Suedfeld, Racism in the Brain; or Is It Racism on the Brain?,
15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 298 (2004) (providing a historical summary of measurement
techniques).
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cades-old literature on gender and racial bias with recent literature on im-
plicit bias and the IAT, and to delve into the research in social psychology in
a more serious way. This study is designed to help with the initial jump.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERSECTIONALITY DEBATE
The literature on intersectionality is more than a decade older than the
literature on implicit bias. The first major scholarly work on intersectionality
was Kimberl6 Crenshaw's groundbreaking 1989 Demarginalizing the Inter-
section of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics.23 The "tendency to treat
race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analy-
sis," Crenshaw wrote, leads black women to be "theoretically erased." 224
The key insight of intersectionality theory: disadvantage is not simply addi-
tive as complex identities lead to complex, and distinct, types of
discrimination." 5
Traditionally, critical race theory, of which the intersectionality debate
is an important strain, has focused on analysis of legal cases or on methods
drawn from the humanities. 226 Critical race scholars have often questioned
223 Crenshaw, supra note 16; see also Afda Hurtado, Relating to Privilege: Seduction
and Rejection in the Subordination of White Women and Women of Color, 14 SIGNS 833
(1989).224 Id. at 139.
225 The social psychological literature on complex social identities posits that some-
times such identities are additive while sometimes they are not. See, e.g., Galen V.
Bodenhausen & Destiny Peery, Social Categorization and Stereotyping In Vivo: The
VUCA Challenge, 3 Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 133, 136 (2009) (arguing
that perceptions of individuals are altered in an additive fashion based on number of
identity dimensions shared); Sonia Roccas & Marilynn B. Brewer, Social Identity Com-
plexity, 6 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. REV. 88, 99-104 (2002) (exploring the complex-
ity of social identity).
226 See generally Hurtado, supra note 223 (discussing the need for intersectional
analysis); Pamela Trotman Reid & Lillian Comas-Diaz, Gender and Ethnicity: Perspec-
tives on Dual Status, 22 SEx ROLES 397 (1990) (also discussing the need for intersec-
tional analysis); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 357 (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995)
(discussing the need for intersectional analysis specifically with respect to domestic vio-
lence); Laura E. G6mez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between
Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, inTHE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND
SOCIETY 453 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (historical analysis highlighting the need for inter-
sectional analysis); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection
of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365 (1991) (discussing legal approaches to employ-
ment policies prohibiting comrows); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black
Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 701 (2001) (discussing identity performance as a
basis for discrimination); Cho, supra note 116 (discussing the relationship between ste-
reotypes of Asian American women and sexual harassment); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punish-
ing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991) (discussing criminal penalties meted out against drug-
addicted mothers); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)
(using humanistic methods to approach race and the law).
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whether one can use the master's tools to dismantle the master's house, criti-
cizing empirical methods as weighted against the voices of people of
color.227 More recently, several critical race scholars have begun to embrace
empiricism, 228 a movement catalyzed by the annual Critical Race Theory and
Empirical Methods workshop founded by law professor Osagie Obasogie
and anchored by a special issue of the UC Irvine Law Review.229
The NSF study begins from social science23 0 and ends by confirming
that the "double jeopardy" hypothesis is too simple. Of course, studies, in-
cluding the NSF, reveal that some women do suffer "double jeopardy"
along one axis of gender bias, Prove-It-Again! For example, because black
women trigger two sets of negative competence assumptions, their mistakes
tend to have even more negative consequences when compared to black men
than mistakes by white women when compared to white men.231 However,
the double jeopardy hypothesis oversimplifies the complex dynamics of race
and gender. For example, one study has found that black women in fact
have somewhat more room to display dominant behaviors than white women
do,232 a finding that is confirmed by the NSF study. Note that black women's
experience may differ not only from white women's, but also from that of
other women of color.
As has been discussed, another important message of the NSF study is
that gender bias is commonplace, perhaps nigh universal, among profes-
sional women of color. The finding that all of the women interviewed re-
ported gender bias is important because several recent studies have
documented both that an increasing proportion of gender bias litigation is
brought by women of color233 and that women of color virtually never win
discrimination suits. 234 While courts have often shown themselves unwilling
to create a new protected category specifically for women of color,235 the
NSF study suggests an alternative approach. Women affected by one of the
four patterns of discrimination can simply allege gender bias. The fact that
gender bias differs somewhat for women of color does not mean that it is not
227 See, e.g., Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Per-
spective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67, 74 (2008).228 See G6mez, supra note 226; Leslie McCall, Sources of Racial Wage Inequality in
Metropolitan Labor Markets: Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences, 66 AM. Soc. REV.
520, 521 (2001).
229 Symposium on Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, U. CAL. IRVINE L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014).
230 For another approach to intersectionality that begins from social science, see
Ange-Marie Hancock, Intersectionality as a Normative and Empirical Paradigm, 3 POL.
& GENDER 248, 248-49 (2007).
231 See Rosette & Livingston, supra note 61, at 1165.
232 Livingston, Rosette & Washington, supra note 76, at 357.233 See infra note 260 and accompanying text.234 See infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text; see also David Benjamin Oppen-
heimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination
and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Mi-
norities, 37 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 511, 549 (2003).
235 See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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gender bias. After all, all gender bias is racialized, including gender bias
perpetrated against white women. Surely the law does not protect against
gender bias as experienced by white women but not against gender bias as
experienced by women of color.
A. Intersectional Plaintiffs' Fate in Courts
Crenshaw first pointed out that intersectional plaintiffs tend to have less
success in court in Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Gender,
where she discussed the case of DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly
Division.236 The black women plaintiffs in that case alleged that General Mo-
tors' seniority system discriminated against them.23 7 The court refused to al-
low them to sue as black women on the grounds that that would "create a
new 'super-remedy' "238 that was not within the intent of the statute. The
court analyzed the plaintiffs' race and sex discrimination claims separately
and found that the plaintiffs lost the race claim because the company hired
black men, and the sex discrimination claim because the company hired
white women. 239 The erasure of experiences as women of color was very
explicit.240
A black woman plaintiff was more successful in a subsequent case,
Jefferies v. Harrison County Community Action Association,24 1 when a court
used the sex-plus theory first introduced in Phillips v. Martin Marietta.242
The sex-plus theory allows women to sue based on sex plus another charac-
teristic, such as in Martin Marietta in which the "plus" characteristic was
having school-age children. 243 The Jefferies court reversed a grant of sum-
mary judgment for the employer, and affirmed that "discrimination against
black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black
men or white women." 244
Despite this success, study after study has found sharply lower rates of
success in employment discrimination cases brought by women of color than
those brought by plaintiffs in general. 24 5 For example, a 2003 study by law
236 Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 141-42 (discussing Degraffenreid v. General Motors
Corp., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)).2 3 7 Degraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
238 Id
2 3 9 Id. at 144-45.
240 See id. at 145 ("The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that
the goal of the statute was to create a new classification of 'black women' who would
have greater standing than, for example, a black male.").
241 Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033-35 (5th Cir.
1980).
242 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969).
243 Id. at 3-4; see Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex
Bias, 50 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1463-81 (2009).2 4 4 Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
245 In addition to the studies discussed below, see Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!,
1989 Wis. L. REv. 539 (1989) (discussing the case of an arts and crafts instructor who
was fired for "negative role modeling" after she became pregnant out of wedlock); Cald-
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professor David Oppenheimer examined a sample of 334 employment dis-
crimination and wrongful discharge cases decided by California courts be-
tween 1998 and 1999, finding that black women had low win rates in
discrimination cases.2 46 Similarly, a small 2009 study by law professor
Minna Kotkin of twenty-six employment discrimination summary judgments
in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York in the one-year period
beginning in June of 2006 found that intersectional plaintiffs virtually al-
ways lost.2 47 Employers won summary judgments 96% of the time, higher
than the 73% success rate that is commonly reported in employment dis-
crimination cases in general. 248 Likewise, a 2012 study by law professor
Emma Reece Denny examined all 162 of the employment discrimination
cases appealed to the Eighth Circuit between 2008 and 2010.249 It found that
intersectional plaintiffs won summary judgments in 7.5% of the cases, as
compared to a 30.3% plaintiff win rate in Eighth Circuit employment dis-
crimination cases in general.25 0 Like the New York study, the finding was
that employees virtually always lose intersectional cases; employers won in
92.5% of cases. 251 Denny also found that cases involving intersectional
plaintiffs are dramatically less likely to be published than cases by non-inter-
sectional plaintiffs (66.1% compared to 28.3 %).252 In other words, the loss
rate of intersectional plaintiffs is probably even higher than what has been
reported in Denny's and other studies.
The most elegant study on the lower success rates of women of color
who bring employment discrimination suits is by Best, Krieger, Edelman,
and Eliason, among whom are both lawyers and sociologists. 25 3 They drew
upon a 2% random sample of district and circuit court opinions in federal
discrimination cases between 1965 and 1999, yielding 328 circuit court
opinions and 686 district court opinions. 25 4 Once again, they found strong
well, supra note 226 (providing an overview of cases where black plaintiffs challenged
workplace restrictions on particular hairstyles); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 226 (using
hypothetical employment discrimination cases to discuss legal theories based on identity
performance discrimination); Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work,
and Title VII, 14 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 21 (1991) (using anecdotes to illustrate the differ-
ences between interactive and double discrimination); Wei, supra note 114 (using two
cases to illustrate how Title VII can be used to convince judges that elements of an
individual's identity cannot be separated when analyzing alleged employment
discrimination).
246 Oppenheimer, supra note 234, at 549.
247 Kotkin, supra note 243, at 1458; see also Emma Reece Denny, Mo' Claims Mo'
Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion, 30 LAW & INEQUALITY 339, 354 (2012).
248 Kotkin, supra note 243, at 1440.
249 Denny, supra note 247, at 354.
250 Id. at 355.
25 Id.
252 Id. at 356.
253 Rachel Kahn Best, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lauren B. Edelman & Scott R.
Eliason, Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO
Litigation, 45 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 991 (2011).
254 Id. at 999.
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support for intersectionality theory: "[P]laintiffs making intersectional
claims are less than half as likely to win" as compared with nonintersec-
tional plaintiffs (15% compared to 3 1%);255 and they are only half as likely
to obtain at least a partial victory and one-third as likely to win com-
pletely.256 Holding other factors equal, intersectional plaintiffs will win only
13% of the time; non-intersectional plaintiffs win 28% of the time.257 While
white women are most likely to have a full victory (38%), nonwhite women
are the least likely (11%), with nonwhite men much closer to nonwhite wo-
men than to white women (15%).258 The study suggested that the claims of
intersectional plaintiffs are not intrinsically weaker than those of discrimina-
tion plaintiffs in general.2 59 Best and her co-authors also found that intersec-
tional claims represent an increasing proportion of discrimination claims. In
the 1970s and 1980s, they represented only about 10% of all discrimination
claims, a number that climbed to more than a quarter once they began rising
around 1990.260
One strategy for improving the success rate for women of color is to
exhort courts to allow intersectional claims. 261 This approach is attractive in
many ways. First, a key tenet of the intersectionality debate is that women of
color should not have to carve their identities up by gender and race. As the
Ninth Circuit determined in a 1994 case, "[Tihe attempt to bisect a person's
identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the
particular nature of their experience."262 This distortion should not occur.
Furthermore, the fact that women of color are women does not mean that
they should join with (white) feminists based on their commonalities, and
forced to leave their race behind.263 For one thing, women of color experi-
ence discrimination based on race (i.e. the kind of discrimination they share
with men of color) in addition to discrimination based on gender (i.e. the
kind of discrimination they share with white women).
In addition, the NSF study shows, even the gender discrimination faced
by women of color is subtly, or not so subtly, different from that experienced
by white women.2 64 Yet the insistence that intersectional plaintiffs should not
255 Id. at 1009.
2 56 Id. at 1011.
257 Id.
2 5 8 Id. at 1012.
2 5 9 Id. at 1012 n.27.
2 60 Id. at 1008.
261 See Denny, supra note 247, at 349-50.
262 Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Denny,
supra note 247, at 339 ("'The identity cannot be compartmentalized; it cannot be split in
halves or thirds, nor have any clearly defined set of boundaries. I do not have several
identities, I only have one, made of all the elements that have shaped its unique propor-
tions.'" (quoting Amin Maalouf, Les Identiti Meurtrid [Deadly Identities], 4 Al Jadid
(1998)).
263 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 86-90 (2005).
264 Many stereotypes often operate at the subgroup level. Indeed, social psychologists
have found that "perceivers sometimes evaluate others on the basis of one dominant
categorization and ignore or even inhibit alternative categorizations, sometimes evaluate
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have to carve up their identities often disserves them in court. As previously
discussed, some courts have, rightly or wrongly, been reluctant to create a
"new super-remedy" for fear of endlessly proliferating new protected cate-
gories.265 Moreover, when a plaintiff alleges discrimination based on mem-
bership in two protected categories, this manner of pleading compounds the
already-difficult problem of finding a suitable comparator. A growing litera-
ture documents that courts increasingly dismiss plaintiffs' employment suits
by insisting on comparator evidence and that comparators be the near twin
of the plaintiff.2 66 The comparator problem is even worse in the case of inter-
sectional plaintiffs. Said one court, "The more specific the composite class
in which the plaintiff claims membership, the more onerous the ultimate
burden" of proving discrimination.2 67 Problems arise when plaintiffs try to
show that the employer discriminated based on the individual's particular
combination of traits. As one court explained in a case brought by an Asian
American woman, "Asian women are subject to stereotypes and assump-
tions shared neither by Asian men nor by white women." 268 By this analysis,
evidence of discrimination against Asian men or white women would not
help in proving the plaintiffs claim.26 9
Alleging discrimination based on only one protected characteristic
might help some plaintiffs overcome these barriers. The NSF study high-
lights that the gender bias experienced by women of color is gender bias,
pure and simple. The fact that the gender bias is racialized does not disprove
that it is gender bias. After all, gender bias against white women is racial-
ized, too, it is just racialized by whiteness. Surely Title VII does not mean
that white women can sue for sex discrimination while women of color can-
not. Nor does it allow only men, not women, of color to sue for race discrim-
ination. Carving up the identities of women of color is not ideal, but in court
it may be strategically advisable. Further studies of how the experience of
others on the basis of an additive combination of the different category memberships, and
sometimes create a compound category with emergent properties that are not predicted
from contributing categories considered separately." Roccas & Brewer, supra note 225,
at 88 ("Social identity complexity reflects the degree of overlap perceived to exist be-
tween groups of which a person is simultaneously a member . . . . When a person ac-
knowledges, and accepts, that memberships in multiple ingroups are not fully convergent
or overlapping, the associated identity structure is both more inclusive and more
complex.").
265 Degraffenreid v. General Motors Corp., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976).2 6 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 192, at 754-55; see also Lewis v. Metro. Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., 343 Fed. Appx. 450, 454 (1lth Cir. 2009) (holding that, to succeed
in a discrimination claim, a plaintiff fired for misconduct must show that the employer
retained another employee who engaged in "'nearly identical"' conduct) (quoting Burke-
Fowler v. Orange County, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006)); Davin v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 678 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiff fired for misconduct
must show that an employee outside the protected class was retained despite "nearly
identical" conduct).26 7 Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003).
268 Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
269 Goldberg, supra note 192, at 765-66.
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gender discrimination differs by race, and how the experience of race dis-
crimination differs by gender, would be most helpful.270
Lawyers litigating discrimination cases on behalf of women of color
ought to allege, and courts ought to allow, women plaintiffs of color to re-
cover both for their experiences of gender bias and for their experiences of
racial bias. 271 Title VII did not forbid adverse employment actions based on
sex and race against everyone else but declare open season on women of
color.
B. How Does the Experience of Gender Bias Differ by Race?
The NSF study confirmed the basic hypothesis of intersectionality: be-
ing a woman of color is different from being a white woman. Not only do
women of color experience racial bias white women do not face, their expe-
rience of gender bias differs from that of white women. The NSF study
methodology offers a fuller understanding of how women experience gender
bias, complementing experimental studies that often yield information
chiefly about white women.
The NSF study also suggests that the types of bias women encounter
differ according to their race. The biggest gap between white women and
women of color concerned Tug of War bias, reported by 59% of women of
color but only 50% of white women. The next biggest gap concerned the
Tightrope, reported by 77% of women of color and 68% of white women.
The Maternal Wall came third, reported by 63% of mothers of color and
56% of white mothers. Prove-It-Again! bias showed the smallest gap: 70%
of women of color reported it, as compared with 64% of white women. One
caveat: as previously mentioned, most of the interviewees were scientists,
and as such, it is impossible to tell to what extent these differences stem
from race and to what extent they stem from their particular professional
environment.
Another important finding is that women of color within racial catego-
rizations have dramatically different experiences of discrimination than
other women within the same category. For example, to the extent that Asian
women trigger the model minority stereotype, they may well have fewer
Prove-It-Again! problems when compared not only to Latinas and blacks,
but also to white women. However, to the extent that they trigger the China
Doll stereotype, their experience may be closer to that of other women of
color than to white women. In other words, Asian women's experiences at
work may depend on whether co-workers see them as Asians or as wo-
270 When black women allege Prove-It-Again! bias, they are alleging a kind of bias
they share both with black men and with white women. In a comparator context, there-
fore, the proper comparator groups are white men and a combined group of all women
and black men.
271 In particular, black women and Latinas should be allowed to allege Prove-It-
Again! bias as to both race and gender bias.
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men.272 Which aspect of complex identities is triggered may well be context-
dependent.
My initial hypothesis regarding the study was that black women and
Latinas would experience more Prove-It-Again! bias than white women,
given that they trigger two sets of negative competence assumptions (that
blacks are lower in status than whites and that women are lower in status
than men).27 3 However, there was actually a smaller difference between the
percentages of women of color who experience Prove-It-Again! bias as com-
pared with white women than any other type of bias. Nevertheless, the NSF
study confirmed other studies reporting that Prove-It-Again! bias, once trig-
gered, is stronger for black women who make mistakes than for white wo-
men who do the same.274 To that extent, the double jeopardy hypothesis
seems partly true. It rings true in another way as well: Latinas and Asian
Americans appear to have more "too feminine" problems than white or
black women. As has been noted, studies suggest that Asians of both sexes
are seen as less masculine-i.e. more feminine-than whites. 275 The NSF
study also suggests that Latinas have more "too feminine" problems than
whites, raising the question of whether Latinos, like Asian Americans, are,
as a group, seen as more feminine than whites.
Moreover, the "too feminine" problems experienced by all groups of
women of color differed in important ways from the challenges faced by
white women. White women reported being expected to take notes, bake
cupcakes, answer the phone, mother students, do emotional work, and re-
main as "service partners" in law firms-but not one of the professional
white women interviewed had been asked to do the work of an administra-
tive assistant or mistaken for a janitor. In broad brush, it appears that women
of color encounter gender pressures not only to assume under-valued femi-
nine roles, but also to assume lower-status support roles-something not
reported in the interviews with white women. In addition, women of color
often are under even more pressure than white women to do one particular
type of office housework: service on diversity and women's initiatives.
Though the double jeopardy hypothesis does cover some aspects of the
experience of women of color, it does not fully capture the complexities at
the intersection of race and gender. Most notably, black women are less
likely than white women to be penalized for having a direct, no-nonsense,
don't-suffer-fools-lightly style.27 6 That comes at a cost, of course; black wo-
men are not eligible for the cherished status reserved solely for white wo-
men. And God forbid they use an authoritative style to advocate for
272 See Shih et al., supra note 120, at 81-82 (assessments of Asian-American women
change, depending on whether racial or gender identity is made salient).
273 See Biemat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 26, at 552, 554.
274 See Rosette & Livingston, supra note 61, at 1165.
275 Adam D. Galinsky et al., Gendered Races: Implications for Interracial Marriage,
Leadership Selection, and Athletic Participation, 24 PSYCHOL. Sci. 498, 501 (2013).
276 Livingston, Rosette & Washington, supra note 76, at 354.
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themselves; it is accepted only when they are furthering the goals of the
company or institution. 27 7 Moreover, as shown by the study, black women do
encounter "too masculine" problems, particularly around self-promotion,
but they appear to encounter fewer such problems than do the other three
groups of women. The same is not true of Asian Americans and Latinas,
who appear to face "too masculine" problems much like those of white wo-
men, except that they are sanctioned not only by being called "bitches," but
also by racialized epithets such as "dragon lady" and "fiery Latina."
Perhaps the least variation emerged around the Maternal Wall. Women
of all groups reported bias triggered by motherhood. Asian women may face
fewer negative competence and commitment assumptions based on mother-
hood but then run smack into backlash against hard-driving mothers. Differ-
ent groups of women of color also face quite different expectations around
motherhood by other members of their own racial groups, with blacks and
Asians more likely than whites to face the expectation that they will con-
tinue their careers. Latinas, by contrast, are more likely than whites to face
the expectation that they will stay home full time.
Women of color faced every type of Tug of War bias known to woman,
but again the experience differs somewhat by racial group. In general, wo-
men of color were more likely than whites to be understanding and forgiving
of older women who judged them for not doing womanhood "right." The
angry tone often heard from white women was, for women of color, typi-
cally replaced by understanding and empathy. Asians were less likely than
any other group of women to report Tug of War problems. Conflict between
administrative personnel and professionals, though it was reported by white
women, may well be even more of a problem for Latinas. Finally, a dis-
turbing finding is that Tugs of War between black and white women often
take on a racial dimension, ranging from white women policing black wo-
men into the conventions of femininity to outright racism.
CONCLUSION
This Article reports on an initial study,2 78 but it suggests that the NSF
study's marriage of experimental social psychology with narrative sociology
can deepen our understanding of gender bias. Too often, reliance on studies
that compare "men" and "women" have led scholars to confuse "gender"
with "the way white women experience gender." The NSF study, along with
the types of lab studies now being performed by Robert Livingston,279 Kath-
277 See Livingston, supra note 81.
27 The Center for WorkLife Law has formed an Advisory Committee, chaired by
Judge Bernice Donald of the 6th Circuit, to help launch a study titled "Double Jeopardy?:
How Gender Bias Differs by Race for Women in the Law."
279 Rosette & Livingston, supra note 61; Livingston, Rosette & Washington, supra
note 76; Livingston, Washington & Rosette, supra note 81.
2014] 241
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
erine Phillips, 28 0 and Jennifer L. Eberhardt 281 hold the promise of a much
more complete and nuanced understanding of the operation of gender in
American society. The NSF study opens up the intriguing possibility of ex-
ploring the complex ways in which the experiences of different groups of
women emerge, converge, and diverge.
The NSF study also has two important messages for the law. The first is
that women of color share some experiences of bias with men of color ("ra-
cial bias") and other experiences with white women ("gender bias"). Instead
of insisting that women of color find "near twins," courts should allow wo-
men of color plaintiffs to plead and prove gender discrimination when they
are describing experiences they share with white women, race discrimination
when they are describing experiences they share with men of color, and both
race and gender discrimination when women of color describe experiences
(as will often be the case with Latinas and black women on the Prove-It-
Again! axis of gender bias) they share both with white women and with men
of color.
The NSF study's second major implication is that lawyers need to un-
derstand the difference between research based on the IAT and the much
larger universe of experimental social psychology. The IAT is only about ten
years old, whereas experimental social psychology is much older, giving the
latter obvious advantages considering the law's reliance on precedent and its
rules concerning admission of expert testimony. The NSF study seeks to
help educate lawyers about the larger experimental literature, and also to
provide a methodology that helps bridge the gap between lab studies and the
workplace, and provides strong evidence that patterns described time and
again in experiments do, in fact, describe the experience of many women at
work.
280 See Richardson et al., supra note 78.
281 Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy, supra note 6; Eberhardt et al., Seeing
Black, supra note 6; Banks, Eberhardt & Ross, supra note 13.
242 [Vol. 37
